The potential for the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Vessel Traffic Service (REEFVTS) to support coastal pilotage and enhance safety is under-utilised.
The operator had limited controls in place to manage the fatigue risk associated with early starts.
The design of the burner nozzle allowed the nozzle swirl plate and needle valve to be misaligned when being assembled which in turn led to the needle valve stem being damaged during assembly. Furthermore, the maintenance manuals and supporting documentation supplied by Garioni Naval, the thermal oil heater manufacturer, did not provide sufficient guidance to ensure safe and appropriate maintenance of the thermal oil heater burner assembly.
Brisbane port authorities had not put in place sufficient procedures, checklists and/or supporting documents to ensure VTS staff were adequately prepared, trained and practiced to handle a predictable incident such as this.
GWA policies, procedures and training had little if any guidance for employees quantifying the duration, consequential dangers and responses to severe weather events.
The warning systems in place to alert GWA staff as to the severity of a flood event at the Edith River Rail Bridge were ineffective.
While the Flinders Ports passage plan for Port Lincoln contained information relating to general navigation in the port, such as depths and navigation/channel marks, it did not contain actual passage specific information, such as courses and speeds to be followed. If the plan had contained course and speed information, the ship’s crew would have been better prepared for the pilotage.
Newlead Bulkers had not implemented any procedures or guidance to inform the crew that extra vigilance was required when operating the main engine in engine room control mode because there was no automatic interlock to prevent ‘wrong way’ operation of the engine and no audible alarm to indicate when it was running the ‘wrong way’.
Flinders Ports had not undertaken a risk assessment, or developed contingency plans for this specific shiphandling manoeuvre in Port Lincoln. Consequently, the pilot had no guidance regarding what actions to take if the berthing manoeuvre did not progress as he planned.
The participation of the two tug masters in the pilotage process was not actively encouraged in Port Lincoln. Consequently, it was not until after the collision that one of the tug masters advised the pilot that the ship's main engine was still running ahead.
When the main engine was operated in engine room control mode, there was no automatic interlock to prevent ‘wrong way’ operation of the engine and no audible alarm to indicate when it was running the ‘wrong way’. As a result, the only system protections to warn the crew of ‘wrong way’ running of the engine were the bridge and engine control room console mounted flashing light indicators.
Paint application to the main rotor gearbox, gear carrier did not effectively protect the part from corrosion resulting from gearbox water ingress.
Differences in the traffic alert phraseology between the Manual of Air Traffic Services and Aeronautical Information Publication increased the risk of non-standard advice being provided by the controller to the pilot of the G-IV during the compromised separation recovery.
There has not been a comprehensive safety management system implemented in the Port of Gladstone with the aim of identifying, evaluating and controlling pilotage related risk.
The shipyard commissioning processes did not identify that the ship’s rudder angle indicator transmitter and tiller link-arm were not installed correctly.
There has not been a comprehensive risk based approach to contingency planning for deep draught bulk carrier operations in Gladstone.
The quality assurance processes used in the acceptance of the Goddards crossing loop project were not sufficiently robust to mitigate the risk of track construction inadequacies.
The aircraft's centre of gravity varied significantly with hopper weight and could exceed both the forward and aft limits at different times during a flight.
