The crew of a Boeing 777-300 rejected the take-off run from Melbourne airport as a result of a failure within the left (number-one) engine.
The failure was reported by the flight crew as being characterised by a single loud `bang' and the immediate left yaw of the aircraft. A flash of flame from the engine intake and other short-lived visual indications of fire were observed by passengers and air traffic controllers, however no fire warnings were received on the flight deck.
Following the rejection of the take-off, the left engine was immediately shut down. After assessment from the attending fire-fighting services to confirm the absence of fire, the aircraft was able to be returned to the terminal using thrust from its remaining serviceable engine.
The passengers and crewmembers were not injured.
Damage to the Engines and Aircraft
Failure of the Rolls-Royce RB211 892-17 (Trent 800 series) engine (S/No. 51197) fitted to the aircraft was attributed directly to the release of a single low-pressure compressor (fan) blade (S/No. RGG16936) from the rotor disk. Liberation of the blade caused extensive damage to the remaining blades and the engine intake linings. A large compressor surge associated with the event and the quantity of ingested debris produced severe internal damage to the engine core. The escape of a small quantity of low energy debris caused minor damage to the aircraft fuselage and the fan of the right (number-two) engine.
Engine Information
The subject engine had been installed since the aircraft was manufactured and at the time of failure had accumulated 5,765 hours and 907 cycles. It is understood that the blades had been fitted since new. The blade configuration was to Service Bulletin RB211-72-C629 standard, incorporating an undercut radius along the length of the root block. The intention of the radius was to alleviate "edge of bedding" stresses within the dovetail root - a mechanism that had been implicated in two previous failures of RB211-524 fan blades. The blade failure was reported to be the first of its type in the Trent 800 series engines.
Flight Recorders
Data recovered from the quick access recorder (QAR) showed that the aircraft reached a maximum ground speed of 41 knots before the take-off was rejected. Blade release occurred at engine turbine N1/N2 speeds of 91.4 / 97.1 % respectively, whereupon the speeds rapidly increased to 110 %, accompanied by a slow decrease in engine power ratio. The engine was still accelerating and had not reached the commanded power output at the time of failure. Immediately prior to the blade release, broadband vibration levels within the left engine increased markedly above those of the right; that being the first indication of a problem with the engine. The flight crew observed elevated exhaust gas temperatures of more than 770 degrees Celsius during the application of reverse thrust, moments after the failure. The temperatures were not associated with any fire indications and no fire warnings were received. The absence of fire was verified by the emergency services personnel in attendance.
Cabin Aspects
The cabin crew reported that immediately following the loud bang from the engine, a number of passengers released their seatbelts and vacated their seats. The cabin crew also reported that the Passenger Entertainment Landscape Camera displays within the cabin remained on during the event, showing the approach of the emergency services vehicles. That distressed some passengers. The displays were subsequently switched off by the Cabin Services Director. The landscape camera system was designed to provide an outside view for passengers during take-off, landing and ground manoeuvring. The system was part of the in-flight entertainment system and was controlled by the cabin crew. There was no flight crew interface with the in-flight entertainment system, and the system could not be controlled from the flight deck.
Tests & Research
The ATSB examined the released blade in conjunction with authorised representatives from Rolls-Royce.
Release of the fan blade from the rotor disk occurred as a direct result of cracking within the dovetail root block. Large transverse fatigue cracks had developed within the undercut radius on the concave (suction) side of the blade, extending into the section from both sides of the shear key slot. The cracks had progressed to a point where the remaining sound material was insufficient to support the loads, with final overload failure and blade release occurring.
Crack growth initially presented a smooth, woody appearance to a depth of around 10-12 mm, before transitioning to a broader, uniform surface leading to the regions of final fracture. Many finely spaced crack arrest marks were observed within the initial areas of cracking, however they became further apart towards the transition point, and only one or two widely spaced marks were observed beyond the boundary. Although the initiation sites were obliterated by post-failure damage, there was no evidence to suggest the contribution of pre-existing defects in those areas. Blade material and manufacturing aspects were also acceptable.
The blade dovetail root faces showed extensive galling and micro-welding type damage in all items examined. Breakdown of the lubricant coating was also apparent and was characterised by a blotchy, irregular colouration on the contact faces. At the time of the occurrence, no requirements existed for the periodic re-lubrication of the blade seating surfaces.
Technical Analysis report No. 8/01 is available on the ATSB website or from the Bureau on request.