Output Number
Approval Date
Organisation
Civil Aviaiton Safety Authority
Published Date Time
Recommendation type
Mode
Date released

Safety Issue

The requirements of Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 157 and the
operator's Approval to conduct Low Flying Instrument did
not include any requirement to specifically define the area in
which the low flying was carried out.

Safety Recommendation

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue.

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Text

Further to your transport safety investigation report 200600523
on the fatal accident involving a Bell 206B (lll) helicopter
registered, VH-MFI, which occurred 15 kilometres east of Parkes
Aerodrome, New South Wales on 2 February 2006 and the subsequent
coronial investigation, CASA would like to inform the ATSB of
additional action CASA is taking regarding ATSB recommendations
R20070013 and R20070014.

R20070013 [safety issue description deleted]

CASA is reviewing ATSB recommendation 20070013. CASA understands
that the intent of the ATSB recommendation is for operations
conducted at heights below CAR 157 (1000 feet over populous area
and 500 feet over non populous area) to only be carried out in
accordance with an operator's operations manual in an area defined
in advance by the task.

Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviaiton Safety Authority
Response Text

I refer to your e-mail dated 30 September 2009 requesting an
update on ATSB recommendations and related actions that resulted
from the above referenced investigation and in particular, ATSB
recommendation R20070013.



This recommendation related to Low Flying Instruments and was
developed and issued an effort to minimise the unnecessary exposure
of an aircraft and crew to low-level hazards, including powerlines,
in an attempt to reduce the risk of a wire strike.



We have reviewed our initial response and can now provide an
update as follows.



Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 206 defines what is considered
Aerial Work operation.  The purpose of issuing a Low Flying
Instrument of Approval to conduct operations below the altitudes
specified in CAR 157 is to allow an operator to participate in
Aerial Work activities as outlined on the operators' air operations
certificate (AOC).



The "area" of operation is not defined on the Instrument because
the nature of aerial work is such that it is generally not confined
to the same specific geographic area for every operation, for
example Air Ambulance, Search and Rescue are aerial work
functions.  To specify an "area" of operations, CASA would
need to have knowledge of the area of operations and time of
operation relevant to the activity being undertaken for each
task.  The assessment of these facts would be limited by
resources and may not necessarily lead to enhanced safety outcomes.
 



It is generally recognised that the low flying activity is
hazardous because of the task, not necessarily the "area" in which
it is being performed.  The responsibility is placed on both
the pilot and operator to ascertain the risk for each operation and
apply the procedures to mitigate the identified risks in operating
an aircraft for the task.  The operator must outline in Part D
of the operators' Operations Manual how each Aerial Work or
specialised activity is to be conducted and training and minimum
experience requirements.  Pilots in command must have
qualification through training to perform the low flying
task.



The introduction of CASR 119 in the future will require all
passenger carrying AOC's to have a Safety Management System (SMS)
in place.  There is no current legislation that requires an
Aerial Work AOC to have a formal SMS.  The lack of a formal
SMS does not relieve the pilot in command of an aircraft of the
responsibility to assess the level of risk involved in performing
the task.  Part D of the Operations Manual should have
sufficient detail on how to conduct the operation and mitigate any
risk involved.

ATSB Response

The CASA response does not address the intent of the
recommendation, which was to reduce unnecessary aircraft exposure
to low-level hazards.



This recommendation has been closed - no action.