Sequence of events
The pilot of a Beechcraft Sundowner was preparing to depart Hoxton Park Aerodrome for his first solo navigation training exercise. The pilot of a Pitts Special S-2A had flown his aircraft from Bankstown to the training area and then to Hoxton Park to conduct practice circuits before returning to Bankstown.
The Pitts pilot reported broadcasting details of his entry to the Hoxton Park common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) area when he was 5 NM from Hoxton Park, and when he entered the circuit area on the crosswind leg for runway 34. He also reported that, in order to maintain separation from a preceding aircraft in the circuit, he had reduced speed and followed that aircraft.
Meanwhile, the Sundowner pilot had completed his pre-departure checks in the runup bay. He then taxied his aircraft onto runway 34 and commenced the take-off run. At that time, the Pitts was on final approach. The Pitts pilot reported that during the final approach he had repeatedly lowered the nose of the aircraft for short periods in order to provide a view of the flight path to the runway threshold before committing himself to a landing. The last time he had performed the manoeuvre was about 400 m from the threshold.
As the Sundowner was accelerating along the runway, the Pitts landed on top of it about 80 m from the threshold. Both aircraft became entangled and travelled approximately 100 m along the runway before slewing to the right then turning sharply left and coming to rest on the runway. The propeller of the Pitts deeply penetrated the Sundowner cabin and killed the pilot.
Another pilot operating in the circuit heard the Sundowner pilot make a pre-taxiing radio broadcast on the CTAF. The investigation could not establish if the Sundowner pilot made any further broadcasts before the collision. The Pitts pilot later stated that he did not remember hearing any radio transmissions from other aircraft. Further, he reported that he had no idea that he had collided with another aircraft until he vacated the cockpit.
Shortly before the accident, three other aircraft were operating in the circuit area. Their crews later reported hearing each other's radio traffic on the CTAF, but not hearing any radio transmissions from the Pitts.
Wreckage examination
The Sundowner came to rest on a southerly heading, sustaining deep propeller slashes to the left forward side of the cabin. The fin was severed. The Pitts's right main wheel had penetrated the Sundowner's left rear cabin. The very high frequency (VHF) transceiver was tuned to 127.0 MHz, the CTAF, and later testing showed that the radio was serviceable.
The wreckage examination indicated that the Sundowner was serviceable before impact.
The Pitts came to rest on a heading slightly east of south. Both right wings were detached and displaced 90 degrees rearward. The VHF transceiver was tuned to 127.0 MHz and later testing showed that the radio was serviceable. Test running of the engine showed that it should have performed normally before the impact.
The wreckage examination indicated that the Pitts was serviceable before impact.
Pilot information
The Sundowner pilot was 70 years old and held a student pilot licence (aeroplanes) and a valid Class 2 medical certificate with a requirement to wear vision correction. At the time of the accident he was wearing multi-focal prescription spectacles, that corrected his vision to 6/6. He had a total of 106 hours flying experience, including 22 hours on type. He had completed a short dual check flight earlier in the day, and had been cleared to carry out the solo navigation exercise.
Autopsy and toxicological tests did not reveal any pre-existing medical conditions, alcohol or other drugs that might have prevented the pilot from safely operating the aircraft.
The pilot's yellow-brown tinted lens spectacle lenses were designed to change colour in accordance with variations in temperature and ultra-violet light exposure. (As temperature reduced and/or the level of ultra-violet light increased, the lens darkened.) This tint reduced light to the eye and changed the colour of the environment. When viewed through the lens, the contrast between the yellow painted Pitts and the blue sky would have been reduced.
The Pitts pilot was 72 years old and held a private pilot licence (aeroplanes) and a valid Class 2 medical certificate with a requirement to wear vision correction. At the time of the accident he was wearing vision-correcting prescription sunglasses. He had been a pilot for about 38 years, and had about 2,700 hours flying experience, including 491 hours on type.
Weather
The weather at the time of the accident was fine, with visibility of 40 km and scattered cumulus clouds with a base of 4,500 ft above mean sea level. Wind conditions were light and favoured landings on runway 34.
Aerodrome information
Hoxton Park was designated as a CTAF aerodrome. The radio frequency for aircraft-to-aircraft communication was 127.0 MHz. The only mandatory radio broadcasts required in accordance with CTAF procedures were to be made when beginning to taxi and when inbound to the aerodrome. Pilots operating within CTAFs would normally be expected, upon hearing one of those broadcasts, to respond with information on their position and intentions and to arrange mutual separation.
According to the Aeronautical Information Publication, "Enroute Supplement Australia" (ERSA), runway 34 was the preferred runway for use in still wind conditions. Aircraft using runway 34 normally conducted left circuits, resulting in traffic on the downwind leg passing behind aircraft in the runup bay for runway 34. A copes of trees about 10 m in height was located immediately to the south-west of the runup bay. The trees obscured the view that pilots in the runup bay would have had of aircraft on the left base leg or of aircraft turning onto final approach for a landing on runway 34. However, from the holding point on the taxiway between the runup bay and the runway 34 threshold, and from most of the taxiway, the view of traffic on final approach was unobstructed.
The Hoxton Park CTAF was changed from 118.1 MHz to 127.0 MHz with effect from 3 December 1998. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) C9/98 (10 November 1998) publicised the change, but it was not published in ERSA until the 25 March 1999 issue.