The handling pilot was undergoing a scheduled 6-monthly
proficiency check in the Learjet, under the supervision of an
experienced instructor who occupied the right control seat. The
flight was planned to depart from Essendon and proceed to the
Ripley locator, for an entry into the holding pattern, before
making a locator approach to Avalon. Three touch-and-go circuits
were planned at Avalon, including one 700-ft asymmetric low level
circuit following a simulated engine failure at V1. The aircraft
was then to return to Essendon via the Plenty locator for an
instrument landing system (ILS) approach.
The instructor briefed the exercise in detail and, because the
pilot under check had low experience in the Learjet, it was decided
that the instructor would handle all radio communications and
conduct the necessary check sequences. The instructor also
indicated that it was company policy for the aircraft be landed
with less than full flap during an asymmetric landing. The aircraft
was to be landed with flap 20 at Vref +10 kts.
The flight proceeded normally up to the point of the simulated
engine failure at V1. When the instructor simulated a right engine
failure by placing the thrust lever in the IDLE position, the
aircraft drifted to the right. Intervention by the instructor
enabled the aircraft to return to balanced flight. The handling
pilot continued to carry out the 700-ft circuit in the
after-takeoff configuration of gear UP and flap 8. Flap 20 was
selected during the base turn. The aircraft was flared normally
with both thrust levers in the IDLE position. As the aircraft
settled, a slight vibration was noticed, and both pilots became
aware that the landing gear was still selected UP. Go-round power
was applied and the aircraft climbed away. The landing gear was
cycled normally and the aircraft returned for a full stop landing.
A subsequent inspection of the aircraft showed that the only
evidence of a runway strike was abrasion of the lower fuselage
mounted very high frequency (VHF) blade antenna.
A subsequent investigation revealed that the pilot under check
was allocated one hour of Learjet flying every 3 months. The
instructor had selected the flight sequences to give the pilot the
maximum handling exposure in the limited time available. In doing
so, the normal two-crew, challenge and response routines were
abandoned and the checks had to be accomplished by the instructor
alone. The instructor became distracted by the asymmetric handling
issues, and the demands of the low-level circuit, subsequently
forgetting the relevant downwind and pre-landing checks. The
handling pilot, who had been absorbed with controlling the
aircraft, had lost situational awareness and did not notice the
lack of check procedures by the instructor, or the lack of a
positive gear-down indication.
The approach had been carried out with flap 20 extended, rather
than full flap (flap 40), because the operator had previously
experienced a partial loss of control during training when
attempting an asymmetric go-around at flap 40. However, with flap
20 selected, the landing gear warning system was inhibited,
contributing to the late realisation that the landing gear was not
extended. The flap 20 asymmetric approach configuration was not in
accordance with the manufacturer's flight manual
recommendations.
