Boeing Co 737-376 , VH-TJA

1. The ADSO did not send a hard copy departure message on the B737's flight.
2. The ADSO was a trainee and was not adequately supervised.
3. The Sector 1 handover/takeover involved poor inter-controller communication and coordination.
4. The oncoming Sector 1 controller did not pass coordination of the B737's TAMOD position report to the Perth Outer controller.
5. There was a lack of appropriate procedures in relation to the departure processing task and the handover/takeover task.

Although there was no breakdown in separation, this incident involved a serious breakdown in coordination that resulted in a B737 not being under effective air traffic control from 0858 EST until after the radar return was identified at 0947. Had the Perth controller not detected the problem, there would have been a breakdown of separation. Although the two aircraft would have both been to the east of TAMOD at the time of passing, and therefore on different routes, this situation was not planned.

The incident directly resulted from a combination of active failures. The two most significant errors were: (a) the omission of a hard copy departure message via the AFTN; and (b) the omission of any coordination on the aircraft from the Melbourne Sector 1 controller.

Processing the Hard Copy Departure Message

Had the trainee ADSO sent the departure message via the AFTN, Perth control would have activated the flight progress strips and, therefore, been better prepared to detect the missing coordination on an aircraft from Melbourne Sector 1. This error consequently removed an important safety defence.

Factors that contributed to the missing AFTN message included:

1. the aircraft movement advice form being incomplete, and therefore not providing an appropriate cue; high workload;
2. insufficiently detailed task procedures; and
3. a lack of direct supervision of the trainee ADSO.

It is likely that the supervising ADSO became too involved in the operation of departure processing tasks to be able to effectively monitor the trainee's performance.

Passing Coordination of the TAPAX Position Report

The omission of the oncoming Sector 1 controller to pass coordination on the B737 to the Perth outer controller meant that the Perth controller had no forewarning of the arrival of that aircraft into his airspace. Therefore, this error increased the likelihood of a breakdown of separation standards. Although the Perth controller did detect the problem in sufficient time to avoid a breakdown in separation, it is likely that such a detection would not usually occur.

Factors that contributed to the omission included the absence of clear communication between the departing Sector 1 controller and the oncoming controller as to who would pass the coordination, and the inability of the departing controller to remain available to ensure the oncoming controller was fully briefed. More specific handover/takeover procedures could have reduced the likelihood of these factors. The development of appropriate teamwork and team resource management programs would also help reduce the likelihood of such inter-controller coordination and communication failures.

The coordination omission was also partly a result of the inherent nature of the task. It was probably an action slip, or an error where the controller's actions did not proceed as planned. More specifically, the error appeared to be a substitution of one highly automatic task (asking the B737's flight crew to transfer frequency at TAMOD) for another (passing coordination on the B737 crew's TAPAX report to the Perth Outer controller). Such substitution slips are usually associated with a period of inattention or distraction. In this case, the controller may have been distracted by the call from another flight crew immediately before she performed the task. As the controller had only been working on the sector for a few minutes, she could also have been distracted by her scanning and familiarisation activities.

An increase in the likelihood of skill-based errors is often correlated with fatigue. In this case, the controller had a less than normal amount of sleep in the 2 nights prior to the incident. However, the investigation was unable to determine if fatigue influenced the controller's performance at the time of the occurrence.

There were cues available to alert the Sector 1 controller to the error, such as the times on the TAMOD strip and the absence of a tick in the last box of the TAPAX strip. However, having developed the intention to conduct a frequency-transfer task, it is unlikely that the controller would have considered checking times on a strip. In addition, research has shown that the absence of a cue (such as a tick) is often not detected. Shortly after the error occurred, the controller disposed of the flight strips and effectively removed any remaining cues she could use to detect the error.

With the introduction of The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS) throughout Australia in 1998 and 1999, the likelihood of this specific type of error should be reduced. Transfers of aircraft between sectors will be conducted automatically. In addition, for procedural control sectors such as Sector 1, the spatial positions of aircraft will be pictorially displayed. It is reasonable to expect that these changes will reduce the likelihood of a controller incorrectly perceiving the position of an aircraft.

