Bureau Veritas design approval
Date issue released
Issue number
Issue Status
Closed – Adequately addressed
Transport Function
Shore operations
Issue Owner
Bureau Veritas
Mode of Transport
Marine
Safety Issue Description

Bureau Veritas’ (the classification society responsible) design approval processes had not identified any potential risks associated with the positioning of the fuel oil settling tank air vent pipe termination within MPV Everest's engine room ventilation casing. Consequently, it approved this design and siting of the air vent pipe that, in concert with other contributing factors, resulted in overflowing fuel from the pipe being directly introduced into the ship’s machinery spaces.

Issue Status Justification

The safety action taken by Bureau Veritas to raise awareness of the fire and its contributing factors, in particular the siting of the fuel oil settling tank air pipe, among its local plan approval offices (LPO) should serve to increase the effectiveness of future risk assessments associated with ship design plan approvals. Additionally, evidence provided to the ATSB of ship’s plans with a similar fuel oil tank air pipe design feature, which was assessed and challenged by the LPO, resulting in the design being modified to comply with BV rules, supports the effectiveness of the safety action. Finally, the action taken by Fox Offshore and Maritime Construction Services in modifying the air pipes to terminate externally effectively eliminates the hazard associated with the positioning of the pipes on board MPV Everest. Therefore, the ATSB considers that this safety issue has been adequately addressed.

Proactive action
Action number
MO-2021-003-PSA-185
Organisation
Bureau Veritas
Action Status
Closed
Action description

On 8 September 2023, Bureau Veritas (BV) advised the ATSB that a case study on the fire was presented to local plan approval office (LPO) managers and to BV global operational representatives at BV’s annual seminar to raise awareness of the accident and its associated contributing factors. LPO managers were required to pass on learnings from the case study to their respective teams. BV advised that this had resulted in proposed designs of this nature being assessed more closely and, as evidence, provided an example where plans for a ship with a similar air pipe design, submitted by a shipyard for BV approval, were challenged and resulted in appropriate revision of the drawing and the location of the pipe. Additionally, BV advised that it is working to implement a process to formally disseminate safety alerts to LPOs for matters related to design review.