The reporter has raised the following safety concerns in relation to the lack of qualified Train Controllers available to provide coverage for rest or meal breaks during a 12 hour shift.
The reporter states a Train Controller rostered to work on operational board [number], was not relieved for either a fatigue or meal break during the 12 hour shift. There were no other qualified Train Controllers available for rest break relief due to staffing shortages, nor was there a qualified supervisor available due to other commitments.
The reporter advises that the Train Controller had a trainee for the entire shift who was only able to operate under instruction and the Train Controller was reluctant to shut down the control board in order to take a break, as they were concerned about the potential negative reaction from management.
The reporter further states that the [number] board has the most demanding workload of all the [Operator] control boards requiring decisions to be made of a safety-critical nature throughout the shift.
Thank you for your letter providing the opportunity to provide comment on the REPCON referenced above.
[Operator] is aware of an event that occurred on [date] relating to low crew/competency numbers owing to unplanned absenteeism, that was responded to at the time. This one event has been confirmed as the only event for the current financial year (since [date]), through a review of all our hazards related to low crew/competency numbers resulting in no extended breaks during the shift, for the controller.
In this instance, an experienced controller was on the [number] control board for a full shift from [time] to [time]. A hazard was raised at the time (supplied to the ATSB and ONRSR), this was shared with the broader business, and it outlined some of the deliberate actions taken to ensure the controller was looked after and monitored for fatigue. In addition to the actions outlined in the hazard [Operator] also implemented the below controls:
- The Rail Controller was partnered with a trainee controller who had been training on [number] control board for some time and was almost ready to sit their [competency confirmation]. The trainee controller was 3 board qualified and had been a Train Controller for approximately [number] years.
- The Rail Controller was provided short 5-10 minute breaks. During these break periods existing controls were utilised to indicate to all stations to standby. This provided opportunity for bathroom, ergonomic or beverage breaks when required.
- Rail Control Supervisor was an appointed responsible person and checked in on the Rail Controller regularly and conducted a fatigue assessment and arranged meals and beverages for the rail controller as needed.
- Track work was reduced to minimise workload and safe working requirements. The only trackwork for the shift of this board is summarised below:
- 2 x Track Occupancy Authority (TOA) were established both continuous and for a duration of 90 minutes each.
- 2 x track machines travelled into [board number] territory requiring 2 x [forms] to be issued.
- 1 x Rail tester also got on a track for a short time to check a switch.
At the time of the event, the [Operator] process for management of crew rostering and more specifically breaks off the board, included the following:
- Supervisor or appointed crew roster officer will create a daily shift roster which allocates Train Controllers for rail control boards they are qualified to operate.
- The daily shift roster outlines designated breaks. The current standard for breaks is 2 x 90-minute breaks (or equivalent for those on a reduced hours flex work arrangement).
- One or two controllers each shift may work up to 4-5 hours then be allocated a 90-minute break and then are given what we call an early knock and can finish the shift off the board early and then undertake other non-board related duties.
[Operator] recognised, during the first half of the financial year, Train Control were experiencing crew shortages due to various team changes and planned and unplanned absences. Since experiencing these challenges, we have embarked on a targeted recruitment and training campaign to increase our overall numbers and build the capability within the train control team. In the last nine months we have instigated the following initiatives and actions, which are either completed or in progress, into our ongoing people management and operating strategy:
1. Recruitment of [x] new controllers and running 2 x Rail Control schools.
2. Engaged and onboarded 3 ex-[Operator] Train Controllers as contractors with extensive train control experience to bolster numbers.
3. Completed 24 [competency confirmations] – increasing the capability across our teams to operate a greater breadth of rail control boards.
4. Utilisation of broader rail control team of qualified rail controllers to cover breaks including rail network controllers (RNC)/training specialist/analyst rail control improvement/[supervisors].
5. Utilisation of overtime to supplement numbers when required. This not only included coverage for unplanned absences but also to support training requirements.
6. Coupling of control boards and cancellation or reduction of track maintenance to limit activities on the control board.
7. Appointment of step-up supervisors and senior rail controllers on each crew - accredited as responsible person or non-statutory supervisors to support with safe working tasks in the absence of the Rail Control supervisor.
ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response. In line with a regulatory focus on ensuring risk management practices are compliant with the requirements of the Rail Safety National Law, ONRSR will follow up with the operator to discuss the risk controls being implemented.