Source: Google Earth, annotated by ATSB

A collision involving a track worker and a passenger train at Petrie Station, north of Brisbane, highlights the need for sufficient resources, including time, information about the work environment, train movements and adequate protection to minimise risk to rail workers, a new ATSB investigation report says.

Late in the evening on 29 May 2017, a passenger train approaching Petrie Station from the north struck and fatally injured a Queensland Rail (QR) protection officer. He was part of a team of four protection officers implementing a planned track closure for maintenance of the Kippa-Ring rail corridor from Petrie Station to Kippa-Ring station. The protection officers were using personal continual vigilance (PCV), which requires track workers to see that tracks are clear, frequently look in both directions for approaching rail traffic and not rely on another person to give warning, when walking within three metres of a track (known as the Danger Zone).

The protection officer had placed permanent way protection* to warn approaching train drivers to stop and mark the outer limits of protection for the track maintenance worksite on the Kippa-Ring lines. The collision occurred while the protection officer was walking on the Up Caboolture line, which was open for rail traffic and not part of the track maintenance worksite.

The ATSB’s investigation found that the protection officer did not apply personal continual vigilance techniques while walking within the track Danger Zone. The investigation noted that while it was evident that immediately prior to the collision the protection officer’s attention was diverted by the mobile phone clipped to the front of his shirt illuminating, the protection officer was already in a position of danger with a collision imminent by this point, and the direction he was walking meant that his back was facing the train involved in the collision.  

This investigation highlights that to minimise risk, rail organisations should ensure processes relating to track work include provisions for protection officers to have sufficient resources, including time for task, information about the work environment, including train movements, and adequate protection available for the work.

“Although the reasons why the protection officer did not apply continual vigilance techniques could not be determined, it was possible that he had no expectation of rail traffic, and a number of factors that increased risk were identified,” ATSB Director Transport Safety Dr Godley said.

Those factors included time pressures, protection officers not being familiar with the new rail infrastructure layout at Petrie Station for the Kippa-Ring line (which officially opened in October 2016), no processes being in place for ensuring adequate time for protection officers to familiarise themselves with new or changed work sites, and the night shift protection officer supervisor inadvertently marking some open lines as closed on the Train Notice Diagram for Petrie Station that was used by the protection officers. Independent verification of the Train Notice Diagram was not undertaken, and so that error was not identified.

“This investigation highlights that to minimise risk, rail organisations should ensure processes relating to track work include provisions for protection officers to have sufficient resources, including time for task, information about the work environment, including train movements, and adequate protection available for the work,” Dr Godley said.

In response to the accident, QR have commissioned a number of independent reviews on its safe work on track processes and practices, including the use and selection of personal continual vigilance, mobile devices in the rail corridor and its worksite protection compliance inspection systems.

QR have also re-enforced the message of ‘the right to stop work and getting safety right before commencing’ as part of its ongoing network pre-start brief project.

* Permanent way protection: One or more devices approved by Access Providers that provide warning to protect rail traffic crew and workers. The device or devices may be used in conjunction with signalling or blocking facilities.

Read the report: Running line collision with worker involving passenger train T570, Petrie, Queensland, on 29 May 2017

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