The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority conduct a review of all Boeing jet
aircraft maintenance documentation to ensure completeness of main
cabin door escape slide deactivation and activation to return to
service following maintenance action.
CASA has reviewed your recommendation and will be discussing the
issue with our officers responsible for operators of aircraft
equipped with escape slides. Our intention is to determine an
appropriate action to ensure operators are made aware of the issue
and check their procedures.
In response to Recommendation R200100168, CASA advises the
following:
CASA has requested our Airline Operations Offices responsible for
the airlines operating Boeing Jet aircraft, to take appropriate
action to review the airlines' main cabin door escape slide
deactivation and reactivation maintenance procedures.
CASA has received advice back from one of our Airline Operations
Offices with regard to Boeing 737 aircraft. A number of revisions
have been made to the airlines' maintenance documentation and
procedures including the inclusion of an independent inspection.
CASA feels that the amendments have satisfactorily addressed the
ATSB Recommendation.
A response from our other Airline Operations Office is expected in
the near future, at which time CASA undertakes to advise the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau of the action undertaken.
Thank you for your letter of 2 September 2002 regarding
Recommendation R20010168. You sought a response concerning
documentation and proposed revisions from one of the Authority's
Airline Offices relating to aircraft other than B737 models. Please
accept my apologies for the delay in my reply. A review of the
airlines escape slide maintenance procedures has revealed that a
considerable amount of effort has been made by the operator to
closely analyse the cause of escape slide incidents and remedy the
problems found. This review has resulted in a number of procedural
and design changes being introduced. A summary of the actions
undertaken by the operator is attached for the information of the
ATSB. CASA believes that this action satisfactorily addresses the
Recommendation. Thank you for bringing this matter to the attention
of the Authority.
B747 & B767
• Following any maintenance on the Slide/Raft there is now an
additional task card maintenance check and certification
requirement to ensure that the safety pin has been removed and
stowed.
• Task cards requiring certification are also provided to
deactivate/activate the door assist bottle with instructions to fit
a safety pin in the door select lever.
• Action has been initiated to introduce a separate check to
deactivate/reactivate the slide raft systems at the completion of
"C" Checks. An additional task card will also be included to ensure
safety pins are not fitted to the slide bottles and are correctly
stowed.
• Longer streamers will also be fitted to the safety pins so they
will protrude outside the door bustles.
• The airline is also experimenting with a modified (longer) safety
pin, which is currently on trial.
