Boeing Co 767-324, VH-BZF, 3 km WNW Melbourne, (VOR) 18 March 1999

1. The supervisor of the trainee, the aerodrome controller, had a lapse in concentration at a critical stage of the departure sequence, having been operating at the position in excess of 3 hours.
2. The trainee was unfamiliar with terminal area operations/procedures and was unaware of the increase in complexity during runway transition.
3. Tower training publications' critical safety section and other references did not include potential standard instrument departure or arrival areas of conflict.

The concentration level of both the aerodrome controller and the trainee had probably lapsed due to the duration of the training session. Additionally, the aerodrome controller may have been less vigilant in his monitoring of the trainee because of the reduction in aircraft numbers and his perception of the trainee's level of competence in the aerodrome control position.

Provision of information regarding the increase in complexity of traffic management during runway transition and regarding the critical safety aspects of standard instrument departures and arrivals would have provided the trainee with some knowledge to compensate for areas where he lacked experience. On-the-job training does not necessarily expose trainees to all critical elements nor provide sufficient time for them to develop their own traffic management models. Information on such critical areas is required to ensure that safety aspects are understood and considered, particularly during on-the-job training.

A greater awareness of terminal area operations and procedures may have provided the trainee with sufficient knowledge to appreciate that the departing aircraft were not going to be separated by the departure controller. In turn, this may have alerted the trainee to the fact that he was required to provide a separation solution or alternatively coordinate one with the departure controller.

A Beech 1900 (Beech) departed from runway 27 and was tracking
via a STRATHBOGIE 8 standard instrument departure, on climb to
5,000 ft. Shortly after, a Boeing 767 (B767) departed from runway
34 on a DOSEL 8 standard instrument departure, on climb to 5,000
ft. The standard instrument departure tracks intersected
approximately 2 NM north of the aerodrome. The departure north
radar controller (departure controller) observed that the
separation between the two aircraft was not going to be maintained
and queried the aerodrome controller in relation to the separation
procedure being applied. The aerodrome control position was being
operated by a trainee under the supervision of a rated controller.
The trainee advised that he thought the departure controller was
providing separation. The departure controller instructed the Beech
crew to turn left onto a heading of 310 degrees and the B767 crew
to turn right onto a heading of 030 degrees. The two aircraft
passed at the same altitude, with 1 NM lateral separation. The
minimum separation required was either 3 NM laterally or 1,000 ft
vertically. There was an infringement of separation standards. The
B767 was fitted with a traffic alert and collision avoidance system
and the crew received a traffic advisory just prior to the issue of
the avoiding instructions from the departure controller.

The trainee and the aerodrome controller had been at the console
for about 3 hours and the number of aircraft being managed had
reduced slightly following a busy period. The runway mode was being
changed from land and hold short operation (LAHSO) using runways 34
and 27, to dedicated departure runway arrangement using those
runways. In LAHSO all aircraft depart from runway 27, while in the
dedicated departure mode, departures to the south and west use
runway 27 and those to the north and east use runway 34. In that
configuration, the intersection of aircraft departure tracks is
almost eliminated. It was recognised by experienced controllers
that the transition period between runway modes required an
increased awareness and careful consideration of the traffic
management plan to ensure that potential conflicts for departing
aircraft were minimised. The trainee was aware of potential
problems for each mode but had not been alerted to the potential
problems that may occur during a mode transition period. On taxi,
the crew of the B767 requested and were approved to use runway 34.
The trainee subsequently amended the departure order of the B767
and the Beech to eliminate a requirement to apply a 2 minute wake
turbulence separation standard to the Beech aircraft.

The trainee did not appreciate that the aircraft's departure
tracks converged north of the aerodrome. The aerodome controller
reported that as the trainee was soon to be checked for a rating
his monitoring of the trainee's control was less vigilant than
normal. Local instructions stated that the aerodrome controller was
responsible for the separation of departing aircraft within 5 NM of
the aerodrome and that for departures from different runways, the
aerodrome control and departure control positions were jointly
responsible for coordinating a separation solution. The departure
controller's preference was to depart the B767 before the Beech but
he agreed to the trainee's request to change the departure order.
Normal practice in this situation was that the aerodrome control
position, having initiated the change, was responsible for the
separation unless otherwise coordinated. The controllers neither
coordinated a separation solution nor clearly established who was
responsible for ensuring separation. Both assumed that the other
was going to separate the two aircraft. The aerodrome controller
was not aware of the developing situation and was only alerted to
the infringement following the departure controller's query to the
trainee.

The trainee had undergone tower control ab initio training,
which included approximately 1 day of training on the vectoring of
aircraft. The course did not provide any terminal area (TMA)
control training. Controllers undergoing training for tower
positions were able to undertake TMA familiarisation. But, the
tower training syllabus did not require trainees to develop an
understanding of, or to be familiar with, TMA operations. TMA
familiarisation by tower trainees was conducted on an ad-hoc basis
and there was no procedure to assess a trainee's level of
understanding of TMA operations.

Melbourne Tower training publications did not provide advice of
a preferred duration for training sessions that would maximise the
training benefit. The publications did list aspects of critical
safety that needed to be covered during training for both trainees
or supervising controllers. But, the list did not include areas of
known conflict for standard instrument departures or standard
arrival routes. The publications did not include advice of the
potential inherent complexity of runway mode transition.