Output Number
Approval Date
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Date released
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SUBJECT



Powerline markings and aerodrome information.



OCCURRENCE SUMMARY



The aircraft, a PA 38-112 Tomahawk, was on final approach for a
landing at Torquay (Vic.) ALA when it struck powerlines. The
aircraft suffered significant damage from the powerlines and
further damage from the impact with the ground. The pilot and his
passenger (also a pilot) were not harmed.



ANALYSIS



THE POWERLINES: The aircraft collided with two strands of 3 X 12
gauge (2.75-mm) galvanised steel powerlines, grey in colour. The
pole height was 12 m and the line dropped to 6.55 m above ground
level at its lowest point. The lines ran perpendicular to the
runway direction, a short distance outside the fence marking the
end of the runway surface. The line was marked by orange marine
buoys of 200-mm diameter that had faded on the upper surface to a
dull white. This combination of grey powerlines and faded markers
made the lines virtually indistinguishable from the dry, light
brown surface, especially in the prevailing bright but overcast
conditions. The electricity company had conducted a ground
inspection of the markers every 3 years but had no requirement to
check the upper surface for fading. At the time of the accident the
markers had been installed for approximately 8 years.



Many aerodromes and landing areas around Australia are situated
near buildings or homesteads, and many of these have power supplied
to them by overhead powerlines. Many of these lines have been
marked prior to the publishing of the relevant standard in 1991,
hence a wide variety of markings have been used, many of which are
not effective in ensuring clear visibility from the air.



The Australian Standard 3891.1 recommends that any powerlines which
infringe the transitional slope or the approach and take-off slope
of an aerodrome shall be marked by a minimum of three spherical
markers of at least 600-mm diameter placed less than 30 m apart.
One of the markers should be off- white and the other colours
should be chosen to provide maximum contrast with the ground. The
other recommended colours are canary yellow and signal red, with
international orange available for circumstances requiring an
unusual contrast. The markers should also be made of a material
that is resistant to deterioration caused by ultraviolet light. The
document containing the full details of this standard is available
from Standards Australia. Comparing the installed markers with the
Australian standard, the marine buoys installed were a third of the
required diameter and they had lost their colour on the upper
surface.



There is a good chance that this accident would not have occurred
had the powerlines been marked to meet the Australian standard. If
the standard had been followed there would have been at least three
markers on the line, each of which presented over eight times more
visible surface than the installed markers. In addition, the
brightly coloured material would have provided a strong contrast
with the background.





AERODROME MARKINGS: The Torquay airport operator had placed
displaced landing threshold markers some way into the landing strip
of runway 18 to establish a safe approach gradient over the
powerlines. These markers were painted white, as were the runway
edge markers, which extended the full length of the runway surface.
The colouring of the airfield surface, at the end of a hot dry
summer, did not provide adequate contrast to allow the pilot to see
the white landing threshold markers against the dry grassed surface
of the runway. The aerodrome was marked correctly, however, the
local dry conditions contributed to the accident by preventing easy
identification of the displaced threshold.



AERODROME INFORMATION: The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) Airports Directory contains information supplied by the
aerodrome operator on a survey form supplied by AOPA. That survey
form does not follow the example on page 55 of the Airservices
Australia publication, the Enroute Supplement Australia, in that it
does not list any examples of hazards that need to be considered.
An airport owner may not consider relevant or cover all the hazards
associated with the aerodrome unless there was a list for
reference. The information published for Torquay did not mention
powerlines or any displaced landing thresholds.



Before departing for Torquay the pilot had studied the AOPA
airfield directory and phoned the operator for approval to land. He
also asked about local conditions and was informed of parachute
operations that day. The pilot did not ask, nor was he told about
any powerlines or displaced thresholds. The pilot and his passenger
were familiar with the runway layout having flown over the
aerodrome previously, however neither had landed at the aerodrome.
Approaching Torquay they had heard another aircraft broadcast that
it was landing on runway 18 so they joined crosswind for that
runway, noting as they flew overhead the worn take-off threshold
area adjacent to the fence.



The pilot followed the correct procedure by telephoning the airport
prior to departure, however when questioned later by the
investigator, the operator advised that he had not brought the
powerline or the displaced threshold to the attention of the pilot.
Also, the operator later advised that the correct details and a
diagram could be found in the other private airfield directory, the
Country Airstrips Guide. He did not check which guide the pilot was
using.



The Enroute Supplement (ERSA) lists items to be considered by
pilots before a safe operation can be conducted into an unfamiliar
aerodrome. Listed below are the specific obstacles, hazards and
special procedures used as examples in ERSA, along with further
items that may need to be considered (this list is by no means
meant to be comprehensive).



Obstacles: - Power lines, trees, buildings, terrain, roads,
railways, fences, windmills, towers and masts etc.

Hazards:- Turbulence, updraughts, downdraughts, livestock, birds,
wildlife, long dry/wet grass, effect of recent rain (e.g. washouts
or soft spots), ditches, drains, earth mounds, tree stumps,
vehicles, anthills, animal burrows, non-standard markings, rough
areas and obstacles hidden by long grass etc.

Special Procedures:- Circuit direction, noise sensitive areas (eg
cattle yards or homes), sport aviation and displaced thresholds
etc.







SAFETY DEFICIENCIES

- Powerlines in the vicinity of some aerodromes and landing areas
are not adequately marked.

- Under some conditions, aerodrome colouring can make runway
markers difficult to distinguish, particularly if the pilot is
unaware of any displaced thresholds.

- A pilot that does not have access to detailed information
regarding local conditions may not be able to conduct safe
operations into an unfamiliar aerodrome.

That AOPA bring to the attention of its members the above
information and amend the Airports Directory survey form to
include, as examples, specific mention of the obstacles, hazards
and special procedures detailed earlier.

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association of Australia
Response Text

Thank you for the opportunity to indicate AOPA's action in
accordance with your recommendation.

Firstly, AOPA no longer publish an Airfield Directory. New
Directories will be published by AOPA Foundation with the first
Issue going to print shortly. AOPA Foundation have changed the
Directory Information Survey Form from that previously used by AOPA
to include a section relating to special procedures and obstacles
etc.

Not withstanding the above it should be brought to your
attention that the Survey Form, as with the previous AOPA Survey
Form, also solicits information on availability of toilets,
telephones, rental cars, accommodation and local attractions.

My advice from the Directors of AOPA Foundation is that this is
not an operational document. It is, in fact, a guide to planning.
However, the Foundation has suggested that it will provide numerous
disclaimers and instructions to that effect throughout the
document.

The Foundation is also acutely aware that with the smaller
amount of information now able to be accessed from official
documents such as ERSA, that there may be a tendency for Pilots to
use Airfield Directories in a manner for which they were not
intended. 1 have personally raised this matter with Airservices at
a recent RAPAC meeting in South Australia.

The Foundation have asked whether BASI would be prepared to
supply AOPA Foundation with all information BASI have regarding
Airfields and any unusual problems that exist. If so, we would be
pleased to receive such data as a matter of urgency. If not, we
respectfully request a reason, as to why.

With regard to the recommendation that AOPA brings to the
attention of its members, the information contained in the body of
the report on Occurrence No 9700822, AOPA agrees with the
recommendation and will publish the report in due course.