The ship’s pilot transfer procedures had not been revised to incorporate the most recent SOLAS requirements that manropes be secured at the rope end to a ring plate fixed to the deck.
The operator’s procedures did not require the flight crew to specifically check the active auto-flight mode during descent, and allowed the crew to select the Vertical Intercept Point altitude when cleared for the approach by air traffic control. This combination of procedures provided limited protection against descent through an instrument approach procedure’s segment minimum safe altitudes.
The ATSB investigation was unable to substantiate the reported observations of the train crew without having an independent source of data, such as forward facing video on train 5BM7.
The condensate drainage pots fitted to Nireas’ main air receivers were not fit for purpose as they were not capable of withstanding the internal pressures that were likely to accumulate in service.
Airservices Australia’s processes for reviewing and testing contingency plans did not effectively ensure that all documented contingency plan details were current and that its contingency plans could be successfully implemented at short notice.
Airservices Australia’s processes for selecting and preparing personnel for the Contingency Response Manager role did not ensure they could effectively perform that role.
Airservices Australia’s processes for managing a Temporary Restricted Area did not effectively ensure that all aircraft operating in the Temporary Restricted Area were known to air traffic services.
Airservices Australia did not have a defined process for recording the actual hours worked by its Air Traffic Control Line Managers and therefore could not accurately monitor the potential fatigue of those personnel when they were performing operational roles such as a Shift Manager or Contingency Response Manager.
The two JRA-776-1 fuselage lateral tie rods fitted to de Havilland DH82A Tiger Moth, registered VH-TSG, had significant, pre-existing fatigue cracks in the threaded sections. The parts’ service life was significantly less than the published retirement life for DH82A tie rods of 2,000 flight hours or 18 years).
The pilot was assigned to a task for which he most likely lacked experience on both the helicopter type and the nature of the flying.
The minimal clearance from obstructions, unfavourable surface conditions and a lack of appropriate wind indication at the helicopter landing site (HLS) increased the risk associated with operations to the HLS, particularly for a pilot unfamiliar with the site.
On the southern approach to the level crossing, the Stop Sign Ahead (W3-1) warning sign was not located in accordance with the requirements of AS 1742.7-2007 standard.
The boundary fence between the railway maintenance access track and Gallagher Road had been removed. As a result, over time and with regular use, the false perception that the maintenance access track was part of Gallagher Road was created and reinforced.
At the time of the occurrence there was limited advisory material available to owners, operators and maintenance personnel to alert them to the possibility of MS21042 nut failure and to assist with appropriately detailed inspections aimed at identifying affected items.
The nut manufacturer’s production control and quality control processes failed to prevent the release of one or more lots of MS21042L-4 nuts that remained in a partially-embrittled state after cadmium electroplating.
Queensland Rail’s risk management procedures did not sufficiently mitigate risk to the safe operation of trains in circumstances when local environmental conditions result in contaminated rail running surfaces and reduced wheel/rail adhesion.
The Queensland Rail driver’s manual did not explain the effects of low adhesion at the wheel/rail interface, how low adhesion is a precursor to prolonged wheel slide events and why these elements reduce the likelihood of achieving expected braking rates.
The Queensland Rail internal emergency debrief following the Cleveland station collision identified issues related to working with external agencies but did not address critical communication shortfalls within train control and between train control and the staff located at the Cleveland station accident site.
Queensland Rail’s strategic risk monitoring and analysis processes were ineffective in precipitating appropriate safety action to the findings and recommendations of their investigations into the Beerwah SPADs in 2009 which identified wheel/rail adhesion issues.
Emergency management simulation exercises to test the preparedness of network control staff, train crew, and station customer service staff to respond cooperatively to rail safety emergencies had not been undertaken in accordance with the Queensland Rail Emergency Management Plan.
