The pilot was conducting a private flight from King Island to
Moorabbin in a Piper PA32R (Lance) with five passengers. The group
had flown from Moorabbin to King Island two days earlier.
A witness saw the aircraft appear to accelerate normally along
runway 35, becoming airborne before the intersection with runway 28
after a take-off roll of about 430 m. A short distance beyond the
runway intersection, at a height of about 100 ft, the aircraft
pitched steeply nose up and banked left about 30 degrees. The
aircraft appeared to hang in the air momentarily, with the engine
at high power, before banking further left in a nose high attitude
and being lost to sight behind trees. The aircraft impacted the
ground in a steep nose-down, left wing low attitude, tearing off
the left wing, before sliding along the ground for about 65 m and
coming to rest on runway 28.
The airport groundsman reached the accident site quickly, and
shortly after was joined by three other people, all of whom
assisted the injured. A fire truck arrived at the site 15 to 20
minutes after the accident and an ambulance arrived in about 30
minutes.
The pilot and passengers remained strapped in their seat belts
throughout the accident. The pilot, front seat passenger, and a
passenger occupying the rear left seat suffered fatal injuries. The
three remaining passengers suffered serious injuries. Those who
sustained the least injuries were the two passengers in the two aft
facing centre seats.
Five minutes after the accident the automatic weather station at
King Island airport recorded the wind velocity as 059 degrees at 18
kts, gusting to 25 kts. The outside air temperature was 20.6
degrees Celsius. Conditions were described by a witness as sunny,
with no cloud and good visibility. A pilot who took off from King
Island about 30 minutes after the accident reported experiencing
strong wind gusts and windshear.
The pilot held a valid private pilot licence endorsed for
single-engine aeroplanes below 5,700 kg maximum takeoff weight,
equipped with retractable undercarriage and constant speed
propeller. She had a total flying experience of 172 hours,
including 7.7 hours in the Piper Lance, and 1.2 hours in a Piper
Cherokee Six.
An investigation subsequently found no defects with the airframe
or engine that may have contributed to the accident. The landing
gear was extended at impact, consistent with the position of the
landing gear selector. The wing flaps were set 10 degrees down, and
the engine had been producing power.
The pilot's seat was found locked on its rails in a position
appropriate for the pilot's size when controlling the aircraft. The
aircraft was equipped with the standard manual trim wheel on the
floor as well as an electric trim switch on the pilot's control
column. The stabilator trim setting, evidenced by the indicator in
the cockpit, and confirmed by the trim jack position, was found
slightly forward of neutral.
An emergency locator transmitter (ELT) located in the rear
fuselage was armed but had not activated on impact. Subsequent
tests found the ELT to have been serviceable. The reason why the
ELT did not activate was not determined. The pilot also carried a
marine EPIRB for the over-water Bass Strait crossing between King
Island and Moorabbin.
Fuel records indicate that the pilot probably departed Moorabbin
with full fuel tanks and subsequently took off from King Island
with an estimated 286 L of AVGAS remaining.
During the night after the accident police weighed most of the
bags found on the aircraft. They described the baggage as having
been dampened externally by fire-fighting foam, leaving the
contents dry. A small amount of gear remained with the wreckage
until the following day. Rain saturated some of this remaining
gear. Two of the survivors subsequently attempted to recall where
the baggage had been positioned in the aircraft prior to the
accident. They also provided estimates of baggage weights. Their
recall was enhanced because the pilot had insisted they weigh
themselves and their baggage using scales before the flight. These
scales were reported to over-read slightly. No evidence was found
that passengers had added unweighed items to their luggage. The
gear carried in the nose locker was estimated to total about half
of the 45 kg allowable weight. The weight of gear behind the rear
seats ranged from about 35 kg using passenger estimates, to
possibly 83 kg using the police weights, which included an unknown
factor for dampness. The maximum allowable baggage weight behind
the rear seats was 45 kg. Several items of luggage were distributed
throughout the cabin.
Using the baggage weights recalled by the passengers, the
estimated takeoff weight at King Island was probably slightly below
the maximum allowable. Using the damp baggage weights provided by
the police, the aircraft may have been up to 48 kg above the
maximum allowable takeoff weight.
The aircraft was originally fitted with a two-bladed propeller.
Records show that in 1994 a three-bladed propeller was fitted,
which was 7.2 kg heavier. An approved supplement for the
three-bladed propeller was included in the flight manual, but a
revised weight and balance sheet referred to in the supplement, was
missing. The additional weight of the three bladed propeller would
have had the effect of offsetting a tail-heavy condition rather
than aggravating it.
Because of the disruption to the baggage following the accident
and associated rescue efforts, and because of doubt as to the exact
location of individual items of baggage and the unknown weight
factor for the damp baggage, it was impossible to accurately
determine the position of the aircraft centre of gravity. Based on
information provided by the passengers, the centre of gravity was
probably within the aft limit. Using baggage weights provided by
the police, the centre of gravity could have been slightly less
than 7 mm aft of the approved limit at the time of the accident.
The pilot was reported to have been familiar with weight and
balance calculations.
The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the PA-32-300 contains a
general statement which indicates that if the centre of gravity is
too far aft an aircraft may rotate prematurely on takeoff, or tend
to pitch up during climb, with an associated reduction in
longitudinal stability. This can lead to inadvertent stalls and
even spins, with spin recovery becoming more difficult as the
centre of gravity moves aft of the approved limit. The handbook
also states: "The stall characteristics of the Cherokee Lance are
conventional. An approaching stall is indicated by a stall warning
horn which is activated between 5 and 10 kts above stall speed".
One of the surviving passengers described the last sounds she heard
before impact as a beeping noise.
The Pilot's Operating Handbook provided takeoff ground roll data
based on either flaps up or flaps 25 degrees down. At maximum
allowable gross weight with flaps up, under the prevailing
conditions, the calculated ground roll was about 415 m for the
takeoff at King Island. In accordance with the Approved Flight
Manual for the aircraft, the maximum permissible crosswind
component for takeoff and landing was 17 kts. The estimated
crosswind component for the takeoff ranged between 16kts and 23
kts.
