As designed, the traction interlock automatically deactivated after a period of time. This allowed traction to be applied and the train to depart with the carriage doors open.
Sydney Trains' fatigue management processes were ineffective in identifying the fatigue impairment experienced by the driver.
The ARTC response to the derailment on 11 September 2013 was ineffective and did not prevent a similar derailment at the same location on 30 October.
When the AK Car was operating in Manual mode, the methods used to identify the location of a defect, and assist track staff to locate the defect could be ineffective in certain scenarios. At the derailment location, there was a consistent offset of about 58 m between the recorded location of the wide-gauge defect and its actual location due to the presence of a ‘long kilometre’.
ARTC processes for managing the condition of the rail were ineffective despite repeated recording of rail head wear by the AK Car, and local knowledge of the worn rail. The rail was worn beyond the rail condemning limits specified within the network code of practice.
Track patrol processes were ineffective at detecting and remedying the wide gauge defect at the derailment location. Track patrols were overly reliant on the AK Car geometry recording vehicle to trigger maintenance action on this track geometry defect.
The ARTC Local Appendix Unit North – Volume 3 did not reflect current equipment installation arrangements for E Frame at Singleton.
The ARTC Network Control centre procedures did not address the unique operation of the Singleton E Frame equipment to ensure correct and consistent interpretation of the indications provided on the Phoenix display.
The practice of pathing a following train onto a line occupied by a preceding train, when an alternate route was available and not obstructed, presented an elevated level of risk.
The design of the NTCS in screening Adelaide metro broadcast communications prevented the driver of 2MP9 from gaining an appreciation of activities close to his area of operation, in particular the position of train 2MP1 along the Mile End main line.
The practice of pathing a following train onto the same line occupied by a preceding train, without pre-warning the driver regarding the train ahead, presented an elevated level of risk.
Vegetation and a low fence adjacent the Mile End crossing loop partially obscured the view that the crew of train 2MP9 had of the empty flat wagons at the rear of train 2MP1.
There were no formal systems in place to manage the accepted practice of Protection Officers leaving a work site to return a Track Warrant and Train Staff, prior to ceasing works, off-tracking and ensuring the line was clear. This practice led to the informal delegation of responsibility for ensuring the track was clear to others at the work site.
Key staff had not been trained in Rail Resource Management.
The lack of an appointed Officer in Charge of the incident site prior to the arrival of an Incident Rail Commander led to a fragmented response with no single employee having a recognised leadership role on site.
Drivers are desensitised to the wheel slip protection indicator light activations through its regular activation in response to momentary losses of adhesion. This, coupled with the inadequate warning provided by the TMS, may result in delayed reaction in response to activations that need driver intervention.
Reporting and communications were not carried out in accordance with Sydney Trains rules and procedures, so that key employees in the Rail Management Centre received delayed and/or partial information and allowed the train to continue in service.
The scheduled ultrasonic tests conducted in November 2013 on the 80 lb/yd rail between Northgate and Alice Springs had been ineffective in detecting and quantifying the significant defects present at 1036.541 km and 975.244 km locations.
Contrary to the requirements of procedure IN-PRC-020, GWA had not established a list of specific locations known to have an increased likelihood of failure, such that particular attention may be applied in those locations during inspections.
The practice of using a third party (the shunt planner) to facilitate communication between Network Control Officers and train drivers at the Melbourne Freight Terminal prevented an effective response to the emergency.
