Boeing Co 737-377, VH-CZK

The crew of a Boeing 737 (B737) received a traffic alerting and
collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisory to reduce
climb when passing 800-1,000ft on departure from runway 34R at
Sydney. This was immediately followed by a TCAS instruction to
descend. As the crew commenced descent, the clear of conflict
command was heard and a Kawasaki BK 117 helicopter sighted passing
to the left in the opposite direction at a distance of about 1
NM.

The investigator reviewed radar data and air traffic control
automatic voice recordings to establish the sequence of events. The
investigation found that the aerodrome controller East was
controlling the B737 and the helicopter was being controlled by the
aerodrome controller West. Through a comprehensive coordination
process, both controllers were aware of the other controller's
traffic.

The helicopter was inbound from the north on a Medical Category
2 flight to Prince Henry Hospital and was cleared by the West
controller to track via the runway intersection at 2,000 ft. The
West controller had provided this advice to the East controller,
who agreed with the clearance and advised that the helicopter was
not required on his frequency.

Prior to clearing the B737 for take-off, the East controller
alerted the West controller of his intention to launch the B737.
The West controller advised that he would keep the helicopter to
the west of the B737. The B737 was departing from runway 34 R and
was cleared via an ENTRA TWO standard instrument departure (SID).
The SID required a right turn after departure to intercept the
Sydney 023 VOR radial. Because the aircraft had been cleared for
take-off and was on an unrestricted climb, there was the potential
for conflict with the helicopter, which was inbound to Sydney from
the north at 2000 ft.

Approximately 30 seconds after the B737 had been cleared for
take-off, the West controller asked the helicopter pilot to report
sighting a 737 on departure roll on runway 34R. The pilot reported
sighting the B737. The West controller then advised the helicopter
pilot of the B737's intentions and assigned the pilot the
responsibility for separation. The pilot acknowledged this.

The TCAS on the B737 activated with a resolution advisory some
20 seconds later and the two aircraft passed each other with 0.9 NM
horizontal and 500 ft vertical separation.

Visual separation of air traffic was a valid method to use in
these circumstances. However, the criteria for its application were
clearly detailed in the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) Part
4 Section 5. In particular, MATS 4.5.1.10 stated: "In circumstances
where an aircraft has been instructed to maintain separation from,
but not follow, an IFR aircraft, traffic information shall be
issued to the IFR aircraft, including advice that responsibility
for separation has been assigned to the other aircraft". The B737
was an IFR aircraft but was not provided with the required traffic
information.