The following text has been reproduced from NTSB Report
OPS02SA003 into this incident:
History of Flight
At 0703:50 [UTC], the flight crew of ROK17 contacted the LAX
local controller (LC1) and advised they were on a visual approach
to runway 6R. Radar data indicated the airplane's radar track was
approximately 7 miles west of the airport on a southerly heading.
The LC1 controller issued the flight crew a landing clearance for
runway 6R and advised that opposite direction traffic was departing
the south complex turning southbound at the shoreline. The flight
crew acknowledged the transmission.
At 0704:14, the LC1 controller issued the flight crew of QAF108
a take off clearance for runway 25R and advised of opposite
direction traffic landing the north complex. The flight crew
acknowledged the transmission.
At this point the LC1 controller began assisting the flight crew
of Aero Mexico 460, the previous arrival to runway 6R that required
assistance exiting the runway. According to the FAA, the LC1
controller walked to the north side of the tower cab (opposite side
from the LC1 position) to view the situation. The controller
returned to the LC1 position and noticed ROK17 was south of course
heading northeast bound and at 0704:55, transmitted to the flight
crew, "confirm turning back to six right." The flight crew
responded, "affirmative." Radar data indicated the airplane's radar
track began a left turn.
The LC1 controller then assisted the flight crew of Aero Mexico
460, who needed additional instructions to exit runway 6R.
According to the FAA, the LC1 controller walked to the north side
of the tower cab again to view the situation. The controller
returned to the LC1 position and noticed ROK17 appeared to be
aligned for runway 7L and at 0705:31, instructed the flight crew to
"turn immediately north you are lined up for runway seven there's a
seven forty seven opposite direction." The flight crew acknowledged
the instructions. Radar data indicated the target separation was
4.05 miles and 1,300 feet.
The LC1 controller then instructed the flight crew of QAF108 to
turn left heading 210 degrees and advised, "the Boeing seven five
seven is moving out of your way." The flight crew of QAF108
responded, "that was close." Radar data indicated the closest
proximity between the 2 targets was 1.17 miles and 600 feet.
The LC1 controller reissued the landing clearance to the flight
crew of ROK17 and advised QAF108 to change to departure control
frequency.
Approximately 2 minutes later the flight crew of ROK17
apologized to the LC1 controller on the frequency and stated that
they had made a mistake and were not aligned properly for runway
6R.
ATC Environment
a. Airport Information
The Los Angeles International Airport is located in the
northwest suburbs of LosAngeles, California adjacent to the Pacific
coastline. The terrain is largely flat to coastal with large
expanses of urban areas.
The airport has dual parallel runways. Runways 6L/24R and 6R/24L
are referred to as the north complex and runways 7L/25R and 7R/25L
comprise the south complex.Runway 6R is 10,285 feet long and 150
feet wide with a displaced threshold of 331 feet. The runway is
equipped with high intensity runway lights, runway centerline
lighting and medium-intensity approach lighting system with runway
alignment indicator lights. According to the FAA, at the time of
the incident the appropriate lighting systems for runway 6R were on
and operating normally.
b. Tower and ATC Operations
The Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Tower is a Level 12 ATC
facility, and is classified as a tower with radar. The tower is
centrally located on the airport between the north and south
complexes. The tower operation can accommodate 2 local control
positions, Local 1 (LC1) and Local 2 (LC2). The LC1 workstation is
located on the south side of the tower cab and is typically
responsible for arrival and departure operations at the south
complex. The LC2 workstation is located on the north side of the
tower cab and typically responsible for the arrival and departure
operations at the north complex.
At the time of the incident the local control positions were
combined at LC1. In this type of configuration the LC1 controller
was responsible for operations at both the north and south
complexes. LAX was conducting over ocean operations, which
consisted of airplanes arriving runway 6R (north complex) and
departing runway 25R (south complex). According to the facility's
Standard Operating Procedures Manual, LAXT 7110.1B, the operation
is used primarily during 0000 and 0630 (Pacific Time) to mitigate
noise. During these hours the facility's runway selection program
requires the use of the inboard runways (6R and 25R) to the maximum
extent possible.
c. Meteorological Information
The LAX surface weather observation at 2350 PDT indicated wind
conditions from 240 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 6 statute miles,
sky condition clear, temperature 17 degrees Celsius, dew point 16
degrees Celsius, altimeter 29.98 (inches of mercury).
d. Applicable ATC Procedures
I. Visual separation is a means employed by ATC to separate
aircraft within airport traffic areas. Tower controllers base
separation on observed or known traffic and airport conditions.
Visual separation procedures are outlined in FAA Order 7110.65,
"Air Traffic Control", paragraph 7-2-1 and states in part:
a. TERMINAL
Visual separation may be applied between aircraft under the
control of the same facility within the terminal area up to but not
including FL 180, provided:
1. Communication is maintained with at least one of the aircraft
involved or the capability to communicate immediately as prescribed
in 3-9-3, Departure Control Instructions, subparagraph a2 is
available, and:
2. The aircraft are visually observed by the tower and visual
separation is maintained between the aircraft by the tower. The
tower shall not provide visual separation between aircraft when
wake turbulence separation is required or when the lead aircraft is
a B757.
II. FAA Order 7110.65, paragraph 2-1-6, Safety Alert states in
part:
Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the
aircraft is in a position/altitude, which in your judgment places
it in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other
aircraft.