What happened
On 23 August 2024, a Bombardier Dash 8-300 was being operated as a ferry flight, departing Perth Airport, Western Australia to Onslow Airport before refuelling and continuing on to Minderoo aircraft landing area (ALA). On board was a captain, first officer and 2 cabin crew. The aircraft was then operated as a non-scheduled air transport passenger flight on the return leg from Minderoo ALA to Perth Airport.
The aircraft departed Onslow at approximately 1402 local time for the 17-minute flight to Minderoo ALA. On approach to Minderoo, the captain made contact with another aircraft which was positioned on the taxiway near the threshold of runway 08, awaiting departure. The crew of this second aircraft instructed the captain to taxi into an open-ended hangar after landing to allow their aircraft to depart on runway 08, as the only other parking bay was occupied by a helicopter. The first officer, who was pilot flying, landed the aircraft on runway 26 and vacated at the first taxiway into a large hangar located on the south side of the runway (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Point of contact on the hangar frame

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB
At approximately 1446, the crew completed boarding of 24 passengers for the return leg to Perth inside the hangar. The captain assumed the role of pilot flying, started the engines and began to taxi following the taxi guideline markings[1] painted on the ground through the hangar.
During taxi, both pilots felt a slight drop, which they believed was the right main wheel moving off the taxiway onto the grass. The cabin crew member at the rear of the cabin thought the wing tip may have contacted the hangar as the jolt was greater in the rear of the aircraft. They inspected the wings out of the windows and noted nothing out of the ordinary. The captain continued to taxi towards the entry point of runway 08.
After entering and backtracking on runway 26, the crew aligned the aircraft for departure and final pre-take-off checks. At this time, the captain received a phone call from the operator’s head of flying operations who informed them that a witness reported that the aircraft may have made contact with the hangar during the initial taxi.
The crew shut down the aircraft on the runway and conducted an inspection. The inspection revealed damage to the aircraft’s left elevator (Figure 2). There were no reported injuries, the passengers were disembarked, and the aircraft was moved to the parking bay.
Figure 2: Damage to aircraft’s left elevator

Source: Operator
Following the event, the operator commenced an investigation into the occurrence using a third‑party investigator. The hangar was inspected, and no damage was identified (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Point of contact on the hangar frame

Source: Operator, annotated by the ATSB
Safety action
Since the completion of the independent investigation on the occurrence, the operator has taken the following safety action:
- A formal risk assessment for each new port is conducted prior to any operation being conducted regardless of the length of contract. This risk assessment also applies to ad hoc charters.
- A risk assessment classification has been included into the aerodromes and routes procedure.
- Charter briefs have been updated to include a triple signature sign‑off process to ensure that the head of flying operations (HOFO), head of safety and quality, and operations team lead have conducted all required risk assessments and briefs prior to the flights taking place.
- Human factors training has been updated to include new materials related to this accident. This includes a requirement for all flight crew to undertake this training on initial employment and every 2 years thereafter.
- The head of safety and quality has conducted a review of the risk assessment and change management process to ensure it is fit for purpose.
Safety message
The ATSB reminds pilots to exercise caution when operating near hangars and avoid taxiing aircraft directly inside. Hangars are confined spaces with limited clearances, increasing the risk of collisions with walls, equipment, or other aircraft. Visibility from the cockpit is often restricted, making it difficult for pilots to accurately judge distances or detect hazards. These factors significantly increase the likelihood of damage to the aircraft or surrounding structures.
To ensure safety, pilots should either stop the aircraft outside the hangar and allow trained ground personnel to tow or manually manoeuvre it into position or organise for a wing walker or marshal to be available during the taxi. This practice provides greater precision and reduces the potential for accidents. In this case, the use of a tug to tow the aircraft through the hanger or the use of a wing walker or marshal would have alleviated these risks.
Operators are also reminded that, even if they have previously used an ALA before, it is important to obtain all relevant information about the ALA prior to flight. ALAs located in remote or rural locations may vary significantly in their condition, dimensions, and available facilities. Operators should ensure they have up-to-date details about the runway surface, obstacles and likely restrictions within the ALA. Additionally, knowledge of available ground support equipment, parking, and turning areas is important for safe operations. Thorough pre-flight planning and communication with the airstrip operator or local contacts can help identify potential hazards and ensure that the aircraft and operation are suitable for the destination.
About this report
Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.
[1] A taxi guideline marking consists of a single conspicuous yellow or white line delineating a path for the aircraft to follow.