When the crossing was last surveyed under the ALCAM program, the measurement of the road angle resulted in an overestimation of the acute road-to-rail interface angle. The implication of overestimating the acute interface angle is that sighting deficiencies may be underestimated or not identified.
There existed an inconsistency between the track speed used for crossing assessment and permitted train speeds. The ALCAM process used a train speed equal to the track line speed, whereas V/Line systems for evaluating driver behaviour permitted an exceedence of line speed by up to 10 km/h for short distances.
The give-way protection installed at the crossing was inconsistent with the available sighting distances on both approaches to the crossing. Sighting was affected by vegetation, embankments formed by a rail cutting and the curved road approaches.
For eastbound road users approaching the B. McCann Road level crossing along the left-side of the road, the view to the track was restricted due to the acute road-to-rail interface. This was particularly problematic for trucks with the viewing opportunity to the left limited to the cab’s passenger-side window.
V/Line did not adequately address level crossing sighting issues at B. McCann Road acknowledged by the rail operator in 2009.
The road incline on the west-side approach to the crossing increased the time required for loaded trucks to transit the crossing.
The level crossing safety coordination processes did not involve a key stakeholder, the gypsum mine owner, who had knowledge of the changing traffic profile. The mine owner was aware of the increasing numbers of heavy vehicles using B. McCann Road since 2010 and the associated changing risk profile of the level crossing.
Gannawarra Shire did not adequately address level crossing sighting issues at B. McCann Road acknowledged by the Shire in 2009.
The Department of Defence’s risk assessment and review processes for the implementation of the Comsoft Aeronautical Data Access System and removal of the flight data position did not effectively identify or manage the risks associated with the resulting increased workload in the Darwin Approach environment, in particular with regard to the Planner position.
The Department of Defence had not provided Darwin-based controllers with regular practical refresher training in identifying and responding to compromised separation scenarios.
The Darwin Approach long-range display was a low resolution screen that presented air traffic control system information with reduced clarity and resulted in it having diminished effectiveness as a situation awareness tool.
The Australian Defence Air Traffic System (ADATS) did not automatically process all system messages generated by The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System. In cases where transponder code changes were not automatically processed, the risk controls in place were not able to effectively ensure that the changes were identified and manually processed.
Darwin Approach controllers were routinely exposed to green (limited data block) radar returns that were generally inconsequential in that Approach control environment, leading to a high level of expectancy that such tracks were not relevant for aircraft separation purposes. Refresher training did not emphasise the importance of scanning the green radar returns.
The proximity of the landing gear selector valve electrical wiring loom to the external hydraulic power connectors within the left engine nacelle on Fairchild SA227-AT Metro aircraft resulted in the ‘down selection’ wire being damaged during routine maintenance activities.
Bosphorus’ safety management system did not detail any guidance or instructions relating to watch handover or changing the helmsman during high risk areas of a pilotage.
Brisbane Marine Pilots’ ‘Port of Brisbane Passage Plan’ did not detail any guidance or instructions relating to watch handover or changing the helmsman during high risk areas of a pilotage.
Bosphorus’ safety management system provided no guidance in relation to the allocation of function based roles and responsibilities to members of the bridge team during pilotage.
Sydney Trains validation processes were not effective in detecting errors in Special Train Notice (STN) 1004 prior to the Local Possession Authority (LPA) implementation.
There were non-compliances to the repeat back provision because it was viewed as onerous under certain Local Possession Authorities (LPAs). An opportunity exists to review rule non-conformance with the implementation of LPAs.
Transfield did not have adequate systems in place to ensure workers were not adversely affected by drugs or alcohol while conducting safety related work in a remote work environment.
