Two aircraft had departed runway 35, and VH-SLW had commenced a takeoff. On reaching about 50 knots the pilot noticed the lights of VH-JMZ on final approach for runway 17 at about 200 feet above ground level. The pilot of VH-SLW stated that he expected the pilot of VH-JMZ to carry out a missed approach, and although his immediate reaction was to abort the takeoff, he decided to continue as the aircraft was accelerating rapidly and going too fast to safely vacate the runway. The pilot of VH-JMZ executed a short field landing and stopped short of the runway 08 intersection. VH-SLW became airborne and passed over the top of VH-JMZ at about 90 knots and 80 feet above the runway. The pilot of VH-JMZ acknowledged a taxiing call from VH-SLW when he was mid downwind for runway 17, but the pilot of VH-SLW did not hear this acknowledgement and was unaware of the presence of VH-JMZ. The second pilot in VH-SLW was not monitoring radio transmissions at the time.
The orientation of the aircraft prior to entering the runway was such that the pilots in VH-SLW were unable to see the downwind leg of runway 17 before they lined up. A review of the ATS tape recordings show that the pilot of VH-SLW did not make a radio transmission to advise traffic that he was lining up on runway 35 or that he was beginning his takeoff roll. While on downwind for runway 17, the pilot of VH-JMZ had communicated with Cessna 210 VH-APU which was departing from runway 35, so that separation could be maintained with this aircraft. Once VH-APU was clear the pilot of VH-JMZ continued his approach, with the expectation that the runway would not be occupied. After advising VH-SLW that he was mid downwind, the pilot of VH-JMZ did not transmit his position in the circuit. Just before landing he questioned the actions of the pilot of VH-SLW. The pilot of VH-JMZ reported that when he first saw VH-SLW on the runway he thought the aircraft was back-tracking and would vacate the runway, but then realised that the aircraft was in fact taking off towards him. He believed that he was committed to land and could not carry out an overshoot once below 400 feet. He was aware that VH-SLW was occupying the runway when he landed.
Significant Factors
During the landing and takeoff sequence of VH-JMZ and VH-SLW, the pilots placed their respective aircraft in a risk of collision situation.
Safety Action
Deficiencies identified during this investigation, including operational practices at uncontrolled aerodromes, are being analysed in conjunction with other occurrences in order to formulate appropriate safety actions.