The reporter has raised a safety concern regarding the stopping pattern reports with timings between stations that are impossible to achieve. The reporter believes this causes a potential safety issue as drivers may be so focused maintaining the impossible timetable that they lose situational awareness, and guards may feel pressured to hurry their platform duties in an effort to maintain the set timetable so as to avoid questions about delays from management.
The reporter states there are numerous timings in the standard working timetable on the [number] line that are impossible to achieve, working within the limits of the posted speed boards and performance of the traction type.
The reporter acknowledges that [operator’s] timetable works to whole minutes and understands that, in many situations, an extra minute is not warranted and would only result in excessive dwell at the platform. However, the reporter is concerned about situations where a whole extra minute is required just to resemble a real‐world level of achievability. Fortunately, these are rare, though they do exist in the standard working timetable and become far more common on weekends with trackwork on adjacent lines requiring [line number] trains to make extra stops, most commonly at stations [B] and [C]. In situations such as this, presumably to avoid altering the timings in and out of major terminating locations, the extra time allocated to accommodate these extra stops is taken away somewhere else in the run resulting in an impossible task for train crew and leaving a run with extra stops to be completed in the same time as without the extra stops.
For example, the normal time on a weekend for a train to travel between [Station B] to [Station C] platform is 6 minutes without stopping at any intermediate stations. The reporter provided an example of a service running from Station A to Station H and allocated 58 minutes. As part of that service, the [Station B – Station C] section was allocated 8 minutes (usually 6), due to extra stops required. However, rather than add 2 minutes to the 1 hour plus service, the scheduling compensates by making up the lost time in other sectors. For example, the section between [Station D to station E] is reduced from 3 to 2 minutes, making it impossible to meet the time requirements, and the normal time from [Station F to Station G] is then reduced from 2 minutes to only 1 minute. This leaves the crew chasing time for the rest of the run, leading to further safety concerns.
The reporter states that the average driver takes 25‐30 seconds to decelerate from the arrival end of a platform to a stop, it also takes around 25‐30 seconds on a [model] train to open the passenger doors, alight and board passengers, then close the doors. Given these timings, only 10 seconds at best now remains for the train to reach the arrival end of station H, platform [number] from a standstill at station G, a distance of approximately 0.774 km.
To achieve this the train must travel at an average speed of 278.64 km/h, obviously impossible in a section with a 75 km/h limit. The normal 2 minute timing allows a far more comfortable average speed of 39.81 km/h. This is but one of many examples that highlights the level of disconnect between what [Operator] provides its crew with for timings and what is achievable in the real world.
The reporter notes that in the wake of the Waterfall disaster, it was determined that the running time from Waterfall and Helensburgh was unachievable within the local speed limits and was a potential contributing factor to drivers speeding in that section. The implemented solution was an increase from eight to nine minutes, timetabled for that section of track, an increase in time of 12.5%.
The [Station G – Station H] timings mentioned above require a 100% increase to be attainable, as does the run from [Station B- Station C]. The reporter advises there are many other examples require 50% more time to become possible.
The reporter advises that these concerns have been raised with management, and staff have been told that the software only allows them to schedule trains to run as fast as what had been determined by [State Transport Authority]. However, since that time, the same unachievable timings are being generated and no changes having been implemented.
With train crew being asked to explain delays of as little as 1-2 minutes, and drivers finding ‘blemishes’ on their driving record for running 2-3 minutes late, the reporter believes the time pressure created from the timetables combined with a fear of drivers’ and guards’ operational records being reflected negatively, this situation has the potential to lead minor safety‐related incidents and more serious incidents or an accident.
The [Operator] planning team has recently received some feedback regarding running time achievability around [location], but no formal feedback has been received to‐date regarding achievability of scheduled running times between [Station B] and [Station C] during weekend working.
In the absence of specific dates and times, it is difficult to conduct a thorough review on the example provided, as there may have been other network or operating conditions at play, and/or multiple track work activities concurrently, however, we would be very happy to conduct a specific review for lessons learnt if the reporter could provide some date specifics via their line management.
Any findings resulting from a comprehensive review will be taken seriously and will be addressed appropriately by both [Operator] planning, and, if required, by [State transport authority] via their [program name] change management processes. The [Operator] planning team will facilitate this process.
[Program name] development process
The program is a very tightly governed process, complete with a comprehensive change management process to ensure minimum journey times are safe and achievable, and scheduled running times provide reliability.
Minimum journey times between locations on the network are modelled in a software system which uses the track infrastructure information and the speed characteristics of each train type / rolling stock type. The model does not assume trains will be operated at 100% of their speed capability, but instead assumes trains will operate somewhere between 95% and 98% of their speed capability depending on the route, to allow for differences in driver behaviour, and also:
- The minimum journey times modelled are validated as ‘safe and achievable’
- Additional ‘fixed’ and ‘linear’ recovery time is then added on top of the minimum modelled journey times for each class of rolling stock (percentages vary by rolling stock type, and by location) to account for the fact that no single train occupies one route on the network at any one time (subsequent train paths need to be timetabled on a given route), and to increase the ultimate ‘reliability’ of any timetable.
[Operator] timetable adjustments for track work – daily working timetable
Due to the requirement for track work to be incorporated into weekend timetables, [Operator] planning teams alter the standard working timetable to divert trains around closed sections of track/cancel them altogether to permit maintenance access.
In altering the standard working timetable, and diverting trains where required, the planning teams may need to remove or reassign a portion of the additional linear recovery time to ensure other key safety criteria (such as headway tolerances) can be maintained, and, or to maintain service frequency for customer experience.
Timetable Feedback Process/Way forward
Recently, the collaboration between [Operator] Customer Operations; Performance and Planning divisions and the [State transport authority] teams to review freight minimum journey times and recovery time allocations has resulted in changes to these minimum journey times in the February 2021. This has followed feedback provided by operational staff within [Operator] for specific routes and locations on the network.
There is a commitment to continue this approach moving forward, and, where [Operator] operational/crewing staff have concerns regarding specific locations or parts of the network and the achievability of minimum scheduled journey times, a joint review of the modelled times and recovery time allocations with a view to making changes where required will be carried out.
Planners always endeavour to reduce the removal or reassignment of portions of linear recovery time as much as possible, and would never remove or alter any of the minimum journey time allocation (software system prohibits this action), thereby ensuring safety and achievability of paths.
ONRSR has received ATSB REPCON report number RR2021-00006, dated 11 February 2021, related to concerns regarding stopping patterns on [Operator] network.
ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and the rail transport operator’s response. ONRSR will consider details of this report in the scoping of a site visit activity to be conducted on the rail transport operator’s network as part of the ONRSR 2021 National Work Program. Any additional information gathered during this activity will be evaluated and any safety issues or concerns identified will be managed in accordance with ONRSR’s internal processes. Further information regarding how ONRSR regulates can be found in the publication “The ONRSR Way” available on the ONRSR website.