Sydney Trains Security Control Centre Standard Operating Procedure contained conflicting instructions on incident response, which were not aligned with the Sydney Trains Network Incident Management Plan (NIMP).
Sydney Trains identified in their investigation (Finding 142) that there were inconsistencies between the Security Control Centre Standard Operating Procedure and the Sydney Trains Network Incident Management Plan.
Sydney Trains made a recommendation which stated:
If procedures are not/cannot be amended to route all priority calls to the NIM, explore the feasibility of installing the DTRS in TSDM workstations.
This recommendation leaves Sydney Trains with a decision to either make procedures consistent and ensure Security staff operate in line with the procedures, or to have DTRS installed on the work stations of the TSDM.
When either of these solutions has been implemented, the safety issue will be considered closed adequately addressed.
Response by Sydney Trains
The Security Control Centre Standard Operating Procedure has now been aligned with the Sydney Trains Network Incident Management Plan with Security Control Centre Operators required to contact NIMs rather than TSDMs, and, Security Control Centre Operators' initial training in responding to emergencies has been upgraded (initial training module - STSCC02C - Knowledge & Skills) so that initial training around communicating during emergencies is improved and a recertification module (STSCC07A - SCC - Competency Assurance Assessment) is currently under development and will be provided as refresher training.
It is expected that the refresher training will be provided to operators every 12 months.
ATSB comment
The actions taken by Sydney Trains as described above addresses the inconsistencies previously in the safety management system. The safety issue is considered closed adequately addressed.
