The operator did not have procedures to assist the crew to ensure that the aircraft was lined up on the runway centreline in preparation for takeoff.
Although the pitot probes fitted to A330/A340 aircraft met relevant design specifications, these specifications were not sufficient to prevent the probes from being obstructed with ice during some types of environmental conditions that the aircraft could encounter.
By the time of the 28 October 2009 occurrence, many of the operator’s A330 flight crew had not received unreliable airspeed training. Such training started being introduced in the operator’s recurrent training program before the occurrence.
When revising or maintaining its A320 endorsement training program, the third party training provider did not use or have access to current versions of the aircraft manufacturer’s recommended training program.
The operator’s winching procedure did not include the requirement to confirm adequate hover reference existed overhead an intended winch area prior to deploying personnel on the winch.
There was no formal risk assessment process in use at the operator’s Horn Island base.
At the time of the last tyre change, crack initiation at the bearing bore shoulder radius was an emerging issue with no requirement for mandatory inspection of this area during a tyre change.
The post-2005 main landing gear wheel design had shown a susceptibility to fatigue cracking at the inner hub bearing bore shoulder radius.
The Registered Operator's maintenance control practices did not ensure compliance with all Airworthiness Directives.
Information contained in the approved flight manual and pilot's operating handbook was not applicable to the engine that was fitted to the aircraft.
There was the potential for the incorrect use of the dipstick to result in the over-reading of the fuel quantity.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the inoperability of the forward drain line heater.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the drip shield.
The location of the decompression panel and absence of cabin floor sealing above the main equipment centre increased the risk of liquid ingress into the aircraft’s electrical systems.
The floor sealing around the forward galley was not of sufficient extent to prevent liquids from passing through to the under floor area.
The aircraft operator’s documented design objectives did not explicitly require the protection of non-structural systems from liquid contact or ingress.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the corrosion in the generator control units.
The United States Federal Aviation Administration regulations and associated guidance material did not fully address the potential harm to flight safety posed by liquid contamination of electrical system units in transport category aircraft.
Maintenance processes did not identify or correct the deterioration of the galley floor sealing
The operator’s flight crew quick reference handbook did not include sufficient information for flight crew to manage the emergency.
