Earlier on the day of the accident the pilot had flown the
aircraft to Stanthorpe before returning to Casino at about 1100
EST. He had refuelled the aircraft with approximately 60 litres of
Mogas (automotive fuel) immediately prior to departure at about
1250. The aircraft was approved to operate on Mogas.
The last confirmed radio transmission from the pilot after he
departed Casino was at 1332 when he reported to Air Traffic
Services (ATS) that he was 62 NM from Archerfield, maintaining
4,500 ft. A search was mounted for the aircraft after it was
reported overdue on the flight to Archerfield. The following two
days of the search were hampered by low dense cloud in the area.
Several pilots of overflying aircraft reported hearing
transmissions from an emergency locator transmitter in the area of
Mt Chingee, near the Queensland-New South Wales border.
Searchers located the wreckage of the aircraft early on the
third day of the search, at approximately 2,500 ft AMSL, in densely
wooded terrain on the slopes of Mt Chingee. The pilot did not
survive the accident. The area where the wreckage was located was
known to be a popular poor weather route for VFR traffic through
the area.
The Bureau of Meteorology analysed the weather conditions in the
area of Mt Chingee on the day of the accident. The analysis
indicated that low cloud and probably precipitation would have
prevailed at the time of the accident. Residents in the area
reported weather conditions consistent with the Bureau of
Meteorology analysis.
The Bureau did not conduct an on-site examination for this
investigation. An assessment of the aircraft wreckage was carried
out using police photographs and video footage. The following
assessment is based on the photographic and documented evidence.
The aircraft attitude at impact and the damage sustained by the
airframe and propeller suggest that the aircraft was in near level
flight when it first struck trees. This suggests it was probably
under control. The majority of the airframe was severely disrupted
by impact forces. The type of torque twisting of both propeller
blades and the manner in which the propeller hub separated from the
engine, indicate that the engine was developing significant power
at impact. The aircraft had a current Maintenance Release that
showed no outstanding maintenance requirements.
The last altitude and position report given by the pilot, placed
the aircraft at 4,500 ft, approximately 7 NM or about 3 minutes
flight time from the accident site. The site was approximately
2,500 ft AMSL.
The pilot usually kept his personal logbook and the aircraft
records in the aircraft. None of these records were recovered for
examination. Records held by the Civil Aviation Authority show that
he held a Private Pilot Licence. He did not hold an instrument
rating. His total aeronautical experience was approximately 650
hours. He held a night VMC rating however, it could not be
established if the pilot ever exercised the privileges of the
rating.
The investigation established that the pilot commonly worked
long hours in demanding employment. A Human Factors specialist
assessed the pilot's known workload. The specialist advised that
the pilot was likely to have experienced sleep deprivation and high
workload in the two days preceding the accident. When these factors
are combined, fatigue, whether of an acute or a chronic nature,
will eventually be experienced. The effects of fatigue on
performance vary from individual to individual and may include:
poor judgement and decision making, increased reaction times,
mental haziness or lethargy, and a general decrement in psychomotor
performance.
The investigation sought the assistance of a specialist in
Aviation Medicine for the interpretation and analysis of the
pilot's post-mortem report toxicological results which indicated
the presence of prescription drugs. This was done to determine the
possible effects these drugs would have on the pilot's ability to
safely operate an aircraft. Prescription drugs used alone or in
combination may seriously interfere with an individual's ability to
safely operate an aircraft, particularly as a single pilot in bad
weather. The pilot should have been aware of the potentially
serious hazards of using these medications in the flight
environment. A review of the CASA aircrew medical examinations of
this pilot could find no evidence of any recorded medical problems
warranting the use of the drugs described in the toxicology
report.
