Sea World Helicopters was reliant on CTAF calls, ground crew advice, and pilot visual detection of aircraft to ensure separation in VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ. Available additional controls for enhancing alerted see-and-avoid and reducing the risk of collision were not implemented.
Response by Sea World Helicopters
Sea World Helicopters provided the following response:
SWH state that additional controls for alerted See and Avoid were available.
As described in our response, TCAS and EFB were available to both pilots, but as stated within your own investigation would not have provided any assistance to either Pilot in the incident.
The See and Avoid principle if used correctly would have made both pilots aware of their position at all times, which they failed to utilise.
SWH as stated previously have introduced additional procedures for the management of aircraft in and around the Sea World Heliport.
ATSB comment
The report states that EFBs would have supported pilots. The stated availability of controls does not represent implementation of those controls.
The operator assumes that deviations from expected outcomes in see-and-avoid can only be due to pilots not looking and not to limitations in the system itself. This approach ignores copious research detailing the limitations of visual and information processing in pilots, the influence of operational requirements, environmental conditions, technology and aircraft characteristics.
However, in contrast to the Sea World Helicopters response to the safety issue, proactive safety action has been taken by Sea World helicopters that will support pilots’ implementation of see‑and-avoid.
The safety action taken by the operator implements additional controls to enhance see-and-avoid and will support pilot's implementation of see-and-avoid.
Sea World Helicopters introduced the following risk controls into their operation to reduce pilots’ reliance on unalerted see-and-avoid:
