Safety concerns raised regarding flight crew fatigue
The ATSB has received multiple reports regarding increased fatigue among [foreign operator] flight crew following changes to the company’s policies introduced during the COVID-19 outbreak. This resulted in changes to calculating and recording flight time limitations (FTL) and rostering flight duty periods (FDP) for augmented (more than one Captain and one First Officer), double flight crew (two Captains and two First Officers), and the flight crew complement for special ultra-long-range flights.
The reporters’ safety concerns are:
1. Heightened levels of fatigue in [aircraft type] crew as a result of prescribed flight time (FT) deductions.
2. Discouraging flight crew from reporting fatigue
Flight time limitations
The reporters collectively advise that the use of prescribed FT deductions does not provide a true record of the levels of fatigue accrued during rostered ultra and special ultra-long-range operations. For double crew operations, the following prescribed deductions apply:
- Relief crew are not permitted to log taxi, take-off and landing as FT despite being required to be present on the flight deck for these phases of flight. Relief crew are to deduct 1½ hours from their FT to cover these periods
- Time spent in jump seats or crew rest facilities cannot be logged as FT.
The reporters have indicated that these prescribed reduced times are in conflict with the company’s own operations manual (OM) definition of FT: Flight Time is the time between an aircraft first moving from its parking place for the purpose of taking off until it comes to rest on the designated parking position and all engines are shut down.
An example provided by one reporter was the city pairing of [location 1] and [location 2] with a FT, in accordance with the definition, of 16 hrs calculated. The pairing operates with two full operating crews onboard, that is, two Captains and two First Officers. The first operating crew will log FT as 8 hrs 45 mins and the relief crew will log FT as 7 hrs 15 mins. The effect of FT logged in this way is the accumulation of actual FT, which is not accounted for, and allows the rostering of additional flight duty.
The ATSB notes that prescribed flight time deductions currently being used by the operator are not consistent with international (ICAO) definitions of FT. Further, the majority of international commercial air transport operators, and relevant regulatory authorities, i.e. CASA, EASA, FAA do not deduct rest time for time spent in jump seats or crew rest facilities from FT.
Multiple reporters have provided examples where FT calculated in accordance with [operator's] FTL policy is the equivalent to a cumulative total FT of 140 –150 hrs per 28 days and more than 1,400 flight hrs in a calendar year, if they were to be calculated in accordance with international definitions.
The reporters believe that [Operator's] approach to fatigue management is solely to comply with regulatory prescriptive limits, rather than any focus on monitoring fatigue, minimising the risk of fatigue and establishing FDTLs in accordance with scientific principles and knowledge, as is outlined in ICAO Annex 6 (4.10).
The ATSB notes that [foreign operator's] flight crews’ actual FTs could exceed the limit of 100 hours per 28 days and up to 1,000 hours per 12-month calendar period, when FT is calculated in accordance with global norms.
The ATSB further notes that Annex 6 requires the State of the operator ensures that an operator’s fatigue risk management system (FRMS) provides a level of safety equivalent to or better than prescriptive fatigue management regulations. (4.10.5)
Flight duty periods
The reporters further advise that following the outbreak of COVID-19, [foreign operator] made significant changes to flight crew rostering. Previous flight duty limits for double crew operations were set at 17 hrs for long range flights with an approval from the [State regulator] to conduct ultra-long-range (ULR) flights with FDPs extended to 20 hrs to overcome the impracticalities of operating between certain city pairs such as [location 1] and [location 3]. A 3-hour extension of duty time at the ‘discretion’ of the commander was available. The ATSB has been advised by the reporters that the intention of such an extension was to cater for any disruption encountered as a result of weather or technical issues enroute and not to act as a means of regularly extending FDPs. If a discretionary extension of greater than 2 hrs was applied to a 17-hour FDP, the [State regulator] was required to be notified.
The [State regulator] approved a further extension to FDP limitations as special ultra-long-range turn-around flights to avoid crew COVID-19 exposure at resting facilities in foreign ports. This new permission saw ‘discretion’ extensions incorporated into a new standard FDP limit of 23 hrs and removed the requirement to notify the [State regulator] when these flights were conducted. It is reported that these were originally approved for flights into China only but have since been utilised on flights to other locations.
The reporters state that these operations triggered a significant rise in fatigue levels of crew conducting these Special ULR flights.
The ATSB highlights that while there were specific flight and duty time limits (FDTL) extensions addressed by ICAO specifically for this (COVID-19) reason, the extensions were intended only for the period of the initial COVID 19 outbreak. The extensions were mainly targeted to facilitate cargo operations where the freight of PPE, ventilators, vaccinations, and humanitarian goods etc. were deemed necessary.
ICAO have since removed this as an acceptable practice and have recommended that States return to their normal pre-COVID-19 FDTLs. This was actioned as a result of industry/ICAO concern due to extended FDTLs for COVID-19 specific reasons being extended to become the norm (https://www.icao.int/safety/OPS/OPS-Normal/Pages/Returning-back-to-FDTLs.aspx).
Rest opportunities
The reporters further advise that [foreign operator's] FRMS includes the option for crew to report fatigue. Previously, this would see the individual removed from flying duties for 48 hrs to provide an opportunity to rest. However, this period has since been reduced to 12 hrs incorporating one local night.
Further reductions in the opportunity for pilots to obtain sufficient rest have been implemented including:
- the cancelation of annual leave, or utilising annual leave to meet legal rest requirements
- an increase in the number of disruptive duties on consecutive night flights
- continued minimum rest periods despite the increase in FDP limitations.
Acknowledging that [foreign operator] has an approved FRMS, in accordance with ICAO Annex 6, where an FRMS is implemented the operator shall as a minimum incorporate scientific principles, ensure remedial actions to mitigate the risks associated with the hazards and provide continuing monitoring and regular assessment of the mitigation of fatigue risks (4.10.6), the ATSB queries what controls [foreign operator] have put in place to mitigate the risk of fatigue when reducing available rest opportunities, increasing FDP and implementing non-standard calculations of FTLs?
Fatigue reporting
The reporters collectively agree that they do not feel they can raise concerns regarding fatigue due to a perceived, or real threat of potential repercussions that may impact their employment.
The reporters state the active discouragement of fatigue reporting, resulted in a decrease of fatigue reports. Detecting this, the safety department subsequently conducted a survey in October 2020 to analyse the fatigue climate since the changes to rostering policies in response to COVID-19. Over 90% of respondents answered they had not reported fatigue in the previous 12 months. Sourced from free text answers, the survey identified that the primary concern for not submitting fatigue reports was the threat of redundancy. 80% of respondents claimed that changes to FT calculations and extensions to FDP since COVID-19 had increased stress at work with 60% of flight crew claiming that this stress had affected their sleep.
It is reported that the survey also sought to identify areas of emerging fatigue risk. The major risks identified were the Special ULR turn-around flights, scheduling, fatigue reporting and the effect fatigue was having on staff mental and physical health.
However, to date (18 Jan 2022), it has been reported that no changes have been made to rostering, and fatigue has been further exacerbated by a reduction to stand-down periods following fatigue reports.
1. Operator has not changed any FTL policies as a result of COVID -19.
2. In regard to flight time limitations (FTL), the reporters state that ‘relief crew are not permitted to log taxi, take-off and landing as FT despite being required to be present on the flight deck for these phases of flight. Relief crew are to deduct 1½ hours from their FT to cover these periods’.
[Foreign operator] advises that all time in the jump seat is recorded towards FTL, in accordance with the OM. However, relief crew operating take-off and landings in the jump seat are not permitted to log those (1.5) hours towards flight crew licensing (FCL) hours.
It has become evident through [foreign operator's] own internal reporting mechanisms, and through the ATSB REPCON, that an Air Crew Notice did cause some confusion among flight crew as to how these hours are being calculated and recorded. As a result, [foreign operator] issued a second Air Crew Notice clarifying that the 1.5 hour deduction for time spent in the jump seat is for the purpose of FCL hours only. Time in the jump seat continues to be recorded towards FTL. In addition, [foreign operator] proposes to produce an e-learning module which will outline to all crew, how flight hours are logged and calculated in [foreign operator’s] time recording system. It is expected that this will alleviate any confusion in regard to how time in the jump seat is recorded.
3. The practice of not logging time spent in a rest facility, when part of an operating crew on augmented flights, towards FTLs was prevalent prior to 2019. With the introduction of EASA FTLs in 2019, [State regulator] approved [foreign operator's] OM which defines the logging FTL hours as flight deck time, minus the time spent in a rest facility, towards FTLs, and based on FRMS. This is only applicable on flights with augmented crew.
However, to ensure [foreign operator] continues to maintain a robust FRMS, [foreign operator] engaged with an external consultant to review our FRMS in October 2021 and are currently working through the results of that review. Should there be any areas identified where there is room for improvement, [foreign operator] will take steps to ensure a best practice approach to FRMS is followed, regardless of the minimum regulatory requirements.
4. [Foreign operator] refutes the reporters claims that [foreign operator] discourages fatigue reporting and that a punitive culture exists for those who report fatigue, or any other safety concern. [Foreign operator] prides itself on its robust FRMS and encourages an open and just reporting culture. Should any crew have queries or concerns in regard to the way FTL or FCL hours are being calculated, or is concerned that they are experiencing fatigue, [foreign operator] encourages crew to contact the safety department who will discuss the individual’s concerns on a case by case basis. Put simply, [foreign operator] maintain an open-door policy.
A CASA international inspector recently presented a paper to the ICAO Flight Operations group regarding operators continually using extended FDTL post COVID-19 pandemic i.e., normalising what was put in place to mitigate the initial COVID-19 layover issue.
It was expressed by ICAO Flight operations Secretariate that the practice of extended FDTL outside the operator’s established FRMS should come to an end and mentioned that this issue will be raised as part of the ICAO HQ regular meetings with the ICAO regional offices.