The reporter has raised concerns with regard to people observed walking within the rail danger zone with safe working locks hanging from their belts.
The reporter states that on [date], senior staff members of [Operator], [State] [VIPs] and media personnel were permitted to access a section of track on the [Location 1] railway between [Location 2] and [Location 3] to inspect the [event] recovery. The reporter states, there are photos in which these people are observed walking in the rail danger zone with their safe working locks hanging from their belts.
The reporter further states - 'This is a bypass of safety procedures related to safe working and constitutes a serious breach of [Operator's] safety management system'.
[Operator] acknowledges the reporter's concerns and the ATSB’s interest in the matter. At [Operator], safety comes first. Always. I do hope the below response further explains the reasons why the reporter correctly identified persons accessing track without network lockout (safe working locks as referenced in the REPCON) and provides clarity to how under [Operator's] established safety management system, the actions were approved.
In the referenced observation by the reporter, [Operator] can confirm that appropriate, authorised and approved protections were in place to allow a range of [VIPs], [Operator] executives and associated media personal to access track near [Location 4], [Location 3] on [date] to view damage that resulted from a recent weather event in the area.
The visit entailed access to the area by approximately 30 attendees and due to the limited time available for the visit, in conjunction with reduced rail safety risk due to lack of available access to the area by rail traffic, temporary suspension of the safeworking system at [Location 4], [Location 3] was considered to be the safest way to simplify and facilitate the visit. Due to damage that occurred during the recent weather event in the [Location 3], [Location 1] and wider [State] area, physical track access for trains to the track area adjacent to [Location 4], [Location 3] was unavailable.
Within [Operator's] safety management system, the [safety manual] is a module that provides the procedures to help ensure the safety of workers, members of the public, rail vehicles and equipment, as well as procedures to be followed in case of an accident, incident or emergency. Within this module is the process for ‘authority to implement special safeworking procedures’.
In order to enact this authority, the risks associated with the special safeworking procedures needed to be considered and were documented through both a risk assessment and a recommendation to approve for the defined timeframe and location. The risk assessment was completed to ensure suitable controls were in place to allow for the suspension of the normal safeworking system to safely facilitate the VIPs' visit for the duration of the visit only.
The risk assessment concluded that although technically possible for a safeworking breach to occur, due to the controls in place, in particular the fact that trains were physically unable to access the area due to existing track damage and no work occurring for the duration of the visit, the realistic consequence of any safeworking breach was insignificant.
As part of this assessment, determination was made that network lockout locks were not needed and suitable controls to delineate the area under the track authority process were still implemented to protect the limits of the special safeworking procedures.
I hope this response provides clarity to the concerns raised and demonstrates [Operator's] commitment to safety through planning and executing a safe site visit for those involved.
ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response and in this instance is satisfied with the response provided by the operator.