The aircraft was cleared via Kinglake and Epping for a landing on runway 27 at Melbourne. The aircraft proceeded south of the cleared track and did not comply with heading change instructions from Melbourne Tower to get the aircraft back on track. The aircraft was transferred back to approach control where it was vectored and descended for a landing on runway 34. There was no breakdown in separation. Investigation determined that on the approach to Melbourne there was confusion in the cockpit between the two crew members. En route the captain had asked the first officer to request runway 34. This had not been done. From some distance out the captain was planning to land on runway 34 but the first officer was basing his actions on a landing on runway 27. It was established that the ILS selectors were tuned to 109.3 which is the runway 27 ILS frequency but it was not established exactly how communication between the captain and the first officer broke down to the extent that they both thought they were going to land on different runways. Significant Factors The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident: There was confusion between the captain and the first officer as to which runway they were going to land on.