Reference number
RR2019-00050
Published date
Mode
Affected operation/industry
Concern subject type
Concern summary

Concern regarding operating procedures at the new [Location] station grade separation

Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern regarding the lack of training for drivers who will be operating at the new [Location] station grade separation, which is currently under construction and scheduled for operational use in [month/year].

The reporter advises that the only training drivers have been provided with, was viewing a video clip regarding the grade separation upgrade. However, the reporter states that the grade separation is not an upgrade, it is a completely new separation that involves:

  • multiple sets of points when there are currently no points
  • incline and decline gradients associated with Skyrail grade separations
  • home signals replacing the existing automatic signals
  • new station limits in the safe working area where there are currently none
  • terminating moves that were not previously required.

The reporter states that viewing a video clip about the changes is insufficient training to deem drivers suitably qualified for operating this section of track. The reporter believes that drivers need to be provided training as per a new route qualification, in that drivers should observe a qualified instructor demonstrating how to drive the section of track, highlighting the threats of the section and the significant changes and then subsequently drive the section under instructor supervision prior to being deemed competent.

However, the reporter states that [Operator] has asked drivers to sign a form acknowledging that they deem themselves qualified, competent and confident to drive the new section of the track, that has not yet been completed, after viewing a video clip. The reporter further states that the majority of drivers did not sign the form as they believed the training to be inadequate. These drivers have subsequently been issued a letter stating that '[Operator] will record that the required instructed briefing has occurred and that you have the required knowledge to safely drive trains through the altered track section in accordance with our policies and procedures'.

The reporter believes that the addition of any one of the changes to the section of track in isolation would be considered a potential precursor for a Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD), while the combination of all the additions poses a significant safety risk to the safe operation of the train. The reporter states that despite the obvious risks and drivers own admissions that they are not confident operating on the track, [Operator] has deemed drivers qualified on a track that does not yet exist. 

Named party's response

Please find below responses in relation to concerns raised in Report Number: RR201900050

The reports have raised safety concerns regarding the lack of training for drivers who will be operating at the new [Location] station grade separation, which is currently under construction and scheduled for operational use in [month/year].

[Operator] response: Driver training requirements, including content and the appropriate level of instruction, were determined at the completion of the steps outlined in [Operator]'s [procedure title]. The completion of this assessment showed that the new [Location] grade separation has provided increased safety for trains, and there is no necessary change to driver training or current operating procedure. The subject matter experts at the route risk assessment workshop included principal drivers, training officers, on-the-job trainers, and experienced qualified drivers. There was also consultation with the [Union], and no new safety or competence risks were identified.

The reporters advise that the only training drivers have been provided with, was viewing a video clip regarding the grade separation upgrade. However, the reporter states that the grade separation is not an upgrade, it is a completely new separation that involves:

  • multiple sets of points when three are currently no points
  • incline and decline gradients associated with Skyrail grade separation
  • home signals replacing the existing automatic signals.
  • new station limits in the safe working area where there are currently none
  • terminating moves that were not previously required.

[Operator] response: As referenced in [Operator]'s response above, specific on-board driver training requirements, including content and the appropriate level of instruction, was determined in accordance with the [procedure title]. This included the route risk assessment workshop performed by subject matter experts, including principal drivers, training officers, on-the-job trainers, and experienced qualified drivers.

[Location] is now an elevated station, and as part of the level crossing removal project similar new sections of track and stations have been introduced into the [Location 2] metropolitan network on eight previous occasions. The route risk assessment workshop determined that operating a train on the new section of track at [Location] does not require additional competency training for drivers. The training mandated is around route familiarisation, which can be achieved in the video clip referenced by reporters.

The video clip is made up of computer-generated Imagery (CGI) of the new [Location] track, developed and built using issued for construction (IFC) designs overlayed on real-world 4K footage. The CGI briefing video is further supported by route information packs given to drivers.

The CGI video delivers an improved outcome for train drivers in that it:

i) Ensures consistent information is given to all train drivers;

ii) Allows for a clear explanation of route changes; and

iii) Provides an outline of how trains will use the new section of track.

The briefing was provided through a training officer instructing qualified drivers on the changes. This enables [Operator] to provide an in-depth overview of the changes and gives qualified drivers the opportunity to ask any questions. CGI briefings have previously been used for changes introduced at [Location 3] on the [Location 4] line with no safety or operational impacts.

An in-depth route evaluation to review the route risk assessment workshop recommendation was completed by operational safety specialists, risk owners, and subject matter experts (qualified drivers) on [date] and recommended to provide a CGI briefing. The delivery of a CGI briefing was accepted as a sufficient control for the changes to the track and signal layout for [Location] and approved by [Position title 1] and [Position title 2] on [date].