Flight Levels

The westbound A320, VH-HYA, was maintaining a non-standard flight level (FL370) which resulted in an eastbound A320, VH-HYR, being given a non-standard level (FL350) for the initial level clearance. This consequential action had the effect of placing VH-HYR in direct conflict with the B737. Had standard levels been applied on the two-way route system that was under procedural control, a safety net would have been put in place. This net would have become prominent had the Perth controller not observed the radar paint of the B737.

At 0627 EST, a Boeing 737 (B737) departed Melbourne for Perth.
Melbourne Sector Inner West advised Melbourne centre of the
departure. An airways data systems operator (ADSO) received this
information and notified Adelaide centre of the departure by
intercom. He then activated the flight strips for Melbourne Sector
1 and delivered these strips to this sector. A hard copy departure
message should also have been sent via the Aeronautical Fixed
Telecommunications Network (AFTN) to all units affected by the
flight, but this task was not completed. As a result, Perth Air
Traffic Control did not receive any notification that the aircraft
had departed.

For much of its flight to Perth, the B737 was on route L513 and
was under the control of Melbourne Sector 1, a procedural control
sector. This sector was combined with Sector 5 until approximately
0850 when it was decided to split the two sectors. The departing
controller proceeded to hand over control of Sector 1 to the
oncoming controller, but kept control of Sector 5.

At 0853 EST, during the Sector 1 handover/takeover, the crew of
the B737 reported having passed TAPAX (a position reporting point
523 NM east of Perth) at 0852. They also reported that they were
maintaining FL350, and estimating TAMOD (a position reporting point
153 NM east of Perth) at 0951. The departing controller took the
position report and appropriately marked the flight strips. The
report was required to be passed to the Perth Outer controller, as
the sector boundary was 10 NM east of TAMOD. This coordination task
was not done.

The departing Sector 1 controller later reported that he did not
perform the coordination task as he assumed that the oncoming
controller would do it. He also reported that he did not
specifically point out the need for the oncoming controller to
perform this task, but assumed that she had heard the position
report and understood that it needed to be done. The oncoming
controller later reported that she could not remember hearing the
position report. Neither controller could recall whether the
relevant flight strip had been cocked on the flight progress board
to indicate that there was an outstanding task to be performed.

The oncoming controller took control of Sector 1 at 0856. Soon
after taking over, Perth control contacted her to advise that an
eastbound Airbus 320 (A320), VH-HYJ, was about to transfer to her
frequency and that the crew would soon contact her. This crew
contacted her at 0857. At 0858, immediately after taking this
crew's report, the controller contacted the westbound B737's crew
and advised them to contact Perth at TAMOD. This frequency-transfer
task was normally performed when the aircraft was 5 minutes from
TAMOD, or 0946 in this case. Shortly after performing this task,
the controller removed the B737's flight strips from the flight
progress board. This action was normal practice for filing the
flight strips after an aircraft had left the Sector 1 area of
responsibility.

At 0929 EST, another eastbound A320, VH-HYR, departed from Perth
for Melbourne. The aircraft was planned on route L513 until TAMOD,
before turning onto the one-way route Y53. The estimate for TAMOD
was 0953. The Perth controller informed Sector 1 of the departure.
He advised that the aircraft had planned FL370 but that he
recommended restricting the aircraft to non-standard FL350 due to a
westbound A320, VH-HYA, at non-standard FL370 and estimating TAMOD
at 1006. The Sector 1 controller agreed with this restriction.

Although having the air traffic under his jurisdiction
procedurally separated, the Perth Outer controller checked the
radar at 0941 and observed a return approximately 220 NM east of
Perth (67 NM east of TAMOD). As the displayed information was based
on extreme range returns, it was considered unreliable. However, it
indicated a westbound jet aircraft at FL350. The controller checked
his coordinated and pending traffic, but was unable to identify the
aircraft.

