Piper Aircraft Corp PA-31-350, VH-MYF

1. The Chieftain pilot was unfamiliar with the airspace in the
area.

2. The Chieftain pilot did not plan via the preferred route.

3. The Chieftain pilot was not provided with traffic information
on the Dash 8 by air traffic control.



4. The proximity of the Taree CTAF to the Williamtown restricted
area increased the complexity for operations in the area.



5. The controller did not appreciate the potential for conflict
when the Chieftain pilot reported tracking direct to
Williamtown.

6. The use of TCAS by the Dash 8 pilot and adherence to CTAF
procedures by both pilots to locate and avoid the other
aircraft.

The controller assumed that adequate separation would be
achieved based on his experience. However, that left little margin
to recover the situation after he saw the Chieftain on radar,
tracking to Williamtown. The provision of traffic information would
have probably enabled the Chieftain pilot to take action earlier to
avoid the Dash 8.

The Chieftain pilot did not flight plan via the recommended
track for aircraft operating from Taree to Sydney. Had he planned
via NICLA it is unlikely that he would have entered the restricted
area without a clearance. It would have also minimised the
possibility of conflict with aircraft on the Williamtown - Taree
track, which was one of the intentions of the preferred track
advice in the en route supplement. The non-use of the preferred
track to Sydney and the pilot's unfamiliarity with waypoint NICLA
were indicators of inadequate flight preparation.

The Chieftain pilot had little option but to depart Taree when
he was unable to communicate with the controller. However, that
meant the pilot would be busy with CTAF broadcasts and establishing
contact with the controller during the initial stages of the
flight. It is likely that the increased workload, and the need for
him to find NICLA, caused the pilot to probably approach task
saturation. That was indicated by the pilot not appreciating the
illogical aspects of being advised, in the same radio transmission,
to expect a clearance by the Williamtown - NICLA track and to avoid
the restricted area. Had the pilot been less busy with the flight,
or more familiar with the area, he probably would have requested
the controller to confirm the track to be adopted.

The controller was also probably approaching task overload as he
coordinated a clearance for the Chieftain with Williamtown air
traffic control. That was likely the reason for the controller
advising the pilot of the incorrect track. In addition, he missed
the pilot's advice of tracking direct to Williamtown. Had the
controller been less busy he would have probably appreciated the
content of both his and the Chieftain pilot's transmissions and
taken action to clarify the situation. That could have included
either navigation assistance or the provision of traffic
information to the pilot.

The proximity of the Taree CTAF to the Williamtown restricted
area results in increased complexity for both controllers and
pilots, especially when aircraft are operating between controlled
and non-controlled airspace. In this occurrence the use of TCAS by
the Dash 8 pilot, and adherence to CTAF procedures by both pilots
assisted them to resolve the situation. The occurrence also
highlighted the importance of effective planning for both
controllers and pilots prior to commencing duty or undertaking
flights respectively.

The pilot of a Piper Chieftain had planned an instrument flight
rules (IFR) flight from Taree to Sydney via overhead Williamtown.
After the aircraft became airborne, the pilot contacted the Myall
sector controller. The controller told the pilot there was no other
IFR traffic and that the Williamtown restricted areas were active.
Shortly after, the controller told the pilot that clearance on the
planned track was not available and to remain clear of the
Williamtown restricted areas. The pilot was told to expect
clearance via the Williamtown - NICLA track. However, the
controller had intended to tell the Chieftain pilot to expect a
clearance via the Taree - NICLA track. The track from Taree to
NICLA is 237 degrees. The pilot did not query the controller
regarding the amended route. He acknowledged the controller's
transmission and then reported intercepting the 198 degree track
from the Taree NDB navigation aid direct to Williamtown, on climb
to 8,000 ft. The controller subsequently saw on his radar display
that the Chieftain was 15 NM south of Taree at 5,000 ft, inside the
Williamtown restricted area. The Chieftain was also approximately 3
NM to the north of a northbound IFR de Havilland Dash 8 that was on
descent to Taree. The aircraft subsequently passed each other
safely.

Pilots of aircraft on the ground at Taree can normally
communicate via VHF radio with the Myall sector, which is located
in the Brisbane air traffic control centre. The Chieftain pilot
later reported that he had attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact
the controller on the aircraft's VHF radio while taxiing. The
investigation could not establish why the Chieftain pilot was
unable to communicate with the controller. The Chieftain was not
fitted with a high frequency radio.

When the pilot of a southbound flight reports taxiing at Taree,
controllers normally issue a secondary surveillance radar (SSR)
code and then coordinate a clearance for the flight with
Williamtown air traffic control. A controller can then issue a
clearance once the aircraft is identified on radar after departure.
As communication was not established until the Chieftain was
airborne the controller had to coordinate with Williamtown after
the pilot reported departure.

Because radar coverage in the Taree area was not available below
about 4,500 ft, controllers were required to pass traffic
information to IFR aircraft on other IFR aircraft. The Dash 8 and
the Chieftain flights were traffic for each other. The controller
later reported that he expected to identify the Chieftain before
the Dash 8 left the Williamtown restricted area. Also, he
considered that the amended track for the Chieftain would have
provided separation, as it diverged from the inbound track of the
Dash 8. After the Chieftain pilot's departure report, the
controller did not appreciate that the aircraft was tracking direct
to Williamtown and was likely to conflict with the Dash 8 on the
reciprocal track.

The preferred route between Taree and Sydney, as listed in the
Aeronautical Information Publication en route supplement, was W238
to NICLA and Craven, a position 41 NM west-south-west of Taree.
That route avoided the Williamtown restricted area. The Chieftain
pilot was unfamiliar with waypoint NICLA and was attempting to
locate its position on his chart as the aircraft climbed.

During the departure the Chieftain pilot made radio broadcasts
in accordance with common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF)
procedures. The CTAF is used for operations in non-controlled
airspace and is not monitored by air traffic control. Immediately
after departure, the pilot broadcast on the CTAF that the aircraft
was tracking to the Mount Mcquoid VOR navigation aid, located 39 NM
south-west of Williamtown. He also advised that the aircraft was on
climb to 8,000 ft. Shortly after, he contacted the Dash 8 pilot in
response to the latter's inbound CTAF broadcast. The Dash 8 pilot
was advised by the Chieftain pilot that he was 6 NM south of Taree
passing 4,100 ft and tracking direct to Williamtown. The Dash 8
pilot then queried the controller regarding the Chieftain's
position. The controller confirmed the position of the Chieftain
relative to the Dash 8. The Dash 8 pilot then returned to the CTAF
and advised sighting the Chieftain. The Chieftain pilot reported to
the Dash 8 pilot that he could see the Dash 8.

The Dash 8 pilot later reported that he had used controller and
CTAF reports plus information from his aircraft's traffic alert and
collision avoidance system (TCAS) to see the Chieftain. He
estimated the aircraft passed with about 3 NM lateral
displacement.

Both pilots reported that the controller's frequency was very
busy with a lot of radio transmissions.