Output Number
Approval Date
Published Date Time
Recommendation type
Mode
Date released
Background Text

HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT



At 2109 EST on 17 October 2003, a pilot, crewman and paramedic
operating a Bell 407 helicopter, registered VH-HTD, were tasked to
fly from Mackay to Hamilton Island, Queensland, to transport an
injured patient back to Mackay. The flight was planned as a visual
operation at night and departed at approximately 2135. When the
helicopter did not arrive at Hamilton Island, a search was
initiated and a search helicopter crew later sighted the wreckage
of HTD floating in the water. Some time later, marine rescue craft
arrived and commenced a search, but no survivors were
located.



Air Traffic Services recorded radar information indicated that the
helicopter, while tracking north-northwest, was flying between
2,900 ft and 3,100 ft for the majority of the flight. It
subsequently climbed to 3,700 ft and performed a number of abrupt
manoeuvres before descending to 2,700 ft and disappearing from
radar coverage.



A weather report provided by the Bureau of Meteorology indicated
that, at the time of the occurrence, there was scattered cloud at
2,900 ft and broken cloud at 9,800 ft and no moon. Moonrise that
night was expected to occur at 6 minutes after midnight.



During the investigation, ATSB investigators conducted a night
flight in similar environmental conditions, at the same altitude
and track towards Hamilton Island. They reported that while
tracking north-northwest in the area of the accident, it was very
dark with no ground or celestial illumination visible and no
discernible horizon.





SAFETY DEFICIENCY



During the course of the investigation, a safety deficiency
relating to visual operations at night was identified.



General requirements for visual operations are contained in
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 1.2 paragraph 2.6.
Flights under the Visual Flight Rules (VFR), for both day and night
operations, are required to be conducted in accordance with various
provisions, including those relating to flight visibility and
distance from cloud. When flying outside controlled airspace below
10,000 ft, the required flight visibility is 5,000 m. There is also
a requirement for 1,500 m horizontal and 1,000 ft vertical
separation from cloud when flying above 3,000 ft above mean sea
level, or 1,000 ft above ground level (whichever is the higher).
Pilots operating at or below 3,000 ft are required to remain clear
of cloud and in sight of ground or water.



The AIP does not require pilots to consider the amount of external
visual reference that is likely to be available for a visual flight
conducted at night. In particular, it does not require pilots to
consider the amount of celestial illumination, the amount of
terrain lighting, or the presence of a visual horizon either
enroute, or at the destination aerodrome. Pilots are also not
required to consider the presence of high-altitude cloud along the
planned route that may obscure celestial illumination.



In addition to the general requirements detailed in the AIP, Civil
Aviation Regulation (CAR) 138 requires pilots to comply with any
specific requirements detailed in aircraft and rotorcraft flight
manuals. Some flight manuals contain specific night flight
limitations. For example, the Transport Canada approved Bell 206B
flight manual states:



'Night flight operation is limited to visual contact flight
conditions. Orientation shall be maintained through visual
reference to ground objects solely as a result of lights on the
ground or adequate celestial illumination.'



The investigation noted that there was no specific night flight
limitation in the Bell 407 flight manual.



Under certain conditions, external visual reference is not
possible while conducting visual operations at night. These include
operating over water or remote areas, in moonless conditions, and
at times when the celestial horizon is obscured by cloud. From the
available information, such conditions probably existed during the
flight from Mackay to Hamilton Island on the night of the
accident.



The investigation to determine the significant factors that
contributed to the Bell 407 accident on 17 October 2003 is
continuing.

Safety Recommendation

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority review the night visual flight
requirements and promulgate information to pilots emphasising the
importance, during flight planning, of considering whether:



* environmental conditions allow for aircraft orientation by
visual reference alone;



* there is likely to be sufficient ground or natural lighting and
flight visibility along the proposed route to provide visual
reference to the ground and/or water during the flight; and



* they are capable of safely operating the aircraft should
non-visual conditions be encountered.

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status
Response Text

CASA supports the issues raised in the Air Safety Recommendation
and advises that the Authority is currently reviewing the night
visual flight requirements with a view to emphasising to pilots,
through its safety promotion activities, the importance of
considering the above factors.

In response to the matters raised in the report, CASA wishes to
bring the following to

the attention of the ATSB. The report, at the heading of 'Safety
Deficiency' contains

the following:



'The AIP does not require pilots to consider the amount of external
visual

reference that is likely to be available for a visual flight
conducted at night. In particular, it does not require pilots to
consider the amount of celestial illumination, the amount of
terrain lighting, or the presence of a visual horizon either
enroute, or at the destination aerodrome. Pilots are also not
required to consider the presence of high-altitude cloud along the
planned routes that may obscure celestial illumination.'



CASA believes that the ATSB may have overlooked the "ground
lighting" requirement specified in subparagraph 4.2(d) of Section
20.18 of the Civil Aviation Orders.



Paragraph 4.2 states:

"A helicopter shall not be operated under the Instrument Flight
Rules unless it is equipped with:

(a) the flight and navigation instruments specified in Appendixes
VII, Vill, or IX to this section as applicable;

(b) any other instruments, indicators or equipment specified it the
helicopter flight manual;

(c) the minimum lighting equipment specified in Appendix V to this
section; and

(d) an approved automatic pilot, or automatic stabilisation system,
for other than night VFR flights except that in the case of such
flight which will involve more than 30 minutes fight over water or
over land areas where aircraft altitude cannot be maintained by
reference to ground lighting, an approved autostabilisation system
or a two pilot crew shall be carried."

Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status
Response Text

CASA does not agree that a review of night VFR requirements is
necessary. Firstly, regulations specify that weather conditions of
night VFR must be such that a planned flight can be conducted at a
safe height clear of cloud. With respect to pilot competency, Civil
Aviation Order (CAO) 40.2.2 specifies that the night VFR rating
requires pilot be trained to control an aircraft solely by
reference to instruments.



Any notion that celestial lighting and/or an apparent visible
horizon are appropriate references for the control of an aircraft
by night is misleading and dangerous and increases the probability
of pilot disorientation.



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Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Text

CASA expressed concern that the report appeared to attribute the
cause of the accident to night VFR regulations rather than the
shortcomings in recruitment, induction and training.

Moreover, CASA was troubled by the emphasis placed by ATSB on the
need for specifying minimum ambient lighting requirements for night
VFR operations. Reliance on ambient lighting at night rather than
instruments for attitude reference is potentially hazardous due to
the high risk of pilot disorientation.

CASA strongly believes that the requirements specified in Civil
Aviation Order (CAO) 40.2.2 are adequate for night VFR operations.
It is the responsibility of the operators to ensure that pilots
meet the requirements specified for rating issue, especially those
related to instrument flying. Therefore, CASA does not believe that
a review of these requirements is necessary given that Australia
already has the most comprehensive night VFR pilot
qualification.