At 0943, Perth Outer contacted Melbourne Sector 1 to report the
return and ask whether she knew its identity. The Sector 1
controller was not aware of any aircraft in that area other than
HYA, the westbound A320 that was 15 minutes behind the position of
the unknown aircraft. Perth suggested restricting HYR to FL330
until the problem could be rectified. Another Perth controller
advised HYR's crew of the problem. At 0946, Perth Outer directed
the crew to divert to the left of track, as the observed radar
return's altitude was still unverified.

With the assistance of other controllers, the Sector 1
controller retrieved the used flight strips and identified the
return as the B737. The relevant information was reported to Perth
Outer at 0947. The aircraft was then transferred to the Perth
controller.

As the A320 had been restricted to FL330 and diverted left of
track, there was no breakdown in separation. The two aircraft
passed each other at 0950:01. HYR passed TAMOD at 0949, and the
B737 reached TAMOD at 0951. Analysis of the radar tape indicated
that HYR would have reached FL350 between 0949:20 and 0950:20. The
B737 was fitted with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System.

Departure Message Processing

After receiving the B737's departure notification from Melbourne
Sector Inner West, the ADSO annotated the callsign, departure
point, destination and departure time on an aircraft movement
advice form before advising Adelaide of the departure. However,
this information was not entered in the appropriate boxes on the
form and the SSR code was not entered. In addition, various
unnecessary items were written on the form, including the numbers
of four AFTN messages that had been sent around the time that the
B737's departure was being processed.

The ADSO who took the departure notification was a trainee. He
was required to be directly supervised during his task performance,
but this supervision was not present at the time the departure was
being processed. It was later reported that workload was high at
the time of the departure, and that the trainee and the supervising
ADSO were both performing departure processing tasks.

Prior to the incident, the tasks required to process a departure
were specified in written procedures, but they were not all
specified in the same procedural documentation. The order in which
the tasks should be performed was not specified in any procedural
documentation.

Sector 1 Handover/Takeover

Sector 5 was in the process of being transferred from the Bight
Group, which also had Sectors 1 and 4, to the Desert Group. A
console for Sector 5 had been set up in the Desert Group's area,
and the controllers in that group were currently being trained in
Sector 5 operations. Until the transfer was completed, Sector 5
could also be operated from Sector 1's console.

Immediately after the oncoming controller took over Sector 1,
the departing controller took the flight strips for Sector 5 and
arranged them on the relevant flight progress board in the Desert
Group. He then proceeded to conduct a training session on Sector 5
for another controller.

It is desirable for a controller to perform all outstanding
tasks prior to handing over to another controller, but this is not
always practical. In this case, several tasks had to be conducted
during the handover/takeover and the workload level was
significant. Both the departing and the oncoming controller
reported that the handover of Sector 1 appeared to be well
conducted. Prior to the incident, there was no written procedure
that detailed all of the required tasks to be performed during a
handover/takeover.

Sector Boundary

The boundary between Melbourne Sector 1 and Perth Outer was
approximately 10 NM east of the reporting point TAMOD (163 NM east
of Perth). The range of the relevant radar was typically 220 NM to
the east of Perth between FL330 and FL370. The Perth controller was
therefore able to see to approximately 50 or 60 NM east of TAMOD at
high flight levels. The air route structure had been redesigned
with the intention of the Perth radar being used to its full
potential, but the sector boundary had not been changed.

Personnel Information

The oncoming Sector 1 controller commenced duty at 0700 on the
morning of the incident. She finished duty on her previous shift at
2030 the previous night. As she lived 90 minutes from her place of
work, she had only slept 5 hours during the night before the
incident. Due to other factors, she had slept even less during the
previous night.

In addition to not passing coordination on the B737, the
oncoming controller made three minor errors during the period after
she took over Sector 1 until the Perth Outer controller detected
the incident. These errors were an attempt to call HYA on the wrong
frequency, and two occasions of contacting the wrong Adelaide
controller (as she forgot that the relevant Adelaide sectors were
combined). There were no other problems noted with any aspect of
her performance or behaviour during this period.

Neither of the Sector 1 controllers had received any training in
the use of teamwork or team resource management skills.