Airservices Australia should note the safety deficiency detailed
in this report and take appropriate action.
SUBJECT
Preparatory training of air traffic control personnel prior to "on
the job training".
OCCURRENCE SUMMARY
A controller was undergoing training in aerodrome control in Perth
control tower under the supervision of a rated aerodrome controller
(ADC). The traffic situation became complex and the trainee lost
traffic awareness, so the rated controller took over control of the
position. Subsequent instructions by the ADC resulted in a
Metroliner inadvertently entering military controlled airspace
without a clearance, then conflicting with a Macchi aircraft
conducting an instrument approach.
ANALYSIS
Airservices Australia have a limited training program in Perth for
controllers undergoing training and rating for tower control
positions (which includes aerodrome, surface movement and tower
coordination control). Additionally, there are very limited
facilities to assist tower position controllers to develop specific
skills prior to undertaking OJT.
Controllers undertaking approach/enroute training are placed on a
three week training program, consisting of one week of classroom
briefings followed by two weeks in a radar approach/enroute
simulator, before commencing OJT. By comparison, controllers
training for tower positions receive no preparatory training prior
to commencing OJT. They are limited by the lack of specific
training systems and procedures. Consequently, trainee tower
controllers may be less prepared for the initial task of OJT in
comparison to their approach and enroute training
contemporaries.
This is the situation at all air traffic service locations around
Australia. There is no specific facility for the preparation of
tower trainee controllers. Additionally, there is no policy
regarding the preparatory training that should be provided to
compensate for the lack of tower training facilities.
This training preparation potentially compromises safety in the
aerodrome environment while trainees undergo OJT. OJT requires a
rated controller to oversee the trainee while the latter attempts
to operate facilities and implement control and separation
procedures. This entails a degree of prompting (the level depending
on the experience, inherent skills and knowledge of the trainee) by
the rated controller to ensure that the trainee undertakes
separation and control in sufficient time. Due to the nature of the
training, the trainee is often slow to act and the rated controller
is required to take over the control function. It is during this
period that incidents are likely to occur as the rated controller
endeavours to correct problems either created by the trainee, or as
a result of delays or misunderstanding in the OJT process.
The separation and control of aircraft in a safe manner by a
trainee, while endeavouring to understand and develop particular
control skills and knowledge under instruction, is recognised as a
difficult process. Adequate preparation of the trainee controller
before undergoing OJT is essential for the maintenance of a safe
air traffic control environment.
SAFETY DEFICIENCY
Airservices Australia does not utilise an aerodrome control
training facility or program that ensures trainee controllers are
adequately prepared to undertake OJT.
Airservices Australia should note the safety deficiency detailed
in this report and take appropriate action.
I am writing in response to your Safety Advisory Notice on
Occurrence 9601487.
Airservices has previously responded at length on this issue and
I note that BASI has only made minor changes to the original draft
occurrence report.
I must state again that it is Airservices' considered opinion
that "training" or the presence of a trainee in the ADC position
prior to the incident had little material effect upon the
outcome.
In support of this position, the following circumstances should
be noted:
- the incident occurred approximately 5 minutes after the
trainee was removed by the training officer;
- the training officer removed the trainee from the "hot seat"
as he was becoming overloaded, an indication that the training
officer was aware of the developing traffic picture;
- the training officer, a rated ADC with a great deal of
experience in this position, had ample time to assess and rectify
any irregularities in the traffic disposition or display.
Statements in the original investigation report, that the ADC
was required to constantly change the radar range and had
difficulty in maintaining the traffic picture due to facility
problems are strongly disputed.
These contentions are not supported by Airservices' own
investigations and are contrary to the evidence of current and past
practice. This point was made in my previous response.
With regard to the trainee, the following points are made
again:
- the trainee was an ATC with at least 15 years experience in
control towers. This experience included GAAP, outstation and Perth
Towers;
- this was the second period of training for a Perth ADC rating
for this officer. He had already experienced the procedures the
report claims he did not understand on his previous attempt;
- the trainee was well advanced in the training program on this
attempt and as such it is even more doubtful that any lack of
preparatory training was a contributory factor.
Not withstanding the above, Airservices accepts that there may
have been deficiencies in the training program provided to officers
attempting control tower training in the past.
ATS management in Perth has introduced a program of preparatory
training for officers attempting a Tower conversion.
In addition, the ATS Operational Training Unit has developed a
formalised program for ab-initio and conversion training to Tower
ratings which includes to the extent possible by the availability
of resources, use of the RAAF East Sale Tower simulator.