The crew of a SAAB, conducting a scheduled passenger service
from Griffith to Sydney, broadcast that they were taxiing to depart
from runway 06. The pilot of a Cherokee advised that he was on
downwind for runway 36. The crew acknowledged this transmission and
then established the position and intentions of the pilot of a
Dromader who was on an extended downwind leg for a low-level
approach to runway 06. The crew of the SAAB then advised that they
were entering and backtracking on runway 06. Approximately 90
seconds later, when the crew advised they were rolling on runway
06, the pilot of the Cherokee responded that he was on late finals
to runway 36. The crew continued their takeoff and overflew the
landing Cherokee by a reported 400 feet.
Each aircraft was in radio communication on the Griffith common
traffic advisory frequency of 126.7 MHz.
The crew of the SAAB later reported that they had not heard the
pilot of the Cherokee respond to their taxiing broadcast. Their
attention had been directed toward the pilot of the Dromader who
had adjusted his approach to assist their departure. They had not
seen the Cherokee and consequently it was not until the pilot
reported on late finals to runway 36 that they realised there was a
traffic conflict. The crew reported that at this time the SAAB had
accelerated to a speed such that rejecting the takeoff was
potentially more hazardous than continuing.
The higher terrain to the south of the aerodrome may have made
the Cherokee more difficult to detect against the background.
Additionally, a line of trees to the south of runway 06 obscured
the final approach path to runway 36 from the view of pilots at the
06 threshold.
The reason why the crew of the SAAB did not recall hearing the
response of the Cherokee pilot to their taxiing report was not
determined. However, it is likely that the decision to expedite
their departure ahead of the arriving Dromader created a
self-imposed high workload that led to a loss of awareness of the
Cherokee.