The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to the new section of rail at [Location 1].
The reporter states [Operator 1] has not provided adequate training for train drivers. Drivers have not been piloted or provided training on the new signals prior to operating on the new section of rail. The reporter states, there is no clarity as to who controls the home signals and is further concerned for the safety of passengers and crew due to unintentional signal non-compliance.
The reporter states [Operator 1] has only provided train drivers with a leaflet in relation to the new section of rail. The leaflet, however, does not indicate who controls the signals or provides authority to pass. The leaflet contains a reference to a safe working circular which has not been distributed to train drivers.
Changes to railway infrastructure controlled by [Operator 2] were made at [Location 1] to support the State’s program for removal of nominated level crossings.
[Operator 1] is an operator on the [Operator 2] network at this location for passenger services to [Location 2] and [Location 3] and is required to respond to information provided by [Operator 2] about the changes.
Network changes that affect driver route competence follow a review process which allow for a planned response, which varies based on the complexity of the change. [Operator 1] provides for consultation with the driver workgroup in considering the training requirement by reviewing with a driver training committee.
In this case, the following process was followed:
- The change was presented to the driver training committee, and the methodology was agreed to by all attendees. The changes to signal positioning and function were identified as being minor, and therefore distribution of information was agreed to be suitable.
- [Operator 2] issued circular [number] (supplied to the ATSB and ONRSR) which included full details of the change and a new signalling diagram on [Day] [date] for changes to come into effect from [time] [Day] [date].
- [Location 2] drivers were informed of the change via safe working circular and an information notice posted within [Location 2] depot, to all drivers.
- Safe working circular and an information notice was posted at [Location 4] crew depot to all drivers.
- Both notices were also placed onto the revolving screens located in the [Location 4] crew depot.
- Driver train [preparation information] updated with change advice for a period of three months.
In relation to the control of signals and authority to pass, these are determined as part of procedures established by [Operator 2].
While not explicitly referenced in the safe working circular, the relevant document providing the information is the [Location 5] group operating procedures [number] (link provided to the ATSB and ONRSR), which has clearly described [Location 6] signal control centre as the controlling location for this section of line, since it was established as part of earlier changes.
If in doubt, [Operator 1] drivers are always able to clarify queries with their supervisor.
ONRSR confirms it received ATSB REPCON report number RR2023-00038 regarding training provided to train drivers for the new section of track at [Location 1]. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response including additional supporting documentation and notes. ONRSR received a previous REPCON report number RR2022-00003 Concern regarding driver training for an upgraded/altered section of track at [Location] | ATSB dated 2 February 2022 regarding concerns with driver training for an upgraded section of track at [Location 7].
In the response to REPCON report number RR2022-00003, ONRSR stated the process followed by the operator regarding driver training for reconfigured sections of track will be considered in the planning of future regulatory activities as part of the ONRSR work program. ONRSR confirms that a regulatory activity was conducted as part of the 2022/2023 ONRSR work program with the scope including driver training procedures for sections of track following level crossing removals and included risk assessments and training procedures. There were no adverse findings as a result of the regulatory activity.
Regarding REPCON report number RR2023-00038, in this instance, ONRSR is satisfied with the response provided by the operator including the supporting documents provided.