Actions following derailment on 11 September 2013
Date issue released
Safety Issue Description

The ARTC response to the derailment on 11 September 2013 was ineffective and did not prevent a similar derailment at the same location on 30 October.

 

Issue number
RO-2013-026-SI-03
Transport Function
Rail: Infrastructure
Issue Owner
Australian Rail Track Corporation
Mode of Transport
Rail
Issue Status Justification

ARTC has taken safety actions to address the recommendation and safety issue (actions articulated in their 90 day response to recommendation).

Recommendation
Action number
RO-2013-026-SR-101
Organisation
Australian Rail Track Corporation
Action date
Action Status
Closed
Action description

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that ARTC takes safety action to enhance the effectiveness of its response to a derailment event to prevent a similar incident. 

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC)
Response Status
Response Text

Since the Newport derailment, ARTC has undertaken the following safety actions to address this safety issue:

  • A new position ‘Area Safety Advisor’ has been created and is located in Melbourne. This position will assist in the investigation of events in Melbourne and supplements other similar positions located in Adelaide and Newcastle.
  • Track management tasks and roles have been clarified. This includes more clearly defined responsibilities for the investigation of a derailment, the production of findings and management responsibilities for ensuring a derailment site is adequately repaired such that a repeat occurrence does not occur.
  • The introduction of a new system to track and review all incidents, improving the robustness of this process compared to that in place prior to the Newport derailment.
Proactive action
Action number
RO-2013-024-NSA XX
Organisation
Australian Rail Track Corporation
Action date
Action Status
Closed
Action description

ARTC provided a summary of its investigations into the 11 September and 30 October derailments indicating that findings were similar to those of the ATSB investigation.

However, the response did not include safety actions to address this safety issue.

ATSB Response

This safety issue pertains to the response by ARTC to the derailment on 11 September 2013. Post-derailment response includes both the initial investigative activity and the physical task of restoring track to a condition suitable for train operations. At the incident site, there was sufficient evidence immediately available to conclude that wide gauge was probably the primary cause of the derailment, but insufficient action was taken to rectify the track condition.

An appropriate safety action in response to this issue would be to examine the immediate investigative response to such incidents including the relationship and communication between the investigation team and those responsible for track restoration.