The operator’s system used to identify passengers with reduced mobility and/or required additional safety briefing information relied on passengers self-reporting a problem.
Due to multiple factors, the design of the rear left sliding door (emergency exit) on the EC120B helicopter was not simple and obvious to use unless the occupant was provided with specific instructions about how to operate the exit. In particular:
There was no requirement for operators of passenger transport flights in aircraft with six or less seats to provide passengers with a verbal briefing, or written briefing material, on the method for operating the emergency exits.
Although the operator had specified multiple methods of cross-checking fuel quantity gauge indications for its C441 fleet, there were limitations in the design, definition and/or application of these methods. These included:
There was an unapproved practice occurring during Track Work Authority of asking the Outer Handsignaller to remove Railway Track Signals from the track as a train was closely approaching in order to let it run free, which placed the Outer Handsignaller at risk of being struck by the train.
Regulatory safety oversight of Iron Chieftain, which comprised flag State audits, surveys and inspections had not identified safety deficiencies with respect to the ship’s fire safety, risk management, emergency preparedness and emergency response.
The capability of Fire and Rescue New South Wales to effectively respond to a shipboard fire in Port Kembla, was limited by:
Iron Chieftain's Emergency Contingency Plan did not include a response plan to fire in the high fire risk self-unloading system spaces. Consequently, there was no clear plan or practiced sequence of actions that could aid emergency preparedness.
The cargo handling spaces of specialised self-unloading bulk carriers continue to present a very high fire risk due to the inadequacy of standards or regulations for self-unloading systems, including for conveyor belts, and dedicated fire detection/fixed fire-extinguishing systems. This has been a factor in at least three major fires over a 25-year period, including Iron Chieftain’s constructive total loss.
Iron Chieftain's operators had formally identified the fire risk in the ship’s cargo self-unloading system spaces, particularly the C-Loop, as being unacceptably high 5 years before the fire due to the absence of fire detection or fixed fire extinguishing system. However, at the time of the fire, the prevention and recovery risk mitigation measures had not reduced the risk to an acceptable level.
The operator did not place appropriate emphasis on ensuring the continuing airworthiness of the landing gear of its GA8 fleet, although being aware of:
Prior to the signal passed at danger (SPAD) occurrence in January 2018, Queensland Rail did not routinely and systematically analyse recorded data to determine driver compliance with key operational rules that had been designed to minimise the risk of SPADs.
After mandating the use of risk triggered commentary driving (in 2011) to mitigate the risk of signals passed at danger, Queensland Rail Citytrain did not provide the necessary support to its trainers, assessors and drivers to effectively maximise the potential benefits of the technique and minimise the potential limitations or risks associated with the technique.
The automatic warning system (AWS) provided the same audible alarm and visual indication to a driver on the approach to all restricted signals (that is, double yellow, yellow, flashing yellow and red aspects). The potential for habituation, and the absence of a higher priority alert when approaching a signal displaying a red aspect, reduced the effectiveness of the AWS to prevent signals passed at danger (SPADs). This placed substantial reliance on procedural or administrative controls to prevent SPADs, which are fundamentally limited in their effectiveness.
Queensland Rail’s management oversight of the Citytrain driver maintenance of competency (MOC) process did not include planned assurance activities or regular and effective auditing of how the MOC assessments were being conducted, even after there were multiple indications that the process was not being conducted as designed.
There were no requirements in Aeropower procedures to provide any post-training supervision for powerline operations. What supervision was provided was ineffective in identifying that a modified stringing method was being used by the pilot.
Although required by the harness instrument commonly issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the operator did not appraise shooting crews of the risks of using only a harness for restraint during low-level flight.
A harness instrument, commonly issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), stated that a harness could be used instead of a seatbelt for take-off and landing. Although not intended by CASA, this instrument was easily able to be misinterpreted as indicating that a seatbelt was not required to be used during take-off and landing.
Recurrency training and drills in aircraft emergencies were not required for reissue of an aerial platform shooting permission. Some shooters last conducted training about 20 years prior, during initial issue of their permissions.
The Director of National Parks did not actively manage the risk of the aerial culling task being conducted in the Kakadu National Park, or effectively supervise the operation. As a result, an increase in the number of crew, a change in helicopter type and change of helicopter operator all progressed without requisite risk management. This exposed crew to avoidable harm during low-level aerial shooting operations.
