Specialised Bulk Rail’s Safety Management System procedures did not provide the supervising drivers with sufficient direction as to the nature of their supervisory role.
SBR to provide guidance in the form of a briefing to the supervising driver of the level of competency of the trainee under their supervision at the commencement of the shift.
SBR conducted an internal investigation on this incident and raised a formal OFI [Opportunity for improvement] to address this issue, which has since been closed. OFI-SBR-2011-005 - The Investigation of the SPAD at Dry Creek on 11th October 2011 which resulted in the collision between SBR 1901S and GWA 5132S recommended that SBR Main Line Drivers in charge of a trainee should be formally briefed by Train Crew Supervisor/Rail Operations Manager on the level of competency of the trainee, when commencing on roster with a trainee/driver under supervision. Drivers PD [position description] has been amended as follows The driver who's name is written on the topmost line of the roster out of the two drivers is considered to be the "driver-in-charge" of the train and will be responsible for all decisions made about the train.
The Driver will be responsible to make themselves aware of the level of Competence of any Second person rostered on with them. The second person, must work under the instruction of the driver in charge, who will make the call on train running activities.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is satisfied that Specialised Bulk Rail Pty Ltd has initiated action to address the safety issue.
