Safety Recommendation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that
Airservices Australia review the effectiveness of its check and
training program in the area of procedural control services.
Safety Recommendation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that
Airservices Australia review the effectiveness of its check and
training program in the area of procedural control services.
Currently Airservices can see no justification to support this
recommendation if it is based on the single incident referred to in
the brief. The individual involved was checked following the
incident and returned to duty. It should also be noted, as
referenced in the report, refresher training for all tower
controllers has been provided in radio telephony in regard to
visual separation which was an error in the incident.
Your response to the recommendation R20040063 is accepted by the
ATSB and its status will remain classified as "MONITOR" until the
MATS amendment has been incorporated.
Your response to the recommendation R20040062 however, is not
accepted by the ATSB and its status remains classified as "OPEN".
While your response meets the literal interpretation of our
recommendation, I am concerned that the focus of your response was
on visual separation. The ATSB recommendation was made because the
controller did not provide any form of procedural separation
between the two aircraft prior to the application of visual
separation. Indeed, the investigation has discovered that there may
be a more widespread problem within Airservices Australia of a
limited understanding of procedural separation concepts.
The Secretary of DOTARS has noted that if there are systemic
problems, they must be clearly identified and fully addressed. The
ATSB recommendation was not based on a single incident and OASIS
summaries of other incidents where procedural separation standards
have not been applied are attached at Enclosure 1. Accordingly, you
are encouraged to undertake a broader review of the effectiveness
of Airservices Australia's check and training program in the area
of procedural control services.
I write in response to a letter from (name deleted) which was
dated the 18th of August 2004. This letter indicated that our
previous response to recommendation R20020062 was not accepted by
the ATSB as it was believed that Airservices Australia had taken
the literal interpretation of the recommendation and had focused on
visual separation. The letter suggested on the basis of a list of
incidents provided that Airservices Australia take a broader review
of the effectiveness of Airservices Australia's check and training
program in the area of procedural control services.
Following receipt of this letter, (name and position deleted)
undertook a review of the occurrences provided (see commentary
provided at Appendix A). This review compliments the analysis
completed for the Breakdown of Separation (BoS) Review which was
conducted in 2003, and the post-implementation review of the
associated BoS Recommendation project which also evaluated
incidents from a controller performance stand point. In neither
review did Airservices Australia identify unhealthy norms or
systemic performance issues within the procedural Tower
environments. These reviews conclude that Airport Services conducts
performance checks in accordance with the requirements of the
CATSOAM.
The mandated CATSOAM checking regime is complimented by the Cross
Unit Evaluations which are conducted on an annual basis within
Airport Services. This program demands that a selected ATC from a
like type tower (eg GAAP, regional, radar) evaluate the operations
at another Tower. The Tower Manager and one other controller are
checked by the visiting ATC to ensure that the standard of checking
is maintained at the highest level. A full and comprehensive report
is supplied after each of these station checks.
Each year like type tower conferences are held [GAAP, Regional and
RADAR] and all aspects of check and training are raised in the
forum.
As recognised in your letter, one of the most difficult aspects of
Regional Tower Control is the concept of procedural separation and
its application in the different classes of airspace and different
categories of aircraft. The number of ATC's that fail to achieve
rating standard in our regional ports is testimony to the
importance of this concept being fully understood.
The training for rating and subsequent checks to maintain ratings,
is intensive and exhaustive, and we remain convinced that we do not
have a systemic problem with our checking regime for procedural
towers.
Appendix A
Hamilton Island 25/5/1999
No separation standard was applied.
Argyle WA 19/3/2001
Not a Tower issue.
Tamworth 27/6/2001
This is not a procedural separation issue for the tower as such.
The aircraft was on a visual approach entering the circuit and
failed to join final as instructed resulting in the aircraft flying
through final. The controller was not required to apply a
procedural standard as he was using visual separation at the time.
This occurrence is a failure on the pilot in command to comply with
procedures.
Albury 8/7/2002
In this breakdown, the understanding of the procedural separation
requirement is quite clear. The phraseology was poor.
Mackay 16/11/2002
Separation Standard was not applied.
Mackay 29/1/2004
Separation Standard was technically infringed as the ATC used TSAD
to establish one aircraft OCTA. The ATC fully understood the
procedural standard.
Hamilton Is 17/7/04
A procedural standard had been established between the aircraft.
Misunderstanding of circuit entry direction then led to a breakdown
in separation.