Boeing Co 737-377, VH-CZK

A Boeing 737-377 (B737) was inbound to Canberra for a landing on
runway 35. The crew had established the aircraft on the extended
runway centreline from 10 NM (18.5 km). At approximately 4 NM the
aerodrome controller (ADC) instructed the crew that they were clear
to land. As the aircraft was about 1.85 km from the runway
threshold, the ADC saw a truck enter taxiway Delta. Taxiway Delta
was approximately 1427 m from the threshold of runway 35. The ADC
considered that the truck was unlikely to stop and instructed the
crew to go around. The crew acknowledged the instruction and
conducted a missed approach, a left circuit and then landed.

The driver of the truck had entered the runway strip without a
clearance and had not complied with procedures. Later analysis of
recorded radar data showed that the B737 had descended to 310 ft
above the aerodrome elevation during the approach and go
around.

Air traffic control

The air traffic control tower operating positions faced
south-south-west, overlooking the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
Fairbairn aircraft apron, the intersection of the runways and the
runway 35 threshold. The tower had three operating positions: ADC,
tower coordinator (COORD) and surface movement controller (SMC).
The ADC operating position was situated on the north-western end of
the console with the COORD to the left and then the SMC position on
the south-eastern end of the console. All positions were staffed at
the time of the occurrence. The COORD and SMC saw the truck
approaching and enter the apron from the south before turning left
onto taxiway Delta. The ADC was conducting the final scan of runway
35 prior to the B737 landing when the SMC advised that the truck
was going to enter the runway. Simultaneously, as the COORD
suggested to the ADC to instruct the crew to go around, the ADC
issued the instruction to the B737 crew.

The SMC saw the truck stop on taxiway Delta, after crossing the
holding point and entering the runway strip, and then reverse as
the B737 went around. The SMC notified an airport safety officer
who then drove to Delta and spoke to the truck driver.

Runway 35/17

Runway 35/17 was bounded by the runway strip that was an area
around the runway, up to 75 m either side of the runway centre line
and included the runway clearways that extend 60 m from the
thresholds. The purpose of the runway strip was to reduce the risk
of damage to aircraft inadvertently running off the runway and to
protect them when flying over it during take-off, landing or missed
approaches. Gable markers indicated the limit of a runway strip. On
taxiways the limit of a runway strip was marked as a holding point.
A clearance from air traffic control was required before personnel,
vehicles or machinery could enter a runway strip. Personnel,
vehicles or machinery were normally excluded from a runway strip
when a runway was in use or a pilot had a clearance that enabled an
aircraft to use the runway.

Runway 35/17 was 45 m wide and the position the truck reached
before stopping could not be accurately established. Reports from
the driver and witnesses indicated that the truck reached a
position somewhere between 35 m to 65 m from the runway
centreline.

Canberra airport works

Canberra airport was halfway through a period of major works to
construct:

- 7.5 m shoulders on runway 35/17;

- a turning node on the northern end of runway 35/17;

- drains along runway 35/17; and

- widened turn fillets at runway/taxiway intersections for runway
35/17.

The works also included the replacement of runway lights.

The airport operator had awarded the contract to a company that
had recently completed similar major works at another capital city
airport. That company was the prime contractor (contractor) and the
task was scheduled for completion by 31 August 2001. Planning was
fast tracked to meet the schedule and both the airport operator and
the contractor believed it was achievable. The truck driver's
company was a sub-contractor to the contractor.

Management of the works site was a joint responsibility between
the airport operator and contractor. The contractor was responsible
for managing the works area while the airport operator was
responsible for managing the interaction of works and airport
activities.

A method of work plan (MOWP) was prepared by the airport
operator and was provided to the contractor to assist in the
development of their work method statement and project management
plan. The airport operator reviewed the project management plan.
The MOWP detailed how areas would be delineated to ensure airport
users and contractor activities did not conflict. The airport
operator also arranged for aeronautical information circular (AIC)
H7/01 to be issued on 14 June 2001. The AIC detailed the scope of
the work during the four work stages, operational restrictions
required during each stage and advised that the dates and times of
activation of each stage would be advised by a notice to airmen
(Notam). The AIC included draft Notams for each stage.

The contractor was working on stages 1 and 2. The MOWP stated
that taxiway Delta would be unavailable during stage 2 between 2200
Eastern Standard Time and 0600 (overnight hours). The MOWP did not
have any restrictions on the use of taxiway Delta during the period
from 0600 to 2200 (daylight and early evening hours). Seven Notams,
that described the work stages and the operational restrictions,
were current at the time of the occurrence. Those Notams were in
accordance with the MOWP except there was no Notam regarding
taxiway Delta overnight.

The airport operator prepared and conducted a site induction
brief for the contractor and associated sub-contractor staff prior
to commencing the work. That briefing included aspects of site
safety including movement of persons and vehicles, "no-go" areas,
contractor vehicle routes and that contractor staff were to comply
with any directions from an airport safety officer. Following the
initial induction, the contractor assumed responsibility for
ensuring that all persons employed on the works underwent a one
hour induction briefing and that copies of the induction brief were
made available to staff. The contractor was also responsible for
maintaining a record of the staff who had been briefed. Those
records indicated that the truck driver had received an induction
brief on 27 June 2001. The truck driver later reported that he was
aware of the need for vigilance when working on the airport and had
often consulted the maps provided that detailed approved routes for
works vehicles and staff.

Effect of the works on runway 35/17

A displaced threshold for runway 17 had been imposed to enable
work on the northern end of runway 35/17. Taxiway Alpha, parallel
to the runway and taxiway Foxtrot that linked Alpha and the runway
were both closed to aircraft operations for this stage. The runway
17 displaced threshold was located south of taxiway Foxtrot.

The contractor had implemented a new route for works vehicles
for the current stage of works. The route had been used for 10 days
by trucks to cart soil from the runway 17 undershoot (at the
northern end of the runway 35/17) to an area outside the airport at
the south-western end (adjacent to the southern end of the runway
35/17). That route was marked with stanchions and used taxiways
Foxtrot and Alpha, across the intersection of Alpha/Delta and the
RAAF apron, along a gravel road parallel to runway 30, around the
eastern end of runway 30 and then along the perimeter fence to the
dump area. The route was sign posted with a speed restriction of 40
kph with a reduction to 25 kph in the area near the runway 30
threshold.

The segment of the route across the intersection of taxiway
Delta and the RAAF apron was not marked. The contractor considered
that the gap in markers at Delta was sufficiently small for staff
to appreciate route continuation, and that the intersection was
referred to in the induction brief and was marked on the maps.
Taxiway Delta remained open to enable aircraft to use the RAAF
apron. There was no restriction on vehicles crossing taxiway Delta
but generally drivers of vehicles stopped or slowed when
approaching that taxiway to check for aircraft before
continuing.

Truck driver

The truck driver had been on the site for five weeks and
generally worked a 12-hour day. Prior to the week of the occurrence
he had had four days leave as a result of rain that prevented work
being carried out. He had little previous experience of operating
on airports. He had worked from 0700 to 1900 Eastern Standard Time
on Monday, 0630 to 1730 on Tuesday and had started at 0600 on the
day of the occurrence. The truck driver was supervising two work
teams. One team was at the northern end of runway 35/17, while the
other team was working outside the eastern runway strip near the
intersection of runways 35/17 and 30/12. He started the team at
taxiway Alpha near the northern end of runway 35 and then commenced
a task himself at about 1700 in the northern area. Shortly after,
he received a request to provide equipment to the team near the
runway intersection. He drove to the north-western boundary of the
airport to get the equipment and then travelled via the northern
and eastern route to the team's location. He delivered the
equipment and was returning to the northern area when he drove onto
taxiway Delta and entered the runway strip.

The truck driver reported that he had a lot on his mind at the
time. His last break had finished at 1330. The truck driver knew
that he had insufficient time in which to complete the job he had
started and that he had to supervise the clean up by his teams
before finishing work that afternoon. He had been warned to watch
for aircraft and consequently, whenever he was crossing a taxiway,
would check for aircraft. As he turned onto taxiway Delta he was
watching the approaching B737 through the passenger's window of the
truck but thought he was turning onto the northern works area via
taxiway Foxtrot. He became aware that there were no markers in the
area and that he was on the wrong taxiway. He stopped the truck and
reversed as quickly as possible off taxiway Delta back onto taxiway
Alpha. The truck driver reported that he had used the designated
route about 25 times previously on the day of the occurrence.