Output Number
Approval Date
Published Date Time
Recommendation type
Mode
Date released
Background Text

SUBJECT



Comprehensive systems safety analysis of the simultaneous opposite
direction parallel runway operations (SODPROPS).





OCCURRENCE SUMMARY



Occurrence 9700052



Simultaneous opposite direction parallel runway operations
(SODPROPS) were introduced at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport,
whereby arriving aircraft approach and land on one runway
concurrently with aircraft departures from the parallel runway, in
the opposite direction.



In this occurrence, an A320 aircraft was to depart from runway 16
Left and the A320 crew were assigned a radar departure with an
initial left turn onto 115 degrees. The crew mistakenly dialled 155
degrees into their flight management system (FMS), despite
correctly acknowledging the assigned heading of 115 degrees.



There was an aircraft approaching runway 34 Left, the reciprocal
parallel runway, under the SODPROPS procedure.



After takeoff, when the A320 crew selected the heading mode on the
FMS, they realised that they had set the incorrect heading. They
continued on the runway heading until the correct heading could be
confirmed. The Tower controller was not able to instruct the crew
to turn left as they had already transferred to the Departures
South (DEPS) frequency.



The Departures South controller instructed the A320 crew to turn
left onto 115 degrees and the aircraft did not breach the
separation standard for the approach in this instance.



The investigation found no record of any significant analysis of
the risks associated with the development and adoption of SODPROPS
for Australian use.



SAFETY DEFICIENCY



The safety implications of SODPROPS were not adequately addressed
prior to the introduction of the procedure at Sydney Airport.





ANALYSIS



Investigation of the occurrence found that the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) adapted a USA Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) air traffic control spacing and sequencing
standard (FAA 7110.65J) and incorporated it into the CASA Manual of
Operational Standards part 3, para. 5.9 "Simultaneous Opposite
Direction Operations". There was no record that CASA had conducted
any significant analysis of the risks associated with the SODPROPS
procedure



Airservices Australia held an industry seminar in September 1996 to
discuss proposed Sydney traffic management procedures including the
limited use of SODPROPS. At this seminar several participants
questioned the extent of risk analysis that had been conducted to
ensure that SODPROPS provided adequate levels of safety during all
operations. The risk analysis provided to the industry indicated
that a form of quantitative modelling had been conducted but that
the analysis had been performed on a narrow set of data. The
assumptions for the modelling were not analysed and the model
itself was not validated as required in the Legislative Instrument
Proposal (LIP) for the safety regulation of Airservices Australia.
The analysis considered localiser track keeping and departure
procedure compliance. The available evidence indicates that the
analysis was not comprehensive.



The Bureau investigated a serious occurrence at Sydney in 1991
involving a near collision following the introduction of
Simultaneous Runway Operations (SIMOPS). One of the safety
recommendations resulting from that investigation was that the then
Civil Aviation Authority "ensure that, prior to the implementation
of any significant change in operational procedures or regulations,
a comprehensive systems safety analysis is carried out." Similarly,
section 6.3 of the LIP specifically details the manner in which
Airservices Australia is required to manage changes to systems,
equipment or procedures to ensure that unacceptable hazards are
eliminated by the time that the change is completed. There was no
evidence that these requirements were met.



CASA advised Airservices Australia that the standard governing the
use of SODPROPS was available for use without impediments to its
application, providing that the risks associated with the changes
were analysed to ensure that unacceptable hazards were eliminated
before the change was completed. Airservices Australia based some
of the safety analysis of SODPROPS on the use of similar overseas
procedures at international airports. Investigation by the Bureau
of overseas operations found that this premise was not
substantiated. Some minor examples of international parallel
opposite direction operations were found but were not regarded as
sufficiently similar to the Sydney operation to be used to support
Airservices Australia's risk analysis.



Although the use of SODPROPS was restricted to a limited time
during the day, there is now the possibility of extending the hours
of operation at KSA. As the SODPROPS procedure was introduced with
an inadequate analysis of the risks it is imperative that a
comprehensive systems safety analysis be carried out as soon as
practicable.

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation recommends that the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority review the Operational Standard
"Simultaneous Opposite Direction Operations" to ensure that it
provides an acceptable level of safety.



The Bureau has also made the following recommendation (R970150) to
Airservices Australia:



"The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation recommends that Airservices
Australia conduct a comprehensive systems safety analysis of
simultaneous opposite direction parallel runway operations
(SODPROPS)."

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Text

CASA has reviewed the Operational Standard "Simultaneous
Opposite Direction Operations" as you have recommended.



Following Occurrence 9700052 on 5 January 1997 the instructions in
AIP OPS paragraph 19.4 were changed by NOTAM to require pilots to
remain on Tower frequency until instructed to change, thus enabling
Tower to correct the kind of confusion evident during the
occurrence. The amendment will be correctly inserted into the AIP
OPS text by AIP Amendment List 20, effective 4 December 1997.



Given the change to procedures our conclusion is that the standard
expressed in the CASA Manual of Operational Standards (MOS) Part 3
Chapter 5.9 is adequate.



The MOS standard will be further reviewed in the light of any study
which may be undertaken by Airservices in response to your
recommendation R970150.



After dispatching a copy of the [name supplied] report to CASA the
following response was received on 28 Aug 1998:



The letter requests a formal CASA response to the recommendations
in a report attributed to [name supplied]. It cites the CASA/BASI
MOU as the basis for advice of actions CASA intends to take in
response to those recommendations.



It is our belief that this request is not consistent with the MOU
between our two organisations. That MOU lays out a basis for CASA
to respond to safety deficiencies identified by BASI and
recommendations made by BASI to rectify those deficiencies. It does
not require CASA to address recommendations made by a third
party.



It was our understanding that BASI would be forwarding a draft
investigation report to CASA for comment. That report would be
along the lines of the outline we had informally discussed early in
July, and would at your discretion incorporate such findings of the
Gleave report as you saw fit. We would of course be pleased to
provide comment on such a report and indicate actions taken or
planned to address any recommendations the Bureau may choose to
make. We are, as you know, already addressing a number of the
issues discussed at our meeting in July. If you have any questions
on this issue please don't hesitate to call.