Although the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) collected or had access to many types of information about a charter and/or aerial work operator, the information was not integrated to form a useful operations or safety profile of the operator. In addition, CASA’s processes for obtaining information on the nature and extent of an operator’s operations were limited and informal. These limitations reduced its ability to effectively prioritise surveillance activities.
Although air ambulance flights involved transporting passengers, in Australia they were classified as ‘aerial work’ rather than ‘charter’. Consequently, they were subject to a lower level of regulatory requirements than other passenger-transport operations (including requirements for fuel planning flights to remote islands).
The available regulatory guidance on in-flight fuel management and on seeking and applying en route weather updates was too general and increased the risk of inconsistent in-flight fuel management and decisions to divert.
Although passenger-carrying charter flights to Australian remote islands were required to carry alternate fuel, there were no explicit fuel planning requirements for other types of other passenger-carrying flights to remote islands. There were also no explicit Australian regulatory requirements for fuel planning of flights to isolated aerodromes. In addition, Australia generally had less conservative requirements than other countries regarding when a flight could be conducted without an alternate aerodrome.
The operator had not formally defined the roles and responsibilities of key positions involved in monitoring and managing flight operations, such as the standards manager for each fleet and the General Manager Flying Operations (Medivac and Charter).
Although the operator’s safety management processes were improving, its processes for identifying hazards extensively relied on hazard and incident reporting, and it did not have adequate proactive and predictive processes in place. In addition, although the operator commenced air ambulance operations in 2002, and the extent of these operations had significantly increased since 2007, the operator had not conducted a formal or structured review of its risk controls for these operations.
Although the operator installed an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) and traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) on VH-NGA in August 2009, it did not provide relevant flight crew with formal training on using these systems, or incorporate relevant changes into the aircraft’s emergency procedures checklists.
The operator’s application of its fatigue risk management system overemphasised the importance of scores obtained from a bio-mathematical model of fatigue (BMMF), and it did not have the appropriate expertise to understand the limitations and assumptions associated with the model. Overall, the operator did not have sufficient risk controls in addition to the BMMF to manage the duration and timing of duty, rest and standby periods.
Although the operator provided its flight crew with basic awareness training in crew resource management (CRM), it was limited in nature and did not ensure flight crew were provided with sufficient case studies and practical experience in applying relevant CRM techniques.
The operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that the occupants on an air ambulance aircraft would be able to effectively respond in the event of a ditching or similar emergency. Specific examples included:
The operator and air ambulance provider did not have a structured process in place to conduct pre-flight risk assessments for air ambulance tasks, nor was there any regulatory requirement for such a process.
The operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that the operator’s Westwind pilots would conduct adequate in-flight fuel management and related activities during flights to remote islands or isolated aerodromes. Limitations included:
The operator’s Westwind pilots generally used a conservative approach to fuel planning, and the operator placed no restrictions on the amount of fuel that pilots uploaded. However, the operator’s risk controls did not provide assurance that there would be sufficient fuel on board flights to remote islands or isolated aerodromes. Limitations included:
Classification of parachuting operations in the private category did not provide comparable risk controls to other similar aviation activities that involve the carriage of the general public for payment.
It was likely that the parachutists on the accident flight, as well as those that had participated in previous flights, were not secured to the single-point restraints that were fitted to VH-FRT. While research indicates that single-point restraints provide limited protection when compared to dual-point restraints, they do reduce the risk of load shift following an in-flight upset, which can lead to aircraft controllability issues.
Research has identified that rear‑facing occupants of parachuting aircraft have a higher chance of survival when secured by dual-point restraints, rather than the standard single-point restraints that were generally fitted to Australian parachuting aircraft.
Some Cessna 206 parachuting aircraft, including VH-FRT, had their flight control systems modified without an appropriate maintenance procedure or approval. That increased the risk of flight control obstruction.
Despite being categorised as mandatory for the pilot’s seat by the aircraft manufacturer, a secondary seat stop modification designed to prevent uncommanded rearward pilot seat movement and potential loss of control was not fitted to VH-FRT, nor was it required to be under United States or Australian regulations.
Despite a steady overall increase in passenger numbers and a mixture of types of operations, Ballina/Byron Gateway Airport did not have traffic advisory and/or air traffic control facilities capable of providing timely information to the crews of VH-EWL and VH-VQS of the impending traffic conflict. It is likely the absence of these facilities, which have been shown to provide good mitigation at other airports with similar traffic levels, increased the risk of a mid-air conflict in the Ballina area.
The aircraft manufacturer did not account for the transient elevator deflections that occur as a result of the system flexibility and control column input during a pitch disconnect event at all speeds within the flight envelope. As such, there is no assurance that the aircraft has sufficient strength to withstand the loads resulting from a pitch disconnect.
