Track inspections were not consistently conducted at intervals of not more than 96 hours, in accordance with TasRail’s standard.
The ARTC had not instigated proactive action to manage the increased risk of a buckling event in accordance with their procedure ETM-06-06 (Managing Track Stability – Concrete Sleepered Track) at section 1.11.5 - ‘Special Locations’.
The ARTC’s systems and operational procedures provided limited additional information or guidance to assist network control staff in identifying and assessing a potential threat to the serviceability of the infrastructure resulting from significant weather events.
West Coast Wilderness Railway had not considered all of the risks associated with the operation of road-rail vehicles on the steep railway. As a result, documented operational procedures had not been developed and locations where vehicles could be safely on/off railed had not been defined.
Subsurface cracks appeared to be more common on wheels made with Class BM grade steel while operating under conditions of high speed cyclic loading, such as the SCT class locomotives
The wheel inspection processes prior to the failure of locomotive wheel L4 on SCT 008 were not effective in detecting surface damage or cracks
There were some minor non-conformances with the level crossing signage, in particular the ‘Stop’ sign assembly and positioning of the ‘Stop’ line on the western side of the Port Flinders Causeway Road level crossing.
The method used to ultrasonically test the tail pins in-situ was not reliable and resulted in small fatigue cracks going undetected.
RailCorp’s acceptance testing regime for tail pins did not identify that the tail pins stamped BU 06 04 were below standard and, hence, not suitable for service.
Specialised Bulk Rail’s Safety Management System procedures did not provide the supervising drivers with sufficient direction as to the nature of their supervisory role.
Worker competency procedures were deficient in providing a structured program for the development of route knowledge by the driver-in-training.
There were no formalised processes for a driver-in-training to record their experience in learning a route, or to document feedback related to their performance, which could be used by supervising drivers or assessors to assist in mentoring them.
SBR’s process for assessing its drivers’ roster for relay operations relied excessively on a score produced by a bio-mathematical model, and it had limited mechanisms in place to ensure drivers received an adequate quantity and quality of sleep during relay operations.
The rules and procedures governing the issue of a Controlled Signal Block did not require or provide for coordination between network control officers when the Controlled Signal Block affects more than one controller’s area of responsibility.
AK Car defect exceedence reports produced on 4 February 2011 did not include fields to record the date and time of follow-up field inspections and to show that these inspections and assessment of defects were completed in accordance with the ARTC Track and Civil Code of Practice.
The urgent and priority category defects detected by the AK Car on 4 February 2011 that were located within a 20 m track section were inadequately assessed and controlled in accordance with the ARTC Track and Civil Code of Practice.
The warning systems in place to alert GWA staff as to the severity of a flood event at the Edith River Rail Bridge were ineffective.
GWA policies, procedures and training had little if any guidance for employees quantifying the duration, consequential dangers and responses to severe weather events.
The quality assurance processes used in the acceptance of the Goddards crossing loop project were not sufficiently robust to mitigate the risk of track construction inadequacies.
The track workers were not provided with sufficient training (competency based or structured on-job training) in relation to the hazards and required protections for working under the authority in place at Newbridge on 5 May 2010.
