Cessna Aircraft Company 210M, VH-NXC

Witness reports indicate that the pilot had established the
aircraft below the cloud layer some distance from Jerilderie. The
most likely reason for this was in order to make a visual approach
to Jerilderie. However, in the area of the cold front, instrument
meteorological conditions extended from the base of the cloud layer
to the ground. With visibility rapidly reducing, the pilot had the
option of continuing straight ahead and climbing in instrument
meteorological conditions to the lower safe altitude of 3,300 ft,
or turning back to remain in visual conditions. The pilot initiated
a left turn and entered instrument meteorological conditions close
to the ground. The turn would have required the pilot to fly with
sole reference to flight instruments. The transition from visual
flight to flight by sole reference to instruments may take several
seconds, and an aircraft in a turn will generally loose altitude
until the pilot takes corrective action. However, as the aircraft
was at low altitude when it began the turn, it probably struck the
ground before the pilot had completed his transition to instrument
flight.

Although the pilot held an instrument rating, he had minimal
experience of flight in actual instrument meteorological
conditions. He may not have experienced the conditions that
confronted him on this occasion. The combination of rapidly
deteriorating weather, gusting winds and low altitude in
conjunction with low experience and recency with actual flight in
instrument meteorological conditions, would have required a high
level of skill and experience.

On the morning of the accident, the pilot reported for duty
between 0630 and 0645 in order to have his aircraft prepared by
0700 for the day's task. The aircraft had been refuelled the night
before, as was the company standard practice. After loading the
freight onto the aircraft, he departed Wagga for Jerilderie at 0804
with an estimate for Jerilderie of 0845. The aircraft had full fuel
and 115 kg of freight. The flight was a standard company "Run 46".
The flight plan indicated that the flight was to be conducted in
the IFR category at 4,000 ft with a minimum safe altitude for the
route to be flown of 3,300 ft.

At 0838 the pilot contacted Melbourne Flight Service (FS) and
advised that he was 15 miles east of Jerilderie and would commence
descent in one minute. FS responded that there was no reported IFR
traffic. There was nothing further heard from the pilot after he
acknowledged this transmission.

An eyewitness working near the maintenance shed on the property
Bungoona, under the flight path and north of the accident site,
observed the aircraft at an estimated altitude of 100 m (328 ft).
The witness described the weather conditions as misty rain, like a
very thick fog or low cloud. This observation is consistent with
other witnesses in the vicinity of the accident site who heard but
did not see the aircraft. It was observed to bank to the left and
the witness lost sight of it as it passed behind the shed. He heard
an explosion, ran to the other side of the shed and saw a ball of
smoke. The time of the aircraft impact was approximately 0843.

Examination of the accident site and wreckage found that the
aircraft had initially struck a small tree, before impacting the
ground in a left turn with 13 degrees angle of bank and 52 degrees
nose down. The aircraft broke up initiating a fire that consumed
the fuel and much of the wreckage and freight. The centerline of
the wreckage splay was 061 degrees magnetic and the wreckage trail
was approximately 60 m in length, starting from the impact
crater.

Examination of the wreckage did not find any pre-existing
defects or malfunctions that would have precluded other than normal
operation. The maintenance records showed that the aircraft had
completed periodic maintenance on 9 June 1997. There were no
outstanding maintenance action items at the time of the accident.
The aircraft was due to undergo scheduled maintenance later in the
week of the accident. Impact marks on the propeller and the nature
of the blade damage indicated that the engine was operating under
power at impact.

The pilot was the holder of a Commercial Pilots Licence and he
was appropriately qualified for the flight. He was issued with an
initial instrument rating on 15 December 1996 for single engine
aircraft. He subsequently gained a Multi Engine Command Instrument
Rating on 17 June 1997. He had accrued approximately 563 hours
total flight time, with approximately 58 hours flight time using
instruments as a sole reference. This information was obtained from
the company computer "Duty Flight Times" log, as the pilot's
logbook was destroyed in the accident. There were no entries for
hours flown since 17 August 1997.

The specialist Bureau of Meteorology report, advised that
conditions at the time of the accident were a cold front passing
through the Deniliquin/Jerilderie district. The frontal change had
passed through Jerilderie at 0843 hours EST and would have been
approaching the accident site. The wind was 270 degrees magnetic,
15 gusting to 25 knots with some localised moderate turbulence
associated with the passage of the change. The visibility was 4,000
m reducing to 2,000 m with moderate showers and light rain. The
temperature was 8 degrees C and the barometric pressure was 1020
hPa.

The calculated aircraft weight at take-off, was 1477 kg with a
maximum allowable weight of 1724 kg. The aircraft was within the
weight and centre of gravity limits at the time of the
accident.

Jerilderie aerodrome does not have a published instrument
approach procedure. If the pilot was unable to make an approach in
visual conditions, the company policy was for the pilot to proceed
to Deniliquin.