ECDIS on board most Australian Border Force cutters, including ABFC Roebuck Bay, operated with a non-type-approved naval software version that was not updated to the latest applicable standards of the International Hydrographic Organization. The ECDIS therefore did not comply with the minimum requirements of an ECDIS being used to meet the chart carriage requirements of the regulations. As a result, the enhanced safety features of the new presentation library, which would have potentially alerted the officers to the danger posed by the reef, were not available.
Most Australian Border Force cutters, including ABFC Roebuck Bay, were installed with ECDIS operating on non-type-approved naval software. Subsequently, DNV GL, acting on behalf of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, incorrectly certified these vessels as using type-approved ECDIS to meet the chart carriage requirements of the regulations. This removed an opportunity to put in place controls to ensure ongoing safety compliance.
Although the online VisionMaster FT ECDIS type-specific familiarisation training included the relevant content, the training as undertaken by Australian Border Force deck officers was not effective in preparing ABFC Roebuck Bay's officers for the operational use of the ECDIS.
Guidelines for the provision, care and use of shipboard equipment were not supported by suitable documentation. The only documentation was for mobile scaffolding equipment of different design and not for that in use on the ship.
The regional harbour master and the pilotage service did not have processes in place to follow up audit findings, to ensure that they were appropriately monitored, actioned and closed out in a timely manner.
The Port Procedures manual for Townsville allowed shipping agents to request a tug reduction without the knowledge of the ship’s master.
The Port of Townsville Limited Pilotage Services’ Pilotage Service Safety Management System did not have documented guidance on berthing manoeuvres nor any associated contingencies.
The Port of Townsville Limited Pilotage Service risk management processes were not sufficiently mature nor resilient enough to effectively identify and mitigate risks during pilotage.
The processes for monitoring the condition of the brushless exciter units’ electrical insulation were ineffective in detecting deterioration prior to unit failure.
Bow Singapore’s planned maintenance system for the steering gear did not include or contain any schedules for detailed inspections or parts replacement.
While TT-Line Company’s standard mooring line pattern for ships at Station Pier had been successfully used for many years, the breakaway indicated the risk could have been further reduced to better prepare for such unusual circumstances.
The Port of Melbourne vessel traffic service (VTS) procedures for adverse weather were not comprehensive and, hence, its response on 13 January was only partially effective. One important consequence was that VTS’s advance warning of storm force winds did not reach all relevant parties, including Spirit of Tasmania II’s master.
The adverse weather procedures for TT-Line Company ships when alongside did not take into account all the necessary factors to provide effective defences against significant, short-term weather events such as thunderstorms and squalls.
Skandi Pacific’s managers had not adequately assessed the risks associated with working on the aft deck of vessels with open sterns, including consideration of engineering controls to minimise water being shipped on the aft deck.
Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo securing were inadequate. There was no guidance for methods of securing cargo in adverse weather conditions.
Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo handling in adverse weather conditions were inadequate. Clearly defined weather limits when cargo handling operations could be undertaken and trigger points for suspending operations were not defined, including limits for excessive water on deck.
Procedures for harbour tugs to meet inbound ships and for their co-ordinated movement in the Fremantle pilotage area were not clearly defined. On 28 February, inadequate co-ordination of the tugs and ineffective communication between Maersk Garonne’s pilot and the tug masters resulted in both tugs, the second one in particular, being significantly delayed from when they could reasonably have been expected to be on station.
Fremantle Pilots’ procedures did not include any contingency plans, including abort points, for risks identified for the pilotage.
Fremantle Pilots’ publicly available information to assist ships' masters with preparing a berth to berth passage plan was inadequate and ineffectively implemented. The information provided consisted essentially of a list of waypoints, which was routinely not followed.
Bridge resource management (BRM) was not effectively implemented on board Maersk Garonne. The ship’s passage plan for the pilotage was inadequate, its bridge team members were not actively engaged in the pilotage and they did not effectively monitor the ship’s passage.
