The automatic broadcast services did not have the capacity to recognise and actively disseminate special weather reports (SPECI) to pilots, thus not meeting the intent of the SPECI alerting function provided by controller-initiated flight information service.
For many non‑major airports in Australia, flight crews of arriving aircraft can access current weather information using an Automatic Weather Information Service via very high frequency radio, which has range limitations. Where this service is available, air traffic services will generally not alert pilots to significant deteriorations in current weather conditions at such airports, increasing the risk of pilots not being aware of the changes at an appropriate time to support their decision making.
Airservices Australia had not provided en route air traffic controllers with effective simulator-based refresher training in identifying and responding to compromised separation scenarios, at intervals appropriate to ensure that controllers maintained effective practical skills.
The utilisation of shift sharing practices for the Tops controllers resulted in them sustaining a higher workload over extended periods without a break, during a time of day known to reduce performance capability.
The relevant tasks in the trouble shooting manual did not specifically identify the pitot probe as a potential source of airspeed indication failure.
Fremantle Ports’ staff did not understand the significance of some wind and weather terminology used in the BoM forecast. Consequently, port procedures triggered by a BoM ‘gale’ or ‘severe weather’ warning such as preparing the tugs and calling the harbour master were not followed.
Fremantle Ports’ procedures for adverse weather were not adequate for weather that could reasonably be expected to occur. Some procedures could not be reasonably implemented and other were not monitored for compliance.
The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) marine forecast title of ‘strong wind warning’ understated the ‘damaging winds’ expected during the ‘severe thunderstorm’. The forecast did not use recognised marine weather terms for wind speed, such as ‘gale force’.
Fremantle Ports’ assessment of risks associated with a ship contacting the Fremantle Rail Bridge as a result of a breakaway, particularly from berths 11 and 12, was limited. Preventing a breakaway from berths where the wind was likely to be on a ship’s beam had not been considered. Similarly, the impediments to assisting a ship near Wongara Shoal after a breakaway had not been assessed.
Due to the curvature of the track, a wide gap existed between the platform and train at the Heyington Railway Station. There are several stations on the Melbourne metropolitan rail network where wide gaps exist between platforms and trains due to track curvature. These gaps pose a risk to passengers.
The existing standards stipulated minimum clearances between trains and platforms but did not consider the effect of the resulting gaps with respect to safe accessibility.
The train door open/close indicator on the driver’s control console was inadequate as a warning device once the traction interlock had deactivated.
As designed, the traction interlock automatically deactivated after a period of time. This allowed traction to be applied and the train to depart with the carriage doors open.
The large size and weight of the ship firefighting cache made it difficult for the duty Port Hedland volunteer firefighter to transport it to the wharf.
The limited professional firefighting capability in Port Hedland restricted the ability to launch an effective response to the fire on board Marigold.
Suitable atmospheric testing equipment was not available in Port Hedland to ensure safe entry to fire-affected spaces on board Marigold. Access to these areas was not controlled until 53 hours after the fire.
The emergency response plans for a ship fire in Port Hedland did not clearly define transfer of control procedures for successive incident controllers from different organisations or contain standard checklists for their use.
Port Hedland’s emergency response teams did not use the ship’s international shore fire connection. As a result, Marigold’s fire main was not pressurised with water from ashore.
Marigold’s shipboard procedures for crew induction, familiarisation, fire drills and safety training were not effectively implemented. As a result, the ship’s senior officers were not sufficiently familiar with the Halon system’s operation. They did not identify its partial failure and did not activate the override function
Marigold’s Halon gas fixed fire suppression system for the engine room was not fully operational. The multiple failures of the system at the time of the fire were not consistent with proper maintenance and testing.
