Output Number
Approval Date
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Published Date Time
Recommendation type
Status
Mode
Date released
Background Text

SUBJECT:Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Installations in
Australian Registered Aircraft





OCCURRENCE SUMMARY



The helicopter had been dispatched to recover the occupants of an
ultralight aircraft who were involved in an accident at Tartrus
Station, Qld. The arrival and shutdown of the helicopter were
normal. About 10 minutes later, in preparation for the return
flight, the pilot returned to the helicopter and opened the valve
of the oxygen cylinder fitted inside the cargo compartment. At this
time, witnesses heard a loud bang and the pilot was thrown clear of
the helicopter. Flames were then seen in the cargo compartment area
and the helicopter was subsequently destroyed by fire. The pilot
suffered blast damage to his left lung and ear drum, and bruising
of his heart and ribs.



The oxygen system fitted to the helicopter was for medical
evacuation purposes. It consisted of a size-"D" medical oxygen
cylinder located and secured in the top front corner of the cargo
compartment. A 1.5m long, 3/8 inch internal diameter, high-pressure
flexible hose linked the pressure regulator on the cylinder to a
remote pressure gauge in the cabin. The pressure gauge displayed
cylinder pressure (up to 19,000 kPa) and the hose was marked "Enzed
TP2". A low-pressure oxygen line also ran from the regulator to
outlets in the cabin. Renewal of the oxygen supply was effected by
replacing the used cylinder with a full cylinder. This operation
had been carried out by the pilot prior to the last flight.



Examination of the recovered aircraft components by the
Aeronautical and Marine Research Laboratory (AMRL) indicates that
the polyester lined flexible hose assembly and its associated
fittings were inappropriate for the application.



The investigation has revealed that when the pilot opened the
valve the oxygen system high-pressure flexible hose failed at
approximately the mid-point. The failure was most likely initiated
by a foreign particle impacting the internal polyester lining of
the hose and initiating combustion. The hose had been fitted to the
helicopter approximately 5 weeks before the accident (see appendix
1, figures 1 and 2).





SAFETY DEFICIENCY



As a result of this occurrence, the following safety deficiencies
were identified:



(i) Oxygen installations may be in operation in emergency medical
service equipped aircraft with the potential for a similar
occurrence.



(ii) Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) staff indicate that,
in Australian registered aircraft, emergency medical service
equipment installations are not subject to any specific CASA
requirements in regard to their design, installation and
maintenance.



(iii) Although external role equipment is specified in the
Aviation Safety Surveillance Program (ASSP) aircraft survey
checklists, emergency medical service installations are not subject
to regular, continuing airworthiness surveillance.



(iv) The investigation revealed that there were no emergency
medical service operating procedures available to the flight crew
in the aircraft flight manual or the company operations
manual.



(v) There is a general lack of awareness within the aviation
industry with regard to the installation and maintenance
requirements of emergency medical service oxygen equipment.





ANALYSIS



Civil Aviation Order 108.26 specifies requirements for oxygen
systems fitted to aircraft. Discussions with Civil Aviation Safety
Authority staff indicate these requirements are intended for
aircraft crew and passenger requirements and are not intended for
emergency medical service installations.



The investigation examined a number of aspects relevant to this
accident and other similar operations. These include:



(i) oxygen system design;



(ii) standards and certification of medical oxygen systems in
aircraft;



(iii) the types of cylinders used in medical oxygen systems;



(iv) flight crew training in the handling of medical oxygen
systems fitted to aircraft; and



(v) maintenance requirements for these systems.



In 1988, The United States National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) conducted a safety study into "commercial emergency medical
service helicopter operations" (report number NTSB/SS-88/01). The
report specifically mentioned an oxygen systems installation to a
Bell 206-L1 helicopter and detailed deficiencies in the
installation. The installation to the Bell 206-L1 was similar to
that fitted to VH-CKP. The report made several recommendations, of
which two (A-88-6 and A-88-7) are relevant.



The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) response to the safety
recommendations was to issue Advisory Circulars (AC) 135-14A,
"Emergency Medical Services/Helicopter (EMS/H)" and 135-15,
"Emergency Medical Services/Airplane (EMS/A)". They also revised
Advisory Circular (AC) 27-1, "Certification of Transport Category
Rotorcraft", to include paragraph 786, "Emergency Medical Service
Installation, Interior Arrangements, and Equipment" (see appendixes
2 and 3).



In addition, the FAA requires additional operating and inspection
requirements for air ambulance operators, above that normally
imposed upon commercial operators.

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation recommends that the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority:



(i) conduct an audit of all emergency medical service
oxygen-equipped aircraft to determine the equipment standards in
Australian registered aircraft;



(ii) issue design standards for emergency medical service oxygen
equipment installations;



(iii) issue maintenance requirements for emergency medical service
oxygen equipment;



(iv) provide surveillance requirements for emergency medical
service oxygen equipment in the Aviation Safety Surveillance
Program;



(v) ensure flight crew are provided with appropriate instuctions
in the use of emergency medical service oxygen equipment in
aircraft flight manuals or company operations manuals; and



(vi) provide educational material to the aviation industry on the
installation, operation and maintenance requirements of emergency
medical service oxygen systems.

Organisation Response
Date Received
Organisation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Text

I refer to BASI Interim Recommendation, IR970104, in relation to
the Bell Helicopter accident at Tartrus Station, Queensland on 2
May 1997. This incident has clearly revealed some deficiencies in
current CASA procedures regarding medical oxygen systems used in
aircraft. These deficiencies require correction.

Issue design and maintenance standards for EMS 02 equipment
installations (Recommendations ii and iii)

Role equipment such as that installed in EMS aircraft is
installed on the basis of "No Hazard, No Interference." There are
at present two Australian standards which relate to aircraft oxygen
systems:

CAO 20.4, Provision and Use of Oxygen and Protective Breathing
Equipment,

CAO 108.26, Systems Specifications - Oxygen Systems

Neither of these standards are directly applicable to EMS 02
systems, addressing instead supplemental oxygen for high altitude
flight. However, Federal Aviation Administration AC 27-1,
Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft contains a section on
EMS 02 systems. Unfortunately, this US AC has no legal standing
under Australian law.

Thus, while much information is available, it is not clearly
presented, is fragmented, and in some cases is out of date. I
therefore intend to expedite the issue of a CAAP providing
integrated design guidelines for this type of installation. This
CAAP, expected to be issued by September 1998, will cover the
design, installation and maintenance of Emergency Medical Services
Oxygen Systems.

Provide surveillance requirements for EMS 02 equipment in ASSP.
(Recommendation iv)

The ASSP program does not at present specifically address
surveillance of aircraft internal role equipment, such as medical
oxygen systems. This deficiency will be addressed, and the ASSP
amended as necessary to include this type of equipment.

Conduct an audit of all emergency medical service 02 equipped
aircraft to determine the equipment standards in Australian
registered aircraft. (Recommendation i)

Because there is at present no readily available standard
against which to audit existing EMS 02 installations, and because
very few CASA (or industry) people have the knowledge or experience
of oxygen systems necessary to conduct such an audit, I do not
believe that an audit is appropriate at this stage.

Issue of the CAAP and clarification of ASSP requirements are
expected to have a beneficial effect, resulting in improvements and
upgrading of existing systems. However, should routine surveillance
reveal widespread problems or raise further concerns, additional
action will be taken to overcome the problems.

Provide educational material to the aviation industry on the
installation, operation and maintenance of EMS 02 systems.
(Recommendation vi)

CASA is planning to conduct an educational seminar in the latter
part of this year involving CASA staff and industry personal,
including designers, operators and other interested parties. Your
assistance in conducting this seminar would be much appreciated,
including a presentation on this incident and the BASI finding. The
CAAP will also assist in this regard.

Ensure that flight crew are provided with appropriate
instructions in the use of EMS 02 equipment in Aircraft Flight
Manuals or Company Operations Manuals. (Recommendation v)

EMS systems are normally installed in aircraft as modifications,
under the auspices of CAR 35. An important part of any such
modification is the provision of the necessary amendments or
supplement to the aircraft flight manual. The CAR 35 authorised
person who approves the modification should be ensure that such
data are available and included in the modification package. This
requirement will be reinforced in the CAAP.