While TT-Line Company’s standard mooring line pattern for ships at Station Pier had been successfully used for many years, the breakaway indicated the risk could have been further reduced to better prepare for such unusual circumstances.
The Port of Melbourne vessel traffic service (VTS) procedures for adverse weather were not comprehensive and, hence, its response on 13 January was only partially effective. One important consequence was that VTS’s advance warning of storm force winds did not reach all relevant parties, including Spirit of Tasmania II’s master.
The adverse weather procedures for TT-Line Company ships when alongside did not take into account all the necessary factors to provide effective defences against significant, short-term weather events such as thunderstorms and squalls.
Skandi Pacific’s managers had not adequately assessed the risks associated with working on the aft deck of vessels with open sterns, including consideration of engineering controls to minimise water being shipped on the aft deck.
Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo securing were inadequate. There was no guidance for methods of securing cargo in adverse weather conditions.
Skandi Pacific’s safety management system (SMS) procedures for cargo handling in adverse weather conditions were inadequate. Clearly defined weather limits when cargo handling operations could be undertaken and trigger points for suspending operations were not defined, including limits for excessive water on deck.
Procedures for harbour tugs to meet inbound ships and for their co-ordinated movement in the Fremantle pilotage area were not clearly defined. On 28 February, inadequate co-ordination of the tugs and ineffective communication between Maersk Garonne’s pilot and the tug masters resulted in both tugs, the second one in particular, being significantly delayed from when they could reasonably have been expected to be on station.
Fremantle Pilots’ procedures did not include any contingency plans, including abort points, for risks identified for the pilotage.
Fremantle Pilots’ publicly available information to assist ships' masters with preparing a berth to berth passage plan was inadequate and ineffectively implemented. The information provided consisted essentially of a list of waypoints, which was routinely not followed.
Bridge resource management (BRM) was not effectively implemented on board Maersk Garonne. The ship’s passage plan for the pilotage was inadequate, its bridge team members were not actively engaged in the pilotage and they did not effectively monitor the ship’s passage.
Fremantle Ports’ staff did not understand the significance of some wind and weather terminology used in the BoM forecast. Consequently, port procedures triggered by a BoM ‘gale’ or ‘severe weather’ warning such as preparing the tugs and calling the harbour master were not followed.
Fremantle Ports’ procedures for adverse weather were not adequate for weather that could reasonably be expected to occur. Some procedures could not be reasonably implemented and other were not monitored for compliance.
The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) marine forecast title of ‘strong wind warning’ understated the ‘damaging winds’ expected during the ‘severe thunderstorm’. The forecast did not use recognised marine weather terms for wind speed, such as ‘gale force’.
Fremantle Ports’ assessment of risks associated with a ship contacting the Fremantle Rail Bridge as a result of a breakaway, particularly from berths 11 and 12, was limited. Preventing a breakaway from berths where the wind was likely to be on a ship’s beam had not been considered. Similarly, the impediments to assisting a ship near Wongara Shoal after a breakaway had not been assessed.
The large size and weight of the ship firefighting cache made it difficult for the duty Port Hedland volunteer firefighter to transport it to the wharf.
The limited professional firefighting capability in Port Hedland restricted the ability to launch an effective response to the fire on board Marigold.
Suitable atmospheric testing equipment was not available in Port Hedland to ensure safe entry to fire-affected spaces on board Marigold. Access to these areas was not controlled until 53 hours after the fire.
The emergency response plans for a ship fire in Port Hedland did not clearly define transfer of control procedures for successive incident controllers from different organisations or contain standard checklists for their use.
Port Hedland’s emergency response teams did not use the ship’s international shore fire connection. As a result, Marigold’s fire main was not pressurised with water from ashore.
Marigold’s shipboard procedures for crew induction, familiarisation, fire drills and safety training were not effectively implemented. As a result, the ship’s senior officers were not sufficiently familiar with the Halon system’s operation. They did not identify its partial failure and did not activate the override function