Consultation with the [Union] was conducted on [date], and no new safety or competence risks were identified.

The reporter states that viewing a video clip about the changes is insufficient training to deem drivers suitably qualified for operating this section of track. The reporter believes that drivers need to be provided training as per a new route qualification, in that drivers should observe a qualified instructor demonstrating how to drive the section of track, highlighting the threats of the section and the significant changes, and then subsequently drive the section under instructor supervision prior to being deemed competent.

[Operator] response: The route risk assessment workshop determined that an on-board training session was not required as the changes at [Location] do not require qualified train drivers to have increased levels of competency, nor does the change meet the requirements of being categorised as an entirely new route. This outcome was arrived at by a risk-based assessment which set out to identify the hazards and risks.

No new potential hazards or risks were identified by the more than [number] qualified drivers who took part in the training.

However, the reporter states that [Operator] has asked drivers to sign a form acknowledging that they deem themselves qualified, competent and confident to drive the new section of the track that has not yet been completed, after viewing a video clip.

[Operator] response: This statement is incorrect. Drivers who attended the briefing sessions have been asked to acknowledge that they have completed the briefing. A screen shot of the signature page has been provided (supplied to the ATSB).

The reporter advises that the majority of drivers did not sign the form as they believed the training to be inadequate. These drivers have subsequently been issued a letter stating that '[Operator] will record that the required instructed briefing has occurred and that you have the required knowledge to safely drive trains through the altered track section in accordance with our policies and procedures'.

[Operator] response: The first part of this statement is incorrect. 15% of drivers who attended the briefings have not signed the form. Train drivers who have not signed the form have been provided with a letter explaining the safety assessment that was undertaken on the [Location] grade separation.

The reporter believes that the addition of any one of the changes to the section of track in isolation would be considered a potential precursor for a Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD), while the combination of all the additions poses a significant safety risk to the safe operation of the train.

The reporter states that despite the obvious risks and drivers own admissions that they are not confident operating on the track, [Operator] have deemed drivers qualified on a track that does not yet exist.

Operator] response: The level crossing removal at [Location] and all associated changes comply with [Operator's] standards in relation to safely running trains, signal design, and operation. The [Location] design improves safety as the level crossing has been removed and improvements have been made to the line of sight for signals. The change does not require increased train driver competence or safety training, and a qualified driver operating in accordance with currently established operating procedures can safely operate over this section of track.

[Operator] has complied with its safety management system by utilising [Operator] procedure [procedure title] to identify, assess and mitigate risks associated with the changes at [Location]. [Operator] has consulted broadly in relation to the changes, and no new safety or competence risks have been identified by any of the key stakeholders consulted.

Appendix 1

The briefing information and methodology delivered for the level crossing removal at [Street name], [Location], is a result of completion of all required steps in the process outlined in [procedure title] as outlined below.

1. Analyse the route characteristics and hazards using:

i. [Form 1] 

ii. [Form 2]

2. A preliminary route assessment to determine if a route risk assessment (RRA) is required was completed.

3. A RRA workshop and risk assessment with proposed controls/mitigations to manage risk of the change was completed on [date], involving subject matter experts which included principal drivers, training officers, on-the-job trainers, and experienced qualified drivers.

4. An in-depth route assessment to review the RRA workshop recommendation was completed by operational safety specialists, risk owners, and subject matter experts (qualified drivers) on [date] and recommended to provide a CGI briefing.

5. The delivery of a CGI briefing was accepted as a sufficient control for the changes to the track and signal layout for [Location] and approved by [Position title 1] and [Position title 2] on [date].

6. All RRA workshop attendees were provided with the final outcomes and consultation completed.

7. Consultation with the [Union] was conducted on [date], and no new safety or competence risks were identified. 

Compliance with [Procedure title] has determined that the required risk mitigations in relation to safe operation of trains and train driver competence are:

  •  Route booklet, TSD; and
  • Instructed classroom briefing via CGI.
Regulator's response

On behalf of ONRSR, the response to REPCON number RR201900050 is below: 

On 12 December 2019, ONRSR received REPCON report number RR201900050 regarding operating procedures at the new [Location] station grade separation. ONRSR has reviewed the information provided by the reporter and the response provided by the operator. ONRSR is satisfied that the operator is managing risks related to this matter so far as is reasonably practicable. ONRSR will consider the information provided in this report in the planning and implementation of regulatory activities as part of the 2020 ONRSR National Work Program.