Beech Aircraft Corp 58, VH-FDN

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau did not conduct an
on-scene investigation of this occurrence. The report presented
below was prepared principally from information supplied to the
Bureau and includes information from an investigation report
produced by Airservices Australia.

REPORTED INFORMATION

On 1 December 2004, at 1403 western standard time, a Beech
Aircraft Corporation Baron was tracking from Jandakot, WA for
Cunderdin, WA. The aircraft was being operated under the instrument
flight rules (IFR) at 7,000 ft. At 1409, a Cessna Aircraft Company
Caravan, operating under the visual flight rules (VFR), was
climbing to 14,000 ft for a parachute jumping exercise (PJE) within
5 NM of Brooklands, WA. Both aircraft were operating within radar
coverage and were radar identified.

The airspace in the Brooklands area was classified as class G
(non-controlled) airspace from ground level to 8,500 ft, and class
C (controlled) airspace from 8,500 ft to 18,000 ft.

At 1419, the controller managing the class G airspace provided
the pilot of the Baron with traffic information on the Caravan as
part of a radar information service (RIS). The pilot of the Baron
became concerned that the pilot of the Caravan was unaware of the
Barons proximity to the parachute drop area, and was unable to
establish radio contact with the pilot of the Caravan to determine
whether the parachute drop was imminent.

At 1420, the pilot of the Caravan requested a clearance to
deploy the parachutists, and to descend. The controller who was
managing the class C airspace provided the pilot of the Caravan
with a clearance and radar derived traffic information on the
location of the Baron. At that time, the Baron was 2 NM ahead of
the Caravan and heading north-east.

At 1421, the pilot of the Baron established radio contact with
the pilot of the Caravan and negotiated a delay in the parachute
drop until the Baron was clear of the area.

The Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 5.5 4
paragraphs 2.1.3 to 2.3.4, effective 25 Nov 2004, specified that
not less than two minutes before parachutists exit an aircraft, the
pilot must make a broadcast on all relevant frequencies for the
airspace through which the parachutists may descend, including a
broadcast on each frequency specified for controlled and
uncontrolled airspace. The pilot must not allow parachutists to
exit the aircraft unless these broadcasts have been made.

In addition to the requirements specified in the AIP, a letter
of agreement (LOA), effective 25 Nov 2004, existed between
Airservices Australia and the PJE operator, which detailed the
radio frequencies and procedures for PJE operations in that area.
This LOA required the pilot to broadcast, on the class G frequency,
an intention to deploy the parachutists, approximately 4 minutes
prior to the drop point.

The Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) section 4.6.1,
specified that Air Traffic Control (ATC) shall not issue a
clearance to a pilot to deploy parachutists before the broadcasts
specified in the AIP have been made.

The pilot of the Caravan later stated that all required
broadcasts had been completed. However, transcripts provided by
Airservices Australia of the ATC voice recordings of the relevant
frequencies contained no evidence that the pilot had made the
required broadcasts on either of the class G or class C
frequencies, in accordance with either the AIP or the LOA, prior to
the intended parachute deployment.

The controller managing the class C airspace did not ensure that
those broadcasts had been made, prior to issuing the pilot of the
Caravan with a clearance to deploy the parachutists.