Operation of the M-18A in accordance with Civil Aviation Safety Authority exemptions EX56/07 and EX09/07 at weights in excess of the basic Aircraft Flight Manual maximum take-off weight (MTOW), up to the MTOW listed on the Type Certificate Data Sheet, may not provide the same level of safety intended by the manufacturer when including that weight on the Type Certificate.
The lack of a designated position in the pre-flight documentation to record the green dot speed precipitated a number of informal methods of recording that value, lessening the effectiveness of the green dot check within the loadsheet confirmation procedure.
The operator’s training and processes in place to enable flight crew to manage distractions during the pre-departure phase did not minimise the effect of distraction during safety critical tasks.
The failure of the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) rack during the tail strike prevented the DFDR from recording subsequent flight parameters.
The lack of a requirement for a charter-specific risk assessment in this case meant that the risks associated with the charter were not adequately addressed.
The procedural and guidance framework for commercial balloon operations generally, did not provide a high level of assurance in regard to the safe conduct of low flying.
A number of non-cold rolled bolts were installed on PT6A-67 series engines during manufacture and overhaul
The Society of Automotive Engineers specification AS7477 was ambiguous in relation to the requirement to cold roll the head-to-shank fillet radius of MS9490-34 bolts.
The scheduled maintenance requirements for ex-military UH-1 series helicopters may not adequately address the increased risk of fatigue failures associated with repetitive heavy lifting operations that were not considered in the original design fatigue calculations.
The conflicting requirements and definitions in the operator’s publications in relation to the pilot not flying role had the potential to diminish the importance of monitoring as an essential element in an aircraft’s safe operation.
There were no soft and hard triggers in the operator’s Flight Operational Quality Assurance system to monitor the selection of the aircraft’s landing gear during an approach.
There was no correlation between the results of the operator’s Flight Operational Quality Assurance and Air Safety Incident Report investigations.
Windshields manufactured with terminal block fittings containing polysulfide sealant (PR1829) have been shown to be predisposed to premature overheating failure that could lead to the development of a localised fire.
The cabin altitude warning pressure switch maintenance manual wiring diagram did not provide a clear indication of the wiring connections for the superseded switch.
The aircraft maintenance manuals did not include the operating specifications of the replacement cabin altitude warning pressure switch hampering the required verification of switch serviceabilty.
There were only subtle cues to the fitment of programming dongles and no requirement to test Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) programming after installation, increasing the risk of inadvertent and undetected ELT re-programming and a less effective search and rescue response.
Material characteristics of some the LPT blades installed in engine 858322 were consistent with a raw material manufacturing cast that had previously been identified as being susceptible to creep rupture
The operator did not have a procedure in place to ensure independent cross-checking of the helicopter's fuel quantity.
The controller had not received training in compromised separation recovery techniques.
Ambiguity existed between the Manual of Air Traffic Services and the Aeronautical Information Publication in relation to the assignment of non-standard cruising levels and the definition of an ‘operational requirement’.
