Output Number
Approval Date
Published Date Time
Recommendation type
Mode
Date released
Background Text

SUBJECT



Simulator training for technical crews to equip them to handle
jammed ailerons in flight on Boeing aircraft.



OCCURRENCE SUMMARY



Shortly after departing from runway 34L at Sydney, the pilot of a
Boeing 747 advised the departures controller that he could only
comply with left turns, and that he needed to jettison fuel and
return to the airfield. A distress phase was declared and the
aircraft was vectored left to an area over water where fuel was
dumped. The aircraft was subsequently vectored to the centreline of
runway 34L and landed safely.



The subsequent investigation found that a plastic aileron cable
guard had broken and jammed the aileron cables where they run
vertically up the left sidewall of the aircraft. The pilot reported
that he was unable to input any right aileron control and it
appeared to be jammed.



ANALYSIS



The roll control surfaces on Boeing aircraft consist of
hydraulically-powered inboard and outboard ailerons (and spoilers)
which are normally controlled by rotating either control wheel. The
aileron cable control systems are constructed in two separate sets,
linked at the control wheels.



The control wheels are connected through an override mechanism
which allows either wheel to move independently if the aileron
control system connected to the other wheel jams and a significant
manual force is applied to the free wheel. Roll control is then
available through the ailerons on the wing corresponding to the
free wheel.



The pilot in command of the above mentioned aircraft advised that
after the aircraft had been landed, he was present when repairs
were carried out and was surprised at the aileron breakout force
required to override a jammed system. Ground training he had
received covered aileron breakout (override) procedures but he
believed it would be beneficial to have it physically demonstrated
during simulator training in case of such an emergency.



Discussions with other technical crews revealed that, while they
were aware of the system, they were generally not aware of the
physical forces required to break out the aileron control system in
the event of an aileron system jam.



The Boeing Company does not recommend activating the breakout
feature of the aileron control system on a regular basis due to
possible stretching of aileron cables and excessive wear to a
system that is installed for emergency use only.



It has been reported that flight simulators in use by operators of
Boeing aircraft in Australia can be programmed to enable
demonstration of aileron control breakout forces. If the simulators
are programmed correctly, all technical crews can be safely exposed
to this aspect during simulator training.



The Boeing Commercial Airplane Company advised that Boeing B737,
B747, B757 and B767 aircraft are all fitted with similar emergency
aileron override and breakout systems.



SAFETY DEFICIENCY



The aircraft is designed to be flown from either control position
should one side become jammed. The pilot was aware of this design
feature but was not aware of the amount of force required to
activate the breakout system.



Technical crews are instructed on this control feature during
ground training but are not physically exposed to the forces
required, either on an aircraft or in a simulator.

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation recommends that the
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company informs operators of affected
aircraft manufactured by them of the need to:



1. develop a simulator training procedure to ensure that aircrew
are familiar with the procedure to be used in the event of aileron
control jamming; and



2. ensure that aircrew are aware of the control wheel forces
required when the override mechanism is being operated in the event
of jammed ailerons.



A similar recommendation (R970128) has been made to Australian
operators of affected aircraft manufactured by the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company.

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Boeing Co
Response Status
Response Text

We have not yet committed to any changes in our simulator
training procedures or our manuals. We are reviewing the reported
event and looking at possible training and manual changes which
would be implemented for all applicable Boeing models, not just the
747.

However, additional time is necessary for this review before we
can come to any conclusions. I anticipate that this review may take
three more months. We plan to keep your office advised of the
progress to our review.

Date Received
Organisation
Boeing Co
Response Status
Response Text

Earlier this month I reviewed proposed changes to our operational documentation concerning flight control jams across all our various model airplanes. This has been a slow process trying to get agreement on. I anticipate that we will have some changes to be released in a couple months. Thesse changes would affect the Flight Manual, the Flight Crew Training Manual, the Operations Manual and the QRH.

Date Received
Organisation
Boeing Co
Response Text

We are progresing slowly on the issue. We currently are planning to review our Flight Crew Training Manual and Operations Manual to add wording describing the breakout forces and the sustained force required following "breakout". A change to the Flight Crew Training Manual will then get fed back into the simulator training syllabus. I now expect that we will have a firmer decision on what changes are being implemented by late October. I will keep you posted on our action. Sorry for the lengthy process.