Recommendation

An internal hazard identification workshop was undertaken using
pilots and controllers to review the extent of hazards associated
with the assignment of non standard levels. The workshop report is
attached for your review. The review determined that to not have
the flexibility to use non-standard levels would significantly
increase the number of level changes and thereby increase the level
of risk beyond the current level. As can be seen from the report a
number of recommendations were made to assure that the extent and
operation of the use of non-standard levels was optimised.

Firstly, let me apologise for the very late response to this
recommendation. Unfortunately the recommendation did not get
processed in accordance with our usual management practices.



The text of this recommendation was as follows: "The Australian
Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Airservices Australia
conduct a review to establish the extent of the use of non-standard
levels in situations initiated by pilots and in situations
initiated by controllers".



A workshop on the application of non-standard levels was conducted
in December 2003 with industry consultation occurring through 2004.
The workshop and industry consultation did not determine with any
accuracy the extent of use of non-standard levels. Review within
Airservices Australia equally has not been able to definitely
determine a quantitative figure on their utilisation. Their use
varies within the year with factors such as jet stream
effects.



Documentation within MATS and AIP limit the circumstances within
which ATC can initiate the use of non-standard levels (see below).
Airservices Australia believes that these are appropriate, and our
Check and Standardisation regime confirms that these are being
utilised by ATC:



AIP ENR 1.7 -- 6

3. CRUISING LEVELS

3.1 Selection of Levels

3.1.1 Flights must be planned in accordance with levels selected
from the tables at Section 5. Any part of a flight that will take
place south of 45S must be planned in accordance with levels
selected from the tables at Section 6. 3.1.2 Within controlled
airspace, ATC may assign and pilots may request a level that does
not accord with the tables in Section 5.



MATS

Assigning levels

6.1.2.5 Level assignment shall take into account:

a. separation;

b. terrain clearance;

c. provision for radio failure;

d priority.

6.1.2.6 When practicable, the pilot requested level should be
accommodated. 6.1.2.7 When adjustment of a level is necessary for
entry to, or leaving controlled airspace, the adjustment should be
made within controlled airspace.

6.1.2.8 Cruising levels conforming to the appropriate table of
cruising levels (See "Tables of Cruising Levels" Annex 4-8) should
be assigned as necessary to provide separation between aircraft.
Levels not conforming to these tables may be assigned when traffic
or other circumstances require. 6.1.2.9 Unless coordination is
effected, aircraft entering airspace where RVSM is not applied
shall be assigned a level complying with the accepting sector's
table of cruising levels before the sector boundary, or by the time
or distance specified by the accepting sector.

Non standard levels

6.1.2.10 When a non standard level is assigned, controllers should
consider: a. workload implications;

b. coordination implications;

c. the effect on other aircraft at standard levels.

Priority for level assignment

6.1.2.11 Level assignment shall generally be determined as
follows:

a. aircraft at standard flight levels shall be afforded priority
over aircraft at nonstandard flight levels;

b. aircraft assigned a level shall have priority over aircraft
requesting that level;

c. when two or more aircraft are at the same level, the preceding
aircraft shall have priority.

Variation to standard assignable levels

6.1.2.12 Where standard assignable levels have been implemented
for arriving and departing aircraft, assignment of other than
agreed levels must be subject to specific coordination.

Aircraft at non-standard cruising levels

6.1.2.13 Aircraft operating at other than a level conforming to
the table of cruising levels for the particular direction of flight
or notifying intention to cruise at such a level, shall be advised
accordingly and the pilots intentions sought.



I would also note that the workshop determined that mandating the
absolute use of standard levels across the board will increase the
level of risk beyond that evident in the current circumstances.

Since the release of this report in 2003, Airservices has been
investigating the issue of non standard routes and non standard
levels in respect of recommendations R20030056 and R20030057.

As you would be aware, flight planning errors of this type are
routinely and reliably tracked through the ESIR application.
Airservices analysed this data and ascertained that non standard
routes are not normally a significant contributory factor to

Breakdown of Separation.

Nonetheless, over the past several years we have invested
significantly in examining technical solutions that would detect
flight planning errors and highlight them to the controller.

Our investigations determined that it was not feasible to use
either NAIPS (Airservices' flight planning system) or to develop a
separate database to process flight plans prior to entering the
Eurocat system. Further, we determined that the cost of
implementation in Eurocat for a warning system is high, and as
Airservices has now commenced work on its future ATS system the
lead time and cost does not support further work in this area.

We discussed the use of non standard levels with CASA a number
of years ago and it was determined that the number of changes of
level that would be incurred if standard levels were required to be
utilised in all cases would introduce an increased level of risk
into the system.

In addition, since this incident a number of changes have been
introduced to improve instruction to both pilots and air traffic
controllers on the use of non standard levels.

The Aeronautical Information Publication (AlP) was updated on 18
November 2010 and now specifically states that a pilot must only
request a non conforming level when it is determined by the pilot
in command to be essential to the safety of the flight and its
occupants.

Airservices' Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) captures this
same procedure and this will be further enhanced in June with an
additional requirement that the controller must make an assessment
of the safety impact to all traffic against any operational penalty
to the aircraftprior to assigning the non conforming level and that
this assessment must be updated regularly.

The other key safety enhancement is that a pilot must now report
to ATC when the aircraft can return to a conforming level. ATC is
required to make this request if not volunteered by the pilot.

As demonstrated above, Airservices has seriously considered the
issues raised in this report and has determined that there are no
further reasonable steps that can be taken to address the
recommendations